





THE GIFT OF TONGUES

THE GIFT OF TONGUES

AND OTHER ESSAYS

BY THE

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TO
MY MOTHER

CONTENTS



| | |
|--|------|
| I. | PAGE |
| THE GIFT OF TONGUES | 1 |
| II. | |
| THE LEGAL TERMINOLOGY IN THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS | 81 |
| III. | |
| ST. PAUL'S VISITS TO JERUSALEM, AS RECORDED IN THE ACTS AND IN THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS . | 177 |
| IV. | |
| THE DATE OF ST. LUKE AND ACTS | 215 |

PREFACE

THE essays in this volume deal only with the writings of St. Paul and St. Luke. They make no ambitious claims, for they neither provide new materials nor advance very novel theories. It is rather their aim, by a careful review, in each case, of recent work, to show that more conservative positions are still tenable.

This is perhaps the most suitable place in which to say a word of necessary explanation about each.

I had worked out the general idea of the first essay, and collected much of the material before coming across Dr. Wright's book, *Some New Testament Problems*, in which he too discusses "The Gift of Tongues." Corroboration of one's view by so eminent a scholar was a strong additional support. I was glad to avail myself of his illustrative instances, my indebtedness for which is acknowledged in the footnotes.

In the second essay, perhaps the chief element of interest to those who are occupied with the

study of the Pauline writings will be the exposition of Halmel's *Über römisches Recht im Galaterbrief*. So far as I know, no full account of this has hitherto been given in English.

The third essay attempts to show that Lightfoot's view about the identity of the visit of Acts 15¹⁻²⁹ with that of Galatians 2¹⁻¹⁰ remains—in spite of more recent criticisms—still unshaken. It is interesting to observe that Rendall, who has edited Galatians in the third volume of the *Expositors' Greek Testament*, strongly supports this view.

The fourth essay seems almost to need a word of apology. When Sanday, Ramsay, Knowling and Bartlet are in general agreement about the later date of Acts, it seems slightly presumptuous still to uphold the earlier one. I have attempted, however, to state the arguments that seem to me to be most convincing. That Salmon and Blass should combine to support a view is a matter of no small weight in its favour. I must acknowledge, however, my special obligations to an article by the Rev. R. B. Rackham in the *Journal of Theological Studies* (vol. i.), which first led me to reconsider the claims of the earlier date.

DAWSON WALKER.

DURHAM, February 1906.

I.

THE GIFT OF TONGUES.

ἤρξαντο λαλεῖν ἑτέραις γλώσσαις.

ACTS 2⁴.

I.

THE GIFT OF TONGUES.

IT is not the aim of this essay to discuss in detail the whole question of "the gift of tongues," but rather to examine with some care one or two particular aspects of it. There is hardly any other phenomenon of the Apostolic age of which it is so difficult to form a clear and accurate impression ; and the more fully one considers the available evidence the more one is inclined to suspend judgment on many features of the case. The difficulties are increased by the fact that there is an apparent contradiction between the two principal authorities as to the essential character of the gift. St. Luke in the Acts of the Apostles, and St. Paul in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, are practically our sole informants upon the nature and working of this spiritual gift, and one of the chief difficulties of the problem is to reconcile their apparently discrepant accounts of the phenomenon. It is

admitted on all hands that what St. Luke describes in Acts 2 is a divinely bestowed power of speaking in foreign languages; whereas the glossolalia of 1 Corinthians 12-14 seems to have been rapt ecstatic utterance, unintelligible and needing interpretation—but not necessarily involving the use of foreign languages.

An impression appears to be gaining ground in many quarters that these diversities of presentation are so great as to be irreconcilable, and that therefore one or other of our two authorities must be accepted as historical and the other rejected as untrustworthy. It is becoming somewhat of a fashion in critical writings to elevate St. Paul at the expense of St. Luke; in the case of this particular topic to say that St. Paul must be regarded as the primary and trustworthy authority, and that the statements of St. Luke which do not harmonise with the evidence of St. Paul must be discounted as being due either to his misunderstanding, or even to his deliberate manipulation of the materials at his disposal.

This method of solving the difficulty seems to be both hasty and unscientific. If two witnesses give discrepant accounts of a com-

plicated matter of fact, it is but rough and ready procedure to rule out the evidence of one, and base the conclusion entirely on that of the other. There remains the possibility that fuller knowledge of the facts may shew that their evidence is complementary and not contradictory; till that fuller knowledge is forthcoming it is better to be content with a *non liquet* than to rush into a hasty and dogmatic verdict.

The purpose of this essay is, in a sense, an apologetic one, for it is written with the conviction of St. Luke's reliability as a historian. Its aim is to shew that when St. Luke tells us that on the Day of Pentecost those on whom the Holy Spirit was bestowed spoke in foreign languages, he is relating a fact which quite conceivably may have happened; that there is nothing antecedently impossible in it; that psychological research not only shews its possibility, but supplies us with interesting analogies; that as this was not the sole expression of the glossolalia, but only one particular form of it, there is no essential contradiction of St. Paul's account in 1 Corinthians; that the two sets of phenomena were generically the same, but specifically different. If this position can be maintained,

then St. Luke's reputation as an accurate narrator of matters of fact remains, so far as this episode is concerned, unimpaired.

I.

A brief survey and analysis of the available New Testament evidence is an indispensable preliminary to a discussion of the nature of the glossolalia. The following passages have to be taken into account :—

St. Mark 16¹⁷.

Acts 2¹⁻¹³.

„ 10⁴⁴⁻⁴⁶.

„ 11¹⁵.

„ 19⁶.

1 Corinthians 12. 13. 14. *passim*.

The passage in St. Mark is itself involved in too many uncertainties to be a reliable witness in this investigation. It forms part of the "last twelve verses" whose genuineness is so keenly debated. There is also in this particular passage a difficulty about the reading. The Revisers and Tischendorf read : *γλώσσαις λαλήσουσι καιναῖς*. But the evidence for *καιναῖς* is so extremely slender that WH. relegate it to the margin. In either case the problem is not

materially affected. If *καιναῖς* be retained, it is simply a variant for St. Luke's *ἐτέραις* in *ἐτέραις γλώσσαις*, and adds nothing to our knowledge; if it be omitted, then the phrase *γλώσσαις λαλήσουσιν* is merely a repetition of the phrase constantly used by St. Paul in 1 Corinthians, and throws no additional light on the nature of the utterances. If this "appendix" to St. Mark's Gospel should ever be proved to be a later writing, based on our existing New Testament books, there would be nothing unlikely in Schmiedel's suggestion that *καιναῖς* is deliberately substituted for St. Luke's *ἐτέραις* in Acts for the sake of greater clearness.

We turn now to examine the passages in Acts. Acts 2¹⁻¹³ is the record of the descent of the Holy Spirit on the assembled Christians on the Day of Pentecost; 10⁴⁴⁻⁴⁶ relates the story of the conversion of the household of Cornelius; 11¹⁵ is St. Peter's account of the same episode; 19⁶ describes the conversion of the twelve disciples of John the Baptist at Ephesus to full Christianity.

Each of these passages has a distinct interest of its own. In 10⁴⁴⁻⁴⁶ the simple Pauline phrase *λαλεῖν γλώσσαις* is used. Apparently the members of the household of Cornelius under

the influence of the Holy Spirit broke out into ecstatic speech and glorified God. ἤκουον γὰρ αὐτῶν λαλούντων γλώσσαις, καὶ μεγαλυνόντων τὸν Θεόν. The interest of St. Peter's account of the same episode in 11¹⁵ is, that though he does not actually use the phrase λαλεῖν γλώσσαις he distinctly identifies the manifestation of the Spirit with that of the Day of Pentecost: ἐπέπεσε τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ Ἅγιον ἐπ' αὐτούς ὥσπερ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ἐν ἁρχῇ. The point to be remarked in 19⁶ is that the glossolalia is there coupled with prophecy: ἦλθε τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ Ἅγιον ἐπ' αὐτούς, ἐλάλουν τε γλώσσαις καὶ προεφήτευον. In the case both of Cæsarea and Ephesus it is especially worthy of notice that the glossolalia is definitely connected with the first reception of Christianity. It is never referred to in Acts as being a normal part of the subsequent continuous worship of the Church, in the manner which seems to have prevailed at Corinth. On the strictly verbal side, however, there is no difficulty. If these references were the only allusions in Acts to the phenomenon, we should have no difficulty in reconciling St. Luke's account with that of St. Paul.

For this reason it may conduce to clearness if the accounts of the glossolalia in 1 Corinthians

be examined now, and St. Luke's record of the Day of Pentecost be afterwards compared with them. In 12⁴⁻¹¹ St. Paul gives a list of *χαρίσματα* that are bestowed by "the one and the same Spirit." At the end of this list—apparently as being last not only in order, but in importance—we have *γένη γλωσσῶν* and *ἐρμηνεία γλωσσῶν*. This slightly varying description of the phenomenon, *γένη γλωσσῶν*, is confined to this chapter, where it once reappears in v.²⁸. The mention of the "interpretation of tongues" is also confined to these chapters (12¹⁰⁻³⁰, 14 *passim*). In 12³⁰ the phrase *λαλεῖν γλώσσαις* first appears, and the phenomenon is again linked to that of interpretation. In 13¹ the words *ἐὰν ταῖς γλώσσαις τῶν ἀνθρώπων λαλῶ καὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων* are probably best regarded as a rhetorical amplification of the simpler *γένη γλωσσῶν*. In 13⁸ the simple plural *γλώσσαι* is used, when St. Paul says of the tongues that "they shall cease."

It is when we come to chapter 14 that we get the fullest amount of detail about the glossolalia, in St. Paul's comparison of it with the gift of prophecy. The whole chapter is full of exegetical difficulties. Even Chrysostom, speaking of this section of the Epistle (chaps. 12-14), says : *τοῦτο ἅπαν τὸ χωρίον σφόδρα ἐστὶν ἀσαφές* (257 E.). It

will be sufficient for our present purpose to indicate the following points. The speaker with "tongues" does not speak to his fellow-men,—as he does who prophecies,—but speaks to God ; hence he edifies himself, but not his fellow-men (14¹⁻⁴). The only exception to this is when the speaker himself (so apparently v.¹³) or some other (v.^{27f.}) is able to interpret. And one who uses the gift of tongues should pray that God would enable him to interpret.

The particular form of the "speech to God" appears to have been that of a prayer (vv.^{2.13.14.15}) or a thanksgiving (v.¹⁶). The language used was unintelligible to the hearers ; St. Paul compares it to the sound of a trumpet giving no clear call (vv.^{7.8}), and to the use of a foreign language (vv.^{10.11}). Further, the phrase *ὁ δὲ νοῦς μου ἄκαρπός ἐστι* seems to shew that ordinarily the speech was unintelligible to the speaker who used it. The fact that the speaker was "edified" seemed to be derived from his attitude of ecstatic devotion rather than from any exercise of his mental faculties in the reception or expression of ideas. Vv.^{5.13} seem to indicate that at Corinth interpretation was the exception rather than the rule. Hence we can see the reason for St. Paul's question (v.²³): "If . . . all

speak with tongues, and there come in men unlearned or unbelieving, will they not say that ye are mad?" The plural *γλῶσσαι* (in *γλώσσαις λαλεῖν*) and the alternative expression *γένη γλωσσῶν* point to the conclusion that there were different varieties of this "tongue speech." A general view of these passages seems to indicate that what is described is rapt ejaculatory prayer uttered during unrestrained emotion.

There is very little doubt that the phenomena thus described as existing at Corinth may be identified with those of Ephesus (Acts 19⁶) and Cæsarea (Acts 10⁴⁶). The juxtaposition of the glossolalia and prophecy forms a close link of connection with the episode at Ephesus; and St. Luke seems to imply an identity between the phenomenon at Ephesus and that of Cæsarea, by his explicit statement that in each case the phenomenon was connected with the reception of Christianity.

But in Acts 11¹⁵ St. Peter clearly identifies the phenomenon of Cæsarea with that of Pentecost. He was an eye-witness on both occasions, and therefore, on the ground of his testimony, we seem to have no alternative but to admit a fundamental and essential identity in the phenomenon throughout. But it must, on the

other hand, be clearly recognised that the narrative of Pentecost, while presenting features that are homogeneous with those of Cæsarea, Ephesus, and Corinth, has certain distinct peculiarities of its own.

Three points of distinction call for notice—

(1) “The sound as of the rushing of a mighty wind.”

(2) The “tongues parting asunder, like as of fire.”

(3) They all “began to speak with other tongues” (ἐτέραις γλώσσαις), and were understood by men of different nationalities, without the aid of any interpreter.

There can be very little doubt that ἐτέραις γλώσσαις in this context means *foreign languages*. Otherwise the long list of Jews from different countries, as well as of proselytes to Judaism, beginning with the astonished question: “How hear we, every man in our own language, wherein we were born?” and ending with the statement: “We do hear them speaking in our tongues the mighty works of God,” would be entirely pointless. The γλώσσαις of v.⁴ are in v.¹¹ obviously identified with the διαλέκτω of vv.^{6, 8}. In view of these emphatic indications pervading the whole context the various

attempts to explain γλῶσσα in some different sense are quite beside the mark. Herder's view that new modes of interpreting the ancient prophets were meant does not call for more than passing mention. The view of Bleek, set forth and illustrated with great erudition, was that γλῶσσαι here meant "glosses," unusual, antiquated, poetical and provincial expressions, as the word is undoubtedly used in Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1457 B. This usage is borrowed from grammarians, and is entirely out of place in a piece of ordinary straightforward narrative like Acts 2. It may be remarked in passing that this explanation has been shewn to be entirely inapplicable to the passages in 1 Corinthians as well; the phrase γένη γλωσσῶν, on this hypothesis, becomes rather meaningless; also, words like these had a well-recognised *meaning*, and in using them the νοῦς could not be ἄκαρπος.

The attempts that have been made to take the word γλῶσσα both in Acts and 1 Corinthians in a quite literal sense, indicating that the speakers used other tongues than their ordinary ones, and (as apparently Thayer-Grimm) to refer the plural γλώσσαις in λαλεῖν γλώσσαις to separate motions of the tongue seems far-fetched and inappropriate.

It is unnecessary for our present purpose to follow out into greater detail these and similar attempts to discover a particular meaning for the word *γλῶσσα* that will fit all the various forms of the phrase (*γλῶσσαι*, *γένη γλωσσῶν*, etc.) and the various manifestations of the phenomenon. There is now a fairly general consensus of opinion among commentators that the phenomena in all the passages of Acts and 1 Corinthians were essentially and fundamentally identical. In both sets of passages the "tongues" are utterances of worship. On the Day of Pentecost those on whom the Spirit fell did not actually address the people. They spoke of "the mighty works of God." So in 1 Corinthians the utterances referred to are those of prayer and adoration. The effect, too, of the phenomenon on unsympathetic hearers is, in both cases, similar. St. Peter in Acts, like St. Paul in 1 Corinthians, regards the glossolalia as derived from the same origin as the gift of prophecy. In spite, however, of this broad, general identity there still remains the fact—admitted with equally general unanimity—that St. Luke would have us clearly understand that the particular form of the glossolalia on the Day of Pentecost was speech in foreign lan-

guages, which the speakers under normal circumstances would neither be expected to know nor to use.

It is not without interest, in this connection, to glance at the history of the interpretation of these passages, and see what attitude commentators and historians of various schools of thought have been compelled to take. The view that the Pentecostal glossolalia was a permanent endowment of the apostles with a miraculous knowledge of all those foreign languages in which they were to preach the Gospel has now merely a historic interest. It seems to have been first propounded by Origen in a comment on Romans 1¹⁴. As this appears to be the earliest expression of a view which was widely held for many centuries, the passage is worth quoting in full. Origen is explaining the words: *"Ελληνσί τε καὶ βαρβάροις, σοφοῖς τε καὶ ἀνοήτοις ὀφειλέτης εἰμί.* His comment is only extant in the Latin translation. He says: "Requirendum nunc est quomodo Apostolus Græcis et Barbaris, sapientibus et insipientibus debitor est. Quid enim ab ipsis acceperat unde eis debitor fieret? Arbitror diversis quidem gentibus inde eum esse debitorem quod omnium gentium linguis eloqui accepit per gratiam Spiritus Sancti, sicut

et ipse dicit: Omnium vestrum magis linguis loquor. Quia ergo linguarum notitiam non pro se quis, sed pro his quibus prædicandum est accipit, debitor omnibus illis efficitur quorum accepit a Deo linguæ notitiam."

Two things are noteworthy about this passage. In the first place, Origen regards St. Paul as possessed of the Pentecostal gift of speaking foreign languages though he was not a Christian on the Day of Pentecost. He apparently holds that it was a necessary accompaniment of St. Paul's status as an apostle. Secondly, Origen interprets the passage in 1 Corinthians 14¹⁸ as referring to foreign languages. To this fact it will be necessary to return at a later stage.

Origen's comment has been quoted as the first clear instance of reference to a permanent endowment with the supernatural power to speak foreign languages. There is an earlier reference — as it seems — to the glossolalia in Irenæus (*Adv. Hæres.* v. vi. 1); but it is not quite clear whether he is referring to foreign languages strictly or to some kind of ecstatic utterance in the way of worship. His words are: *Καθὼς καὶ πολλῶν ἀκούομεν ἀδελφῶν ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ προφητικὰ χαρίσματα ἔχόντων, καὶ παντοδαπαῖς λαλούντων διὰ τοῦ Πνεύματος γλώσσαις, καὶ*

τὰ κρύφια τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς φανερόν ἀγόντων ἐπὶ τῷ
 συμφέροντι καὶ τὰ μυστήρια τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐκδιηγουμένων.

There appears to be no lexical authority for giving to παντοδαπὸς the specific sense of "foreign." The whole passage in Irenæus seems to be influenced by 1 Corinthians 14^{24, 25}.

Broadly speaking, the chief patristic commentators follow the lines of interpretation laid down by Origen. Gregory Nazianzen says : ἐλάλουν μὲν οὖν ξέναις γλώσσαις, καὶ οὐ πατρίοις, καὶ τὸ θαῦμα μέγα, λόγος ὑπὸ τῶν οὐ μαθόντων λαλούμενος.* Further on in the same passage he makes it clear that he regards the miracle as one of *speech*—discarding the view that one voice was uttered but was miraculously heard and understood by each bystander in his own particular language—in which case the miracle would rather have been one of *hearing*. Jerome takes the same view. The Holy Spirit was bestowed on the Day of Pentecost, he says, "ut prædicaturi multis gentibus, acciperent genera linguarum."† Augustine has a still more developed form of the same idea. He says : "Linguis omnium gentium locuti sunt omnes." Further on in the same passage he defines more

* Oratio xli. *In Pentecosten*, c. xv., § 742.

† Ep. cxx. *Ad Hedibiam*, c. ix.

precisely the mode of distribution of the gift. It was not the case that one man spoke one language and another man another, but: "Unusquisque homo, unus homo linguis omnium gentium loquebatur. Loquebatur unus homo linguis omnium gentium: unitas ecclesiæ in linguis omnium gentium." *

In the *De Civitate Dei* he connects the gift with the whole future of the church: "Post dies decem misit promissum Spiritum Sanctum: cujus venientis in eos qui crediderant tunc signum erat maximum et maxime necessarium, ut unusquisque eorum linguis omnium gentium loqueretur: ita significans unitatem catholicæ ecclesiæ per omnes gentes futuram ac sic linguis omnibus locuturam." †

The reference made to Pentecost by Gregory of Nyssa has a twofold interest; partly because he quite decidedly interprets the gift as a power of speaking foreign languages, partly because he connects the episode, by way of contrast, with that of the tower of Babel. He says: οὐκ ἐκ προπαιδείσεως καὶ μελέτης τινὸς, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐπιπνοίας τοῦ Πνεύματος, ἀθρώως τοῖς ἀποστόλοις ταύτης ἐν-σχεδασθείσης τῆς χάριτος, ἡ τοῦ φθέγγεσθαι δύναμις

* Sermo cclxviii.

† *De Civ. Dei.* lib. xviii. cap. xlix.

προσεγένετο. Ἔδει γὰρ τοὺς ἐπὶ τῇ γῆϊνῃ πυργοποιῖα τὴν ὁμοφωνίαν λύσαντας, ἐπὶ τῇ πνευματικῇ πάλιν τῆς Ἐκκλησίας οἰκοδομῇ, εἰς ὁμοφωνίαν ἐλθεῖν.*

Chrysostom's comment agrees with Gregory of Nyssa in comparing the incident with that of Babel and with Augustine in declaring that each one of the recipients possessed the power of speaking many languages. He says: *τίνος ἕνεκεν πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων χαρισμάτων τὸ τῶν γλωσσῶν ἔλαβον οἱ Ἀπόστολοι; ἐπειδὴ πανταχοῦ διέρχεσθαι ἤμελλον· καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν καιρῷ τῆς πυργοποιίας ἡ μία γλῶττα εἰς πολλὰς διετέμενετο οὕτω τότε αἱ πολλαὶ γλῶσσαι πολλάκις εἰς ἓνα ἄνθρωπον ἦεσαν· καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ τῇ Περσῶν καὶ τῇ Ῥωμαίων καὶ τῇ Ἰνδῶν καὶ ταῖς πολλαῖς διελέγετο γλώσσαις τοῦ Πνεύματος ἐνηχοῦντος αὐτῷ· καὶ τὸ χάρισμα ἐκαλεῖτο χάρισμα γλωσσῶν, ἐπειδὴ πολλαῖς ἄθρόον ἡδύνατο λαλεῖν φωναῖς.†*

It is unnecessary for our present purpose to carry further this catena of patristic comments. It is possible to trace in them a certain development—a certain pushing of the interpretation into greater detail, as in the statement that each Apostle spoke all languages; a certain attempt to claim a definite place for the phenomenon in the Divine order, as in the comparison with the

* In S. Stephanum, 704 D. † Cramer's *Catena* in Acts 2⁴.

Dispersion at Babel: but one fixed idea underlies all the exegesis from first to last, namely, that the fact of which the writer of Acts spoke was a divinely bestowed power of speaking in foreign languages. With regard to the comparison with Babel, it is interesting to note that some of the most recent criticism joins hands with that of the Fathers. The Bishop of Ely in his Hulsean Lectures on "The Credibility of the Acts"—either at the suggestion of Gregory and Chrysostom or from an independent examination of the text—concludes that "the historian recalls the language of the ancient story which told of the confusion of tongues (Gen. 11th); and it is plain that his language in recording the events of Pentecost is moulded by the remembrance." *

The view that the Pentecostal glossolalia was a permanent endowment of the Apostles with a miraculous knowledge of all those foreign languages in which they were to preach the Gospel was, as we have seen, held by Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries. From them it was accepted by the great majority of older divines. It is now abandoned by nearly all Protestant commentators, the most notable ex-

* *Op. cit.* p. 40.

ception being the late Bishop Wordsworth, who supported the older view by a long array of patristic references. Modern critics are, for the most part, at one in approaching the consideration of Pentecost from the standpoint of St. Paul's information in 1 Corinthians. They differ considerably in the resulting view of the credibility of St. Luke's narrative, varying from the extreme left wing which regards that narrative as entirely fictitious, to the more orthodox and cautious, which is inclined to suspect that St. Luke's story gives an amplified and perhaps slightly distorted version of the original events.

Of the extreme "left" it will be sufficient to mention two representatives, Zeller and Schmiedel. In a sense, extremer English critics may claim Schmiedel as their representative, for the article on "The Gift of Tongues" in the *Encyclopædia Biblica* is from his pen.

The conclusion to which Zeller comes after a prolonged examination of the passage in Acts 2 may best be given in his own words—

"For our immediate object we restrict ourselves to the question from which we started: whether, as far as the existing indications can be followed, the narrative before us was based on any definite fact. After what has been said

we can only reply in the negative. The demonstrably unhistorical elements of this narrative, as we have seen, concern not only its outworks or single subordinate features, but its real nucleus and focus; nay, the entire groundwork on which it moves is highly uncertain, and according to all appearance there seems to be no scope for any fact which could serve to explain it. Neither do we require any such fact to render its origin credible, as it is in all respects perfectly explicable by dogmatic motives and typical points of view." *

It would be hard to find a clearer statement of the results of a process of purely destructive criticism. Still, even in this process elements appear which, if differently applied, may contribute to a more constructive view. This will become apparent when we have occasion, at a later stage, to ask what are the "dogmatic motives and typical points of view" referred to by Zeller.

Schmiedel's view is expressed with great point and brevity. "The student who is not prepared to give up the genuineness of the principal Pauline Epistles is in duty stringently bound to consider the account of Paul as the primary one, and discuss it without even a side

* *Acts of the Apostles* (Eng. trans.), vol. i. p. 205.

glance at Acts, and to reject as unhistorical everything in Acts which does not agree with this account." * Acting on this fundamental principle, he lays it down, "that in the present connection (*i.e.* in a consideration of the nature of the glossolalia) Acts 2¹⁻¹³ must be set aside not provisionally, but definitively. Nothing is more certain than that "tongues" (γλῶσσαι) in the case before us must not be translated "languages." †

Professor Ramsay has done invaluable service to the cause of sound criticism by his demonstration of St. Luke's claim to be regarded as a historian of the first rank. But in the matter of this particular event he quite clearly holds that the narrative as St. Luke gives it is not ultimately reliable. "In Acts 2⁵⁻¹¹," he says, "another popular tale seems to obtrude itself. In these verses the power of speaking with tongues, which is clearly described by Paul as a species of prophesying (1 Cor. 12^{10 f.} 14^{1 f.}), is taken in the sense of speaking in many languages. Here again we observe the distorting influence of popular fancy." ‡

As an example of the critic who, while deal-

* *Encyclopædia Biblica*, vol. iv. col. 4761.

† *Op. cit.* col. 4763.

‡ *St. Paul the Traveller*, p. 370.

ing with the New Testament writings in a sober and reverent spirit, has yet misgivings about the absolute credibility of St. Luke as compared with St. Paul, we may quote Dr. Bartlet. "We cannot hesitate for a moment," he says, "in declaring for Paul's description as reflecting the normal facts touching the 'gift of tongues' in the Apostolic age; and it is hard to believe, in view of the back-references in Acts 10⁴⁶ f. 11¹⁵ (where the source used is probably different), that the Pentecostal form of it was really as unique as has usually been assumed. Paul himself quotes the prophecy about God's speaking to His people 'by men of strange tongues' as exemplified in principle by glossolalia. And it is quite possible that in time confusion arose between the two senses of the word 'strange,' and that this has crept into the account in Acts. The fact at the bottom of glossolalia in any form was one and the same. In it men were raised above their normal selves by a Divine impulse." *

These passages may be taken as typical specimens of the agreements and differences of modern critical procedure. There is a general agreement to take St. Paul's information as

* *The Apostolic Age*, pp. 13, 14.

primary and normative: there are differences in the resultant treatment of Acts 2 varying from those who absolutely exclude it as historically worthless, to those who suspect a slight distortion of the narrative.

For the sake of completeness we may at this point indicate briefly the views of various modern writers who have discussed the problem, and so mark the position which they take in the critical line. To take German opinion first. Weiss regards the problem as being unsolved. "The narrative," he says, "of the history of Pentecost is pervaded by the contradiction, not yet explained by any exegesis, that on the one hand a unique miracle of tongues is incontestably meant to be narrated, while on the other there is much that points to the first manifestation of speaking in tongues." He concludes that "here at anyrate an older foundation must be distinguished from the revision of the narrator." *

Wendt† holds that the phenomena in Acts and 1 Corinthians are essentially identical, and that we have in St. Luke's narrative of the Day of Pentecost a legendary embellishment of what actually took place. He admits that the embel-

* *Introduction to the New Testament*, vol. ii. p. 335 (Eng. trans.).

† Meyer-Wendt, *Apostelgeschichte* (1888), pp. 59-70.

lishment was already accomplished by Christian tradition before St. Luke. He does not deny that there was a miraculous element in the phenomenon of Pentecost, but he thinks that St. Luke has added a further miraculous element, prompted by a desire to bring the episode into line with the Jewish traditions about the giving of the Law on Mount Sinai. To this latter point we shall have occasion to return later.

The view of Blass may be mentioned here. It has to be gathered from series of detached passages. He says at the outset that the *locus classicus* on the glossolalia is 1 Corinthians 14. He disposes of the objection so often urged that St. Luke's *ἐτέραις γλώσσαις λαλεῖν* and St. Paul's *γλώσσαις λαλεῖν* are generically different phrases. He compares the various passages, and then says: "Nihil igitur discriminis inter Paulam Lucamque, et recte hic *ἐτέραις* addit ut scriptor rerum (v. tamen 10⁴⁶. 19⁶.) omittit ille ut de re legentibus notissima." * On the whole episode his verdict is: "Quæ sequuntur etiam magis quam priora *προφητικῶς* narrata sunt, non *ιστορικῶς*. Ut postea per homines omnis nationis evangelium dissipatum est, ita jam initiis nascentis ecclesiæ omnium nationum viri adstitisse ejusque

* *Acta Apostolorum*, p. 50.

participes facti esse narrantur.”* In other words, he would hold that the narrative is not a record of literal fact, but has been influenced by dogmatic subjectivity. His account of the way in which St. Luke may have misunderstood the facts is interesting. The bystanders, he says, “Non solum sonos familiares audire sibi videbantur, sed verba quoque intellegere. Putavit igitur Lucas (qui τῷ λαλεῖν γλώσσαις sæpissime interfuerat), ea quæ ipse non intellegebat, alios tamen alia lingua utentes partim intellegere posse.”† His final words are marked by characteristic humour and caution. “Nobis nullum exemplum γλωσσολαλίας servatum est; verum si quando aliqua oratio talis ab actuario excepta inventa erit, tum judicare poterimus.”‡

One of the most recent references to this subject in Germany is that of Dobschütz.§ He quite discards the view that speaking with foreign languages took place at Pentecost, and holds that such an idea has come into existence through a misunderstanding of the phrase γλώσσαις λαλεῖν.

Amongst English commentators on Acts there seems to be a fairly general consensus of opinion

* *Op. cit.* p. 51.

† *Ibid.*

‡ *Op. cit.* p. 53.

§ *Probleme des Apostolischen Zeitalters.*

that the phenomena at Corinth and Jerusalem were generically identical, but that a special form of the phenomenon at Jerusalem was speech in foreign languages; that this particular manifestation of spiritual power was unique and not afterwards repeated. This would appear to be substantially the view of Plumptre, Knowling, and—presumably *—Rendall. Farrar, too, holds the view that the glossolalia at Corinth and elsewhere was identical with the glossolalia at Pentecost. He further asserts that: “It is impossible for any one to examine that section (*i.e.* 1 Cor. 12–14) carefully without being forced to the conclusion that, at Corinth at anyrate, the gift of tongues had not the least connection with foreign languages.”† Yet it would appear that he does not absolutely and entirely rule foreign languages out of court in connection with Pentecost, for he says: “I do not see how any thoughtful student who has really considered the whole subject can avoid the conclusion of Neander, that ‘any foreign languages which were spoken on this occasion were only something accidental, and not the essential element of the language of the Spirit.’”‡

* This appears to be his meaning. *Acts of the Apostles*, p. 176.

† *Life and Works of St. Paul*, vol. i. p. 96. ‡ *Loc. cit.* p. 98.

It will probably be conducive to clearness if we pause at this point to summarise the results at which we have arrived by our investigation.

I. In the first place, there may be said to be universal agreement, an agreement shared both by those who accept the narrative as literally true and those who reject it as historically worthless, that what St. Luke tells us is, that on this particular occasion those on whom the Holy Spirit was bestowed did as a matter of fact utter the praises of God in tongues other than their own, *i.e.* in foreign languages; that some at any-rate of the bystanders heard, or thought they heard, these praises being uttered in their own particular tongues, and expressed their surprise at it; and that these auditors—Jews and proselytes—represented a variety of languages between Rome in the West and Parthia in the East. This conclusion remains unaffected even if the languages spoken by Jews of the Dispersion lying between these geographical limits be ultimately reducible (as the Bishop of Exeter in the article on “Gift of Tongues” in *Hastings* thinks possible) to Greek, Western Aramaic, and Eastern Aramaic. The very point of the surprise was that “we hear these Galileans—from whom we should have expected to hear no such thing—

speaking in our tongues the wonderful works of God." Whether we believe it or not, it is St. Luke's intention that we *should* believe that on the Day of Pentecost foreign languages were spoken under the influence of the Holy Spirit.

II. In the second place, we note that a series of Fathers—possibly influenced directly or indirectly by Origen—interpret the gift of Pentecost as a permanent endowment with power to speak all foreign languages. In some cases this is regarded as a reversal of the confusion of Babel.

III. Thirdly, a résumé of modern critical opinion has shewn that the generally accepted procedure now is to test the historicity of Acts 2 by a reference to 1 Corinthians 12–14. The results of this testing process differ with different critics. In the hands of some it entirely discredits Acts 2; in other cases the Lucan narrative rests under a slight cloud; there are vague suspicions of embellishment or exaggeration, the underlying view apparently being, that if we only knew the circumstances accurately we should find that the phenomena at Corinth and at Jerusalem were absolutely identical. Again, in other cases the result of an appeal to 1 Corinthians 12–14 is the conclusion that the two sets of

phenomena were generically identical,—identical, that is, both in origin and in the general circumstances of their manifestation, but that there were circumstances that were peculiar to Jerusalem and the Day of Pentecost; that the glossolalia on that day took a form that was unique and not afterwards repeated, *i.e.* that while, under the power of the Spirit, foreign languages were spoken at Jerusalem, there is no reason to suppose that the gift was bestowed in that particular form either at Corinth or at any other place.

On this body of evidence certain observations may now be made. In the first place, as has already been remarked, the patristic view of a permanent endowment with the power of speaking all foreign languages and proclaiming the gospel in them, cannot now be regarded as tenable. Such an endowment would have been, so far as we can see, superfluous; would have been, to use the expressive German term, a “Luxus-wunder.” And we have no reason for supposing that God ever bestows unnecessary gifts. Greek and Latin—or indeed Greek alone—were quite sufficient for the Apostles in all places in which the Canonical Scriptures record that they preached. Again, all the extant New

Testament writings are in the one language—Greek. There is no subsequent New Testament allusion to the possession and display of any such power by the Apostles in their evangelising work. It even appears fairly certain from St. Luke's narrative of the episode at Lystra (Acts 14⁸⁻¹⁸) that St. Paul and Barnabas did not understand the speech of Lycaonia. It is recorded, too, by Papias that St. Mark accompanied St. Peter as his *ἐρμηνευτῆς*.* In the face of these considerations the claim that the Apostles received a miraculous power of speaking foreign languages, for their preaching of the Gospel, can hardly be maintained.

Secondly, the view that St. Luke's narrative in Acts 2 is to be rejected as unhistorical and incredible ought to be completely discarded. As has been already stated, such a method of criticism appears to the present writer to be uncritical and unscientific to the last degree; that is, the method of contrasting St. Paul and St. Luke, and rejecting the latter when he gives other and apparently discrepant information.

It may not be out of place, in this connection,

* Eus. *H.E.* iii. 39. The meaning of the word is disputed, but it may reasonably be taken to mean the same as the English "interpreter."

to refer to a quite recent instance of the application of this method of treatment to the records of another mysterious subject—the nature of our Lord's resurrection body—with equally unsatisfactory results. In the *Hibbert Journal* for April 1904, Canon Hensley Henson writes on the Resurrection. He points to the fact that the earliest testimony to it is that of St. Paul in 1 Corinthians 15. "St. Paul," he declares, "repudiates a materialistic conception of the resurrection." * Christ's resurrection body was a πνευματικὸν σῶμα. He goes on: "We turn to the Gospels, and we find ourselves confronted with another conception altogether. In St. Luke's Gospel, for example, the risen Christ is described in terms which might seem to imply the precise contradiction of St. Paul's teaching." † He then quotes St. Luke 24³⁶⁻⁴³, which describes the occasion on which the risen Christ not only says, "a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye behold Me having," but in the presence of His disciples eats a piece of broiled fish. Canon Henson proceeds: "The question cannot but suggest itself, Is it possible that the author of 1 Corinthians 15 believed all this? And if, as can hardly but be the case, the answer is that

* *Hibbert Journal*, vol. ii. p. 487.† *Ibid.*

he certainly did not, then it follows that, to his mind, resurrection was quite conceivable apart from physical resuscitation; and, so far as his doctrine goes, there was no importance in the empty tomb, which has figured so prominently in later Christian apologetics." * It is unnecessary for our present purpose to quote the article at greater length, because what has been given is sufficient to indicate the principles on which the criticism rests. St. Paul speaks of a *πνευματικὸν σῶμα*, and St. Luke speaks of flesh and blood and the eating of a piece of broiled fish. St. Paul and St. Luke cannot be harmonised, therefore St. Luke must go. It is perfectly true that the two accounts seem hard to reconcile, and that, on the surface, the one appears quite incompatible with the other. Yet, in our present state of knowledge, it is both premature and presumptuous to dogmatise about our Lord's or any other resurrection body. We know too little of spirit, too little of matter, too little of all the possible relationships between them, to say whether a being whose body is *πνευματικὸν* rather than *ψυχικὸν* could or could not allow Himself to be handled by His followers, and eat food in their presence. It is more

* *Loc. cit.* p. 488.

than probable that St. Luke had access to first-hand information for his Gospel narrative. And his general credibility in matters in which his statements can be tested is such that his narrative, when it deals with these more profound and mysterious topics, can never lightly be rejected, but should be allowed to stand over against evidence from other sources, till fuller knowledge enables us to rightly correlate them all. This seems to be not only the more sober and reverent, but also the more truly critical and scientific treatment of a subject that is both mysterious and intricate.

The foregoing remarks apply with equal force to the question of the gift of tongues. In this case too the authorities are hard to harmonise, and it greatly simplifies the problem to accept the one and reject the other. Here, again, the wiser course is to wait for fuller knowledge. A better understanding of psychological phenomena may one day make certain—what already seems highly probable—that the two different accounts are not mutually exclusive, but are both at the same time true.

It would appear, therefore, that two classes of interpretation must be abandoned: on the one hand, that which infers too much from the

Lucan narrative ; on the other hand, that which declines to regard it as a trustworthy ground for any inference at all. The key to the true solution of the problem will, as it seems to the present writer, be found either with those who regard the phenomenon of Jerusalem as generically identical with that of Corinth, but modified by circumstances peculiar to that one occasion of Pentecost, or with those who not only claim this fundamental and generic identity, but also boldly maintain that speech in foreign languages was a mark of the phenomenon at Corinth also.

This latter alternative brings us to a new stage in the discussion. We have acquiesced hitherto in the generally held view that the glossolalia at Corinth was simply rapt, ecstatic, generally unintelligible speech quite unconnected with any speaking of foreign languages. This position is not only held but explicitly asserted by cautious and "orthodox" critics. Knowling says : "In Acts we have what we have not elsewhere—the speaking in foreign tongues,—this was not the case at Corinth."* Farrar states his conviction on the point with characteristic vigour. Alluding to 1 Corinthians 12–14 he says : "It is impossible for anyone to examine

* *The Expositor's Greek Testament*, vol. ii. p. 100.

that section carefully without being forced to the conclusion that, at Corinth at any rate, the gift of tongues had not the least connection with foreign languages.* In the face of these emphatic assertions it is a matter of the greatest interest to observe that in some of the most recent literature on Acts in English there is a distinctly conservative reaction, a return to the older point of view,—for the view that speech in foreign languages formed an element in the glossolalia at Corinth would seem to be as old as Origen. In the passage that has already been quoted, in which he speaks of St. Paul's power of speaking "in the tongues of all nations," he quotes St. Paul's words in 1 Corinthians 14¹⁷: "I speak with tongues more than you all." By St. Paul's "tongue speech" Origen certainly meant foreign languages—and inasmuch as he takes St. Paul's words from this particular context in 1 Corinthians, it is a fair inference that he regarded their "tongue speech" also as expressing itself in this way.

Origen is by no means without followers in this matter. Jerome interprets the passage in the same way: "Apostolus Paulus, qui de Jerusalem usque ad Illyricum prædicavit, et inde

* *Life and Works of St. Paul*, vol. i. p. 96.

per Romam ad Hispaniam ire festinat, gratias agit Deo, quod cunctis Apostolis magis linguis loquatur. Qui enim multis gentibus annuntiaturus erat, multarum linguarum acceperat gratiam." * Theodoret speaks to the same effect in commenting on 1 Corinthians 14². Referring to the gift of the Spirit he says: 'Εδόθη γὰρ τοῦτο τοῖς κήρυξι διὰ τὰς διαφόρους τῶν ἀνθρώπων φωνάς· ἵνα πρὸς Ἰνδοὺς ἀφικνούμενοι, τῇ ἐκείνων χρώμενοι γλώττῃ, τὸ θεῖον προσφέρωσι κήρυγμα· καὶ Πέρσαις πάλιν διαλεγόμενοι, καὶ Σκύθαις, καὶ Ρωμαίοις, καὶ Αἰγυπτίοις, ταῖς ἐκάστων κεχρημένοι φωναῖς τὴν εὐαγγελικὴν διδασκαλίαν κηρύττωσι.' †

It should be remarked in passing that Jerome and Theodoret follow Origen in one misconception of the nature of the gift. They regard it as related to the preaching of the Gospel, as equipping the Apostles for their work among different nations. But neither in Acts 2 nor in 1 Corinthians is there any indication of this. On every occasion on which reference is made to "tongue speech" it is the language of worship and adoration that is implied, addressed to God and not to man.

If we turn now to more modern writers we

* Epist. cxx. *Ad Hedibiam*, c. ix.

† *Interpretatio Epist. ad 1 Cor.* 256 D.

find that, though the view of the gift as a permanent endowment for the purpose of preaching the Gospel is discarded, the view that the glossolalia at Corinth included speech in foreign languages is strongly supported. Alford may certainly be reckoned among the supporters of this position. "I believe," he says, "the event related in our text (Acts 2^d) to have been a sudden and powerful inspiration of the Holy Spirit, by which the disciples uttered, not of their own minds, but as mouthpieces of the Spirit, the praises of God in various languages hitherto, and possibly at the time itself, unknown to them." * And in answer to the question: "How is this *ἐτέραις γλώσσαις λαλεῖν* related to the *γλώσση λαλεῖν* afterwards spoken of by St. Paul?" he says "they are one and the same thing. *γλώσση λαλεῖν* is to speak in *a* language as above explained; *γλώσσαις* (*ἐτέραις* or *καιναῖς*) to speak in languages under the same circumstances." †

Dr. Arthur Wright takes up Dean Farrar's remark that it is "impossible" to avoid the conclusion that the gift of languages at Corinth had no connection with foreign languages, declaring that he himself has done that very "impossible"

* *Greek Testament*, vol. ii. p. 15.

† *Ibid.*

thing. "I have," he says, "read through the section (1 Corinthians 12-14³³) in question with all the care that I could command, and have been forced to the conclusion that, though some of St. Paul's illustrations undoubtedly favour the theory of incoherent noises, yet his application of them does not do so, and, on the whole, foreign languages are certainly implied." *

The Bishop of Ely's verdict is: "The probabilities of the case, then, and the language used by St. Paul, alike give support to the view that speech in a foreign language was one among the many forms of the glossolalia at Corinth. It should be added that, according to St. Paul, these utterances were addressed to God rather than to men. They were mainly prayers, doxologies, thanksgivings." †

We may, at this point, indicate the features of St. Paul's language which support this conclusion.

I. Blass has pointed out that the word *γλῶσσα* in the usage of Attic writers may mean, by itself, either a foreign word or foreign speech (cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, iii. 2, *al.*). It is not, therefore, impossible that St. Paul, speaking of the

* *New Testament Problems*, p. 285.

† *The Credibility of the Book of the Acts of the Apostles*, p. 38.

phenomenon to those who were accustomed to it, might refer to a use of foreign languages by the phrase *γλώσσαις λαλεῖν*. So far, then, as the wording of the expressions goes, “*nihil discriminis inter Paulum Lucamque*.” *

II. St. Paul speaks of “kinds of tongues” (*γένη γλωσσῶν*), 1 Corinthians 12²⁸. This expression in itself seems to indicate that the gift of utterance took different forms—one of which may have been speaking in a foreign language. The expression “tongues of men” (*γλῶσσαι τῶν ἀνθρώπων*) in 13¹ may not improbably point in the same direction.

III. When St. Paul wishes to enforce his view that the glossolalia was only a sign to unbelievers, he quotes (14²¹) a prophecy of Isaiah (28^{11 f.}) which held out the threat that God would speak to His rebellious people by the Assyrian invader with his strange language (*Ἐν ἑτερογλώσσοις καὶ ἐν χεῖλεσιν ἑτέρων λαλήσω τῷ λαῷ τούτῳ*). This would seem to imply that he regarded foreign languages as at any rate having a place among the phenomena in question.

IV. Sometimes, according to St. Paul, a bystander was able to interpret what another man said in a tongue (1 Corinthians 12¹⁰ 14²⁸).

* *Acta Apostolorum*, p. 50.

It is at any rate possible to suppose that he is referring to an ecstatic utterance in a foreign language, unintelligible to the speaker (his *νοῦς* being *ἄκαρπος*), but capable of being understood by some one who knew the language.

St. Paul's language, then, is not such as, in itself, to exclude the supposition that foreign languages formed part of the glossolalia at Corinth, provided that this view can be shewn to be, on other grounds, probable.

The demonstration of this view, that foreign languages were spoken in ecstasy at Corinth as well as at Jerusalem, is not essential for the establishing of the view which we are here seeking to support; but it has a most interesting bearing on it. Quite a good case can be made out for the view that speech in foreign languages was the distinctive and peculiar form of the glossolalia at Jerusalem on the Day of Pentecost, and that St. Luke, in so reporting it, is simply recording what happened. But if the view of these modern critics, just quoted, can be established, that this variety of the gift was displayed at Corinth also, it immensely strengthens the case in favour of St. Luke, and provides additional grounds for regarding his narrative as reliable.

✓

We come now to the “general probabilities” of the case. We have to ask what it precisely is that St. Luke tells us? How far is he simply recording facts, or how far is he, in the terms of his narrative, attempting to *interpret* the facts, and convey to us a sense of their particular theological significance? Presuming that he is writing in the spirit of an interpreter, and trying to convey to us his view of the import of the facts, how far is his reliability thereby impaired? Finally, can we draw any evidence from our general knowledge of psychological phenomena, more especially of such phenomena as are influenced by religious causes, which will justify us in supposing that what St. Luke records may perfectly well have taken place?

Taking the questions in this order, we have to consider first the details of St. Luke's narrative.

The occasion was the Day of Pentecost. The disciples “were all together in one place.” Where was this place? Very cogent reasons have been suggested* for supposing that the place was one of the chambers within the Temple precincts. We know that both before and after the Day of Pentecost (Luke 24⁵³, Acts 2⁴⁶) the Apostles were “continually in the Temple.” It had for them

* Cf. Chase, *Credibility of the Acts*, p. 30 ff.

many associations with their Master. At Pentecost, just as at the Passover, "it was the custom of the priests to open the gates of the Temple at midnight."* The crowds of worshippers entered then, in order that their offerings might be examined by the priests before the morning sacrifice. It is not improbable that the Apostles would be there along with the other pious Jews. St. Luke speaks of the sound as filling the "οἶκος" where they were sitting. This term is the regular one both in the LXX and in Josephus for the chambers of the Temple.

We see from this point of view the particular significance of the article in the phrase *συνῆλθε τὸ πλῆθος*. It refers to the crowd of worshippers in the Temple courts. On this hypothesis it is easy to see why so large a multitude, consisting of Jews and Proselytes, was in the immediate neighbourhood, and how so large a crowd came to gather so quickly. The worshippers in the Temple at once flocked to the "οἶκος" in which the Apostles were sitting.

As, then, they were thus met together in the early hours of the Day of Pentecost, there came a sound from heaven, there appeared to them

* Josephus, *Ant.* XVIII. ii. 2, mentions the custom in connection with the Passover.

tongues parting asunder "like as of fire." "And they were all filled with the Holy Spirit." That this last sentence expresses what was a Divine reality is, here, taken as axiomatic. It seems legitimate to use every resource of criticism in order to explain the results of the bestowal of the Spirit; but to resolve the gift itself into something naturalistic and non-supernatural is to fly in the face of the whole consciousness of Christendom, as well as to misconceive the entire history of the early Church. Whatever we may have to say about the external attendant phenomena, a real and remarkable bestowal of the Holy Spirit on the Christians assembled on the Day of Pentecost should be regarded as an unquestionable fact of history.

"And they began to speak with other tongues." The theme of their speech was "the mighty works of God." It seems not unnatural to suppose that, just as Zacharias did when he was "filled with the Holy Ghost" (Luke 1⁶⁷), so too these disciples burst forth into praises or "benedictions," drawn from the liturgical stores of the Jewish Church—such words of adoration as are found in the ancient service of the "Eighteen Benedictions." But St. Luke expressly says that they uttered these praises

ἐτέραις γλώσσαις. It is therefore of the greatest importance to observe that there is clear evidence that the Palestinian authorities sanctioned the use of any language whatever in repeating the Shema, the Eighteen Benedictions, and the Grace at Meals.* To this highly significant fact we must shortly return. For our present purpose it is unnecessary to follow the events of Pentecost into further detail. The surrounding multitude assembled at the point where these men, possessed by the Spirit, were uplifting their voices in strains of ecstatic praise. Some were able to detect sentences of their own particular language; others, perhaps at a greater distance, able only to perceive what seemed to be symptoms of excitement and unnatural abnormal speech, declared: "They are filled with new wine." St. Peter, in his immediately following address, regards this exhibition of the Holy Spirit's power as the fulfilment of a prophecy of Joel, but makes no particular allusion to the speech in foreign languages. It is upon the origin, rather than upon the precise mode of the phenomenon, that he lays stress.

This brief account of St. Luke's record brings us to the next question. Is St. Luke giving to

* Schürer, *History of the Jewish People*, II. ii. p. 284 (E.T.).

us a purely neutral, objective account of what happened, or is his narrative coloured by any subjective conception, any attempt to interpret the facts from a certain point of view, and to bestow upon them a certain significance ?

Before dealing with this aspect of the matter a word may be said on the general principle involved. It seems to be taken for granted in many quarters, with regard to New Testament criticism generally—and especially of late with regard to the Fourth Gospel—that if the writer has a distinct view as to the dogmatic significance of some fact which he records, his credibility must be suspected, and the historicity of his narrative doubted. The conclusion seems to be regarded as inevitable that he has invented the fact in order that it may stand as a basis for the doctrine which he believes and wishes to promulgate. To the present writer it seems that this conclusion is not at all inevitable. It is not impossible that a writer may do both things, *i.e.* may record what, as a matter of fact, took place, but may also convey in his narrative what he conceives to be the inner meaning of the fact. It does not follow because he does so that his fact is to be relegated to the realm of fiction. He may very well at the same time

be writing both *προφητικῶς* and *ἱστορικῶς*. It is the legitimate business of criticism to scrutinise his record carefully, and to say, if possible, where fact ends and interpretation begins. To assume it as axiomatic that because interpretation is there it must be prior, and that the fact has been afterwards invented as a basis for the interpretation, is not criticism, but uncritical and dogmatic prejudice.

With this proviso we approach the question : "Does St. Luke regard the event of the Day of Pentecost from any particular standpoint?"

It has been already shewn that a certain body of critical opinion, both ancient and modern, is inclined to see in St. Luke's narrative a conscious reference to the Old Testament story of the Tower of Babel. To the present writer this reference appears improbable. A careful comparison of St. Luke's language here fails to shew any decisive points of contact with the LXX of Genesis 11¹⁻⁹. Nor does the narrative of Acts 2 contain any trace of the conception of a unity of language, to which the Jewish idea appears to have tended, as a contrast to the confusion of Babel, the *εἰς λαὸς Κυρίου καὶ γλῶσσα μία* of the "Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs."

There would appear to be more probability

in the supposition that St. Luke's version of the events of the Day of Pentecost is not uninfluenced by the prevailing Jewish belief as to the conditions under which the Law was promulgated on Mount Sinai. The Feast of Pentecost is to the Jews of the present day, and was doubtless also to their predecessors, the festival of the Sinaitic legislation. We know from certain familiar passages (Gal. 4^{21 ff.}, Heb. 2²⁻⁴, 12¹⁸⁻²⁴) that the contrast between the New Dispensation and that of Sinai was already a familiar one to Christian thinkers. Now there are to be found in the works of Philo and in Rabbinical writings conceptions as to the giving of the Law on Sinai which have striking points of resemblance with St. Luke's narrative of Pentecost. According to Philo, an invisible voice (*ἡχὴ*) was formed by God in the air, which the air then shaped into a flame. "And," to quote his own words, "a voice sounded forth in most amazing wise from out the midst of the fire that poured from heaven, as the flame articulated itself into language, that familiar to the hearers."* The last phase of the Feast of Pentecost was called the Feast of Trumpets; because "then from heaven sounded forth a trumpet's voice, which

* De decem oraculis 9, 11.

reached, in all likelihood, forthwith to the ends of the Universe.”* In a similar strain the Midrash on Psalm 68¹¹ says: “When the Word went forth from Sinai it became seven voices, and from the seven voices was divided into seventy tongues. As sparks leap from the anvil, there came a great host of proclaiming voices.”†

The points of apparent similarity between these accounts of Sinai and St. Luke’s account of the first Christian Pentecost are too obvious to need emphasis. It ought to be added that many competent critics doubt whether this connection between the giving of the Law on Sinai and the Feast of Pentecost had gained a footing in Jewish tradition so early as the first Christian Pentecost.‡ The evidence, they hold, is not convincing. Even, however, if this particular point cannot be established, we still have Philo’s account of the circumstances which attended the giving of the Law on Sinai; and Philo was contemporary with the first forty years of the Christian era.

It is obvious that this comparison may be

* De septenario 22.

† I am indebted for these references to Bartlett’s *Acts of the Apostles*, pp. 384, 385

‡ E.g. Knowling, *op. cit.* p. 99.

used in different ways. In the hands of a destructive criticism it is the solvent which reduces St. Luke's narrative of Pentecost to pure fiction. Zeller, commenting on the Acts narrative with reference to Philo's account of Sinai, says: "If the phenomena of our verses 2 and 3 are already foreshadowed here, their symbolism is also so simple and so entirely in keeping with the usual style of spiritual revelations that it may not only be easily explained, without any definite prototype, but it was almost required by the standpoint of the ideas of that period. A basis of fact is quite superfluous for this portion of our narrative." * In the hands of a more cautious critic, such as Dr. Bartlet, this comparison is put to a more constructive use. He appears to hold "that the original facts of Pentecost were quite akin to the known analogies of glossolalia, but gradually took on another and more unique colour in the tradition as it reached the author of Acts."

"In the course of tradition," he says, "the idea would arise that the Divine voice speaking through these inspired tongues assumed the forms of the languages of mankind. This last stage may have been due to a current belief

* *Acts of the Apostles* (E.T.), vol. i. p. 204.

touching the analogous inauguration of the Old Covenant." *

What this would seem to mean is, that on the Day of Pentecost the glossolalia did not, as a matter of fact, take the form of speaking in foreign languages, but that under the influence of this Jewish tradition about the giving of the Law on Mount Sinai it afterwards came to be supposed that it did. In other words, St. Luke's narrative is not in the strict historical sense true.

Neither of these views can be regarded as finally satisfactory, and there still remains a third possibility with a strong claim for consideration. It may be held that the glossolalia on the Day of Pentecost did take the form of speech in foreign languages; that St. Luke, partly through his known association with St. Paul; partly, possibly, through intercourse, during St. Paul's imprisonment at Cæsarea, with Christians who had been present on the Day of Pentecost, had access to reliable evidence, and gives us a true account of the facts. It is also quite possible that again, through intercourse with St. Paul, whose familiarity with Rabbinic methods of thought is so patent in his epistles, St. Luke may have come to see an analogy

* *The Acts of the Apostles* (Century Bible), Note C, p. 385.

between the events of Pentecost and those which Jewish tradition associated with the giving of the Law. For the fact of the occurrence of these ideas in the writings of Philo shews that they were at any rate in the air. St. Luke's view of the analogy may be said to shew itself in the details of his narrative. In fine he is, in this passage, both the historian and the interpreter. He speaks *ιστορικῶς* as well as *προφητικῶς*. We have to deal with fact and not with fiction.

This brings us to the third, and in some ways the most crucial, question. Do we know of any psychological phenomena, especially such as may have been determined by religious causes—though not necessarily within these limits only—which may justify us in supposing that the glossolalia on the Day of Pentecost took the form of speech in foreign languages? The statement of the question in this form obviously limits the scope of our inquiry. It is unnecessary to go into the whole subject of "tongue speech." That such a phenomenon existed, at Corinth at any rate, in Apostolic days is as well attested as any reasonable critic can demand. That there have been recurrences of analogous phenomena is seen by the history

of Montanism, of the Camisards, and the prophets of the Cevennes in France; of the early Quakers and Methodists, of the "preaching sickness" and "reading sickness" in Sweden between 1841 and 1845, and especially in the history of the Irvingites. But to investigate all these in a general way would not subserve the purpose of this inquiry. What we need to discover is whether under abnormal mental and spiritual conditions it ever happens that foreign languages are spoken by those who might not be expected to do so.

We say "under abnormal mental or spiritual conditions"; for it surely does no violence either to the terms of St. Luke's narrative or to a most reverent view of the facts, to hold that when the Divine afflatus came on the assembled Christians, when this rush, as it were, of spiritual power and conviction seized them and possessed them, they were, for the time being, if not "beside," at any rate "above," themselves. Psychologically speaking, they were lifted to a different, an abnormal plane of consciousness, and their normal faculties were in abeyance. In such a condition it would appear that the "unconscious self," or, to use present-day terminology, "the subliminal self," which under normal

circumstances is comparatively quiescent and inoperative, is, as it were, set free, and the person is capable of producing effects of which he would be quite incapable under ordinary conditions, and of which he has no recollection when the exciting cause has passed away. The same condition of things might not inaptly be described as an abnormally excited memory. That is to say, under the influence of some strong external compelling force the whole being may be so possessed and transported that while the normal faculties are in a state of suspense, the "subliminal self" is set free to produce and express the results of impressions made on it without any conscious knowledge on the part of the subject.

Such a powerful, external cause may come from many sources. It may be spiritual, as we believe was the case on the Day of Pentecost ; it may be both spiritual and mental, as in the case of great grief, or prolonged persecution or overwhelming disaster ; it may be even physical in origin, with still similar results.

Now, that this does, as a matter of fact take place,—that people do under certain conditions speak passages of considerable length in a language which they do not know, and of which,

when they return to a normal state of consciousness, they have no recollection, is a well established truth.

Mr. Lecky says that in certain abnormal states "a multitude of facts which are so completely forgotten that no effort of the will can revive them, and that the statement of them calls up no reminiscence, . . . may be reproduced with intense vividness." *

During delirium persons have been heard to speak a foreign language which they learned in childhood, but had since completely forgotten.

There came, quite recently, to the present writer, first-hand information of a striking case. A lady of his acquaintance was placed under an anæsthetic for the purpose of an operation. During the period of suspended consciousness she talked French volubly. In this case the foreign language was not absolutely unknown to the speaker ; but English was her native and ordinary speech. Her husband is a teacher of foreign languages—and the probability is that her abnormally excited memory was bringing forth impressions that had been made on it without any conscious knowledge or attention on her part.

* Quoted in Wright, *Some New Testament Problems*, p. 291.

What may be regarded as the classical instance of this unconscious use of a foreign language is the one preserved by S. T. Coleridge. The story may best be told in his own words: "In a Roman Catholic town in Germany a young woman who could neither read nor write was seized with fever and . . . was heard talking Latin, Greek, and Hebrew. Whole sheets of her ravings were written out, and found to consist of sentences intelligible in themselves, but having slight connection with each other. . . . At last the mystery was unveiled by a physician who . . . discovered that at the age of nine she had been charitably taken by an old Protestant pastor, a great Hebrew scholar, in whose house she lived till his death. On further inquiry it appeared to have been the old man's custom for years to read aloud to himself with a loud voice out of his books. The books were ransacked, and . . . many of the passages taken down at the young woman's bedside were identified." *

As an instance of similar results produced, apparently through stress of severe persecution, we may refer to the *Little Prophets of the Cevennes*.† In this case it was not an indi-

* *Biographia Literaria*, p. 55.

† See Heath in *Contemporary Review*, January 1886; quoted by Wright, *Some New Testament Problems*, p. 292.

vidual who was affected, but as many as six hundred people at once. Nor was the phenomenon single and isolated; it recurred from time to time during a period of thirteen years, from 1688 to 1701 A.D. It took place during broad daylight. Children of three years old, and upwards would preach sermons in correct French,—which they could not ordinarily use, sermons three-quarters of an hour long delivered with appropriate gestures.

An eye witness wrote: "The boldness of the young boy astonished me. It was, indeed, a marvel to see an ignorant and timid child undertake to teach the people, to preach in a language he was incapable of speaking at another time, expressing himself magnificently, and presiding like a bishop in an assembly of Christians."

These instances* may suffice to support our

* Since these words were written the religious revival in Wales has been accompanied by analogous phenomena. The following passage—taken from the *Yorkshire Post* of December 27, 1904—is of the greatest interest in this connection:—

"Now comes the remarkable—in a sense the most remarkable—feature of the present revival. These young Welshmen and Welshwomen who know little or no Welsh, and who certainly cannot carry on a sustained conversation in their parents' tongue, and who are supposed to have derived little or no benefit from the Welsh services, now, under the influence of the revival, voluntarily take part in public prayer,—but the language employed is almost invariably not the familiar English, but the unknown, or supposed to be unknown, Welsh Biblical phrases,

present contention—that when the mind is under the influence of some powerful external force, when the unconscious self is roused to activity, when the powers of memory are subjected to an abnormal stimulus, foreign languages, the words of which have fallen on the ears of the subject without any conscious attention on his part, and have again without any consciousness of it on his part been impressed on his memory, may be clearly uttered.

Let us now see how these considerations suit Jerusalem and the Day of Pentecost.

In the first place, the powerful exciting cause was there. Under the Divine Providence, the and the peculiar idiomatic expressions connected with a Welsh prayer which they never used before, and which they were supposed hitherto not to be able to understand, trip off their tongue with an ease and an aptness which might be supposed to indicate long and familiar usage. It is true these, as spoken, bear the unmistakable stamp of the English accent, but they also bear the equally unmistakable stamp of intelligent familiarity in their use.

“How is this to be accounted for? How can we explain the fact that a youth or maiden who cannot speak a dozen words in Welsh in ordinary conversation can nevertheless engage for five or ten minutes in public prayer in idiomatic Welsh? Do these young people really know Welsh without being conscious that they do know it? Have the religious services of the past after all appealed to an intelligence the existence of which they themselves never suspected?

“There is thus opened up a very interesting study in psychology which, when explained, may help to explain also other features of the revival.”

Holy Spirit, in a remarkable and awe-inspiring way descended upon and possessed the assembled Christians. Through this possession they were plunged into a state of rapt and adoring ecstasy. They were, for the moment, no longer masters of themselves; their normal control of their faculties was suspended. But this was not all.

Jerusalem was a meeting place for visitors from the whole civilised world. Jews and proselytes from different countries and speaking different languages would crowd its streets, especially at the time of the great festivals. We have already alluded to the fact that the authorities in Palestine sanctioned the use of any language whatever in repeating the Shema, the Eighteen Benedictions, and the Grace at Meals. Probably on many former occasions the Apostles and other Christians had heard these Jews of the Dispersion using these doxologies and offering praise to God in the language of the country in which they sojourned. These forms of worship, falling on their ears, without any conscious attention on their part, had become a portion of their mental possession or property. When, through the irresistible rush of the Spirit's power, they were thrown for the time into a state of, practically unconscious, ecstasy, the

outburst of adoration came flooding to their lips in forms supplied from the resources of a memory abnormally quickened and lacking normal control, and so they "began to speak with other tongues as the Spirit gave them utterance." To say all this, it may be observed, is in no way to diminish or detract from the Divine and miraculous character of the occurrence. The primary fact was the Divinely bestowed gift of the Holy Spirit. The immediate results of that gift may have been such as we have tried to indicate.

Those who hold that the glossolalia at Corinth included speech in foreign languages point to the fact that the conditions there were in certain respects like those of Jerusalem. Corinth was a cosmopolitan city, the meeting place of East and West. Here, too, it is in accord with ascertained mental phenomena to hold that foreign expressions heard casually might be reproduced in the abnormal fervour of religious excitement. It must, however, be admitted that utterances of a devotional character would hardly be as likely to be heard in the streets of Corinth as in those of Jerusalem, where the Temple and streets would constantly be filled by worshipping throngs.

Certain features, in the account we have tried to give of the Day of Pentecost, harmonise well

with St. Paul's account of the glossolalia in 1 Corinthians. He evidently would have us understand that when the gift was being exercised, the subject was in an abnormal state of consciousness with the ordinary faculties in suspense. This is a legitimate inference from his expression *ὁ δὲ νοῦς μου ἄκαρπός ἐστι*. It is evident too that he held the chief value of the gift—as regarded its influence on spectators—to lie in the fact that it was a striking exhibition of spiritual power—and as such was calculated to arrest the attention of unbelievers. Apparently this was the precise result that, under Divine Providence, the gift affected at Jerusalem on the Day of Pentecost. He further declared that the effect on “men unlearned or unbelieving,” *i.e.* on curious and unsympathetic spectators, would be to make them say that those who spoke with tongues were “mad.” It was a somewhat similar conviction that made certain of the spectators at Jerusalem assert that the disciples were “filled with new wine.”

If this be regarded as the true account of what happened on the Day of Pentecost, what bearing has the conclusion on our estimate of St. Luke's narrative? A highly important bearing, for it enables us to say that he accurately

records what as a matter of literal fact took place. On the Day of Pentecost "they were all filled with the Holy Spirit, and began to speak with other tongues as the Spirit gave them utterance." St. Luke says nothing of a permanent endowment with this power for the purpose of evangelisation—he simply tells us what took place on that particular day. The view we have taken keeps closely to his words, though it parts company with the patristic and mediæval interpretation of them. It equally parts company with various modern theories: with the theory that the episode was deliberately invented in order to provide a worthy and impressive beginning for the Church's career; with the theory that St. Luke misapprehended the information that was given to him; with the theory that he correctly relates what was told to him, but that the materials had become amplified by traditional accretions before they reached his hands. All these hypotheses leave St. Luke's narrative under a cloud of suspicion; there is inaccuracy or misunderstanding somewhere; it is not strictly true. If the interpretation we have put on the facts be correct, then the credibility of St. Luke's narrative is vindicated. He has recorded what actually happened.

It was admitted at the outset that this paper has an apologetic purpose. Its aim is to shew reason for regarding St. Luke as a reliable informant on matters of fact. The testimony which he bears is called seriously into question nowadays; testimony—not on a comparatively insignificant matter such as the gift of tongues—but concerned with the Incarnation and the Resurrection. His testimony is questioned not merely by professedly anti-Christian or non-Christian critics, but also by those within the Church. St. Luke asserts that Jesus was born of Mary the Virgin; he asserts that He rose from the dead and left an empty grave. These are tremendous assertions, and the man who makes them must be regarded not only as generally veracious, but as an accurate recorder of literal fact—if we are to believe these assertions on his testimony. To have shewn reason for believing that his narrative of Pentecost is literally true in reference to its accompanying speech in “tongues” may be of use in removing at least one obstacle to a belief in his narrative of the great central historic facts that form the groundwork of our faith.

II.

The second topic that calls for discussion is considerably different from the former one. It is concerned not so much with the precise nature of the gift of tongues, as with St. Paul's treatment of it. Both the occasion and the manner of his discussion are remarkable.

So far as the extant evidence goes, it would appear that the fondness for, and the cultivation of, this particular gift were peculiar to Corinth. It is not referred to in any other Pauline Epistle, while in 1 Corinthians it is discussed with the greatest fulness and care.

It is not difficult to see why, when once such a gift as this became known at Corinth, it would be held in especial esteem. It was a gift congenial to the Corinthian temperament. They were well accustomed to the idea of the divinity speaking through the lips of the human priest or priestess, who, when seized by the power and inspiration of the God, was plunged into a state of unconscious ecstasy, and so, in frenzy, delivered the oracular reply. This is sufficiently well shewn by the description of the *μάντεις* in the *Timæus* * and the *Ion*. A few words may

* 71 E-72 B.

be quoted from the latter dialogue, as they put the matter with great clearness: ὁ θεὸς ἐξαιρούμενος τούτων τὸν νοῦν, τούτοις χρήται ὑπηρέταις καὶ τοῖς χρησμοδοῖς καὶ τοῖς μάντεσι τοῖς θείοις, ἵνα ἡμεῖς οἱ ἀκούοντες εἰδῶμεν, ὅτι οὐχ οὗτοι εἰσιν οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες οὕτω πολλοῦ ἄξια, οἷς νοῦς μὴ πάρεστιν, ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ λέγων, διὰ τούτων δὲ φθέγγεται πρὸς ἡμᾶς.* The conception of a person filled by Divine power in such a way that the νοῦς was rendered ἄκαρπος (1 Cor. 14¹⁴) was familiar to the Corinthians.

There was, too, in the gift something showy, something calculated to produce an impression on bystanders, which would appeal to Corinthian shallowness and love of display. Also the very fact that in the exercise of the gift they were brought into contact with mysterious invisible spiritual power was attractive to a people who apparently had little love for the quieter and more ordinary walks of Christian life.

Corinth, then, was a peculiarly congenial sphere for the exercise of the glossolalia. But the question still arises: How did the gift come to be known there in the first instance? Corinth was not the only Greek city in which St. Paul founded a Christian Church, and to which he

* Ion. 534 CD.

afterwards wrote an Epistle. It would seem that there must have been some reason, peculiar to Corinth, why the glossolalia gained a foothold in the beginning and flourished with such excessive vigour.

In close connection with this arises the question of St. Paul's treatment of the subject. When this treatment is viewed as a whole it is hard to resist the impression that he regarded this gift with very mixed feelings. It is true that he includes it, in two separate passages, in the list of *χαρίσματα*,—but he is careful on both occasions to put “tongues” and “the interpretation of tongues” at the bottom of the list. He afterwards proceeds to definitely place it on a lower level than prophecy, on the ground that it produces only a reflex edification on the “tongue speaker,” but none on the Church at large. This is owing to the fact that it is generally unintelligible, unless there be one at hand to interpret. It is also on a lower level, because the intellect, the *νοῦς*, plays no conscious part in it. As a display of unusual and remarkable power, it may impress unbelievers—but even then, if unbelievers come in from the outside and observe merely the outward manifestations of the gift, they will say that its possessors are

madmen. The Apostle then gives special injunctions restraining the exercise of the gift in acts of public worship. Not more than two or three should speak on one occasion, and that only if an interpreter be present; if there be no interpreter, then the possessors of this gift should forego open utterance and worship God in silence. It is in the course of this discussion that the remarkable admission occurs: "I thank God, I speak with tongues more than you all," * qualified immediately by the words: "Howbeit in the Church I had rather speak five words with my understanding, than ten thousand words in a tongue." † His final conclusion is: "Desire earnestly to prophesy, and forbid not to speak with tongues."

One cannot help feeling that this treatment of the subject represents something like a conflict in the mind of St. Paul. The utmost he says for the glossolalia is that it is a *χάρισμα*, and that they must not forbid the exercise of it. ‡ But he gives numerous reasons why that exercise should be carefully restrained, and he shews in detail the inferiority of this gift compared with that of prophecy. Here again we

* 1 Cor.-14¹⁸.† 1 Cor. 14¹⁹.‡ 1 Cor. 14³⁹.

may inquire: "Can any cause be discovered that will account for this? Were there any reasons why St. Paul could absolutely discourage the use of a gift, of which it is obvious that he hardly approved?"

It may, of course, be replied that the very peculiar nature of the gift was in itself quite sufficient to account for his way of discussing it. Still, if any additional cause of an external kind can be suggested, which appears to explain St. Paul's words, it will be at any rate interesting to examine its claims to consideration.

Such a cause, the present writer ventures to think, may be found in the presence of St. Paul's Judaising opponents at Corinth, more especially those who entitled themselves "the Christ party." The precise nature of the component elements in the various Corinthian factions—especially in the "Kephass party" and the "Christ party," is not a matter on which critics are generally agreed. But there is a high degree of probability in the hypothesis that the reference to the "Christ party" in 1 Corinthians 1¹² finds its explanation in 2 Corinthians 10⁷: "If any man trusteth in himself that he is Christ's, let him consider this again with himself, that, even as he is Christ's, so also are we." The result of

this identification is that we have in the "Christ party" those Jewish-Christian opponents of St. Paul against whom the polemic of the Second Epistle is directed. This view has the strong support of Bernard Weiss, and it may be best expressed in his words: "In a Church in which the excesses of the free Gentile-Christians and the prevailing differences of opinion on important questions showed undoubted necessity for a legal regulation of the Christian life, they had apparently a just title to come forward as *διάκονοι δικαιοσύνης* (2 Cor. 11¹⁵); and in a Church where the name of the Apostle was still used only in the sense of a party leader, they might look for the readiest success if they could attack the Gospel that rested on his authority with effect. They were native Jews, who came from abroad with letters of recommendation to Corinth (2 Cor. 11²² 3¹) and there represented themselves as *διάκονοι Χριστοῦ*, and even as Apostles of Christ (11^{13. 23}), while Paul sometimes designates them ironically as *ὑπερλίαν ἀπόστολοι* (11⁵ 12¹¹), and again openly calls them *ψευδαπόστολοι* (11¹³). If they founded their claim to this character on their special relation to Christ (10⁷: *εἰ τις πέποιθεν ἑαυτῷ Χριστοῦ εἶναι*), it can only have been they who said of themselves *ἐγὼ*

Χριστοῦ (1 Cor. 1¹²); and after the analogy of parallel expressions in this passage, the term can only mean that they were immediate disciples of Christ, since they made this discipleship the basis of their title to preach another Jesus and another Gospel than Paul's" (2 Cor. 11⁴).*

If this view of the "Christ party" be the true one, we see that there was within the Corinthian Church a formidable group of men hostile to the Apostle and bent on disparaging his Apostolic authority. His consciousness of their presence and animosity comes out especially in 1 Corinthians 9. Now it is not improbable that one of the taunts which such a body of men would hurl at the Apostle would be this—that he did not, in the sense that they did, belong to the original Christians. He was a later convert, and was not in that group of disciples on whom the Spirit fell at Pentecost and caused them to speak with other tongues. Indeed, it is quite possible that the word *ἔκτρωμα* which St. Paul applies to himself in 1 Corinthians 15⁸ may have been an insulting epithet, flung at him in the first instance by these Judaising antagonists. It was true, they might say, that

* *Introduction to the New Testament* (E.T.), vol. i. pp. 262, 263.

he was a disciple and a member of the Christian household; but compared with those who had accepted Christ before, and as His followers had received the Pentecostal outpouring, St. Paul was but an "abortion," an imperfectly formed offspring. It is, again, not improbable that the members of this "Christ party" may have chosen to regard "tongue speech"—the phenomenon they associated with Pentecost—as a mark of original Christianity, and so encouraged its use among the Corinthians; all the more so if they perceived that the practice was disapproved of by St. Paul. Indeed, they may have pointed to his disapprobation as a mark of his deficient Christianity. "The mere fact," they would say, "that he cannot appreciate a gift so obviously Divine, but bestowed on the assembled Church before he became a disciple, betrays an imperfect grasp of Christian truth."

In the face of charges such as these how was St. Paul to act? He could not absolutely forbid the use of the glossolalia and declare that its presence was no necessary sign of a sincere, whole-hearted Christianity. In the face of what happened on the Day of Pentecost this would have been both rash and impolitic. The glossolalia was undoubtedly a *χάρισμα*, and must

be treated as such. But its only real use—with reference to the world generally—lay in the fact that it was a striking and arresting display of spiritual power; as such it was calculated to impress unbelievers.

There is a further criticism of the glossolalia which St. Paul seems to suggest, though he does not express it in so many words. It is this; that the glossolalia was appropriate, was, so to speak, in its right place, at the moment of the beginning of Christianity, when the powerful conviction of the Spirit was first experienced. In a very real sense the day of Pentecost was the beginning of the Church's career after the ascension of Jesus into heaven; and it is a remarkable fact that the two other occasions of the glossolalia recorded in Acts—those at Cæsarea and Ephesus—are both connected with the first acceptance of Christianity. On these occasions "speech in other tongues" was natural and spontaneous; they were transported by the power of the Spirit. But what was natural and appropriate in a moment of great religious crisis might easily become artificial and insincere if repeated on future occasions. What was a perfectly genuine outburst at the moment of conviction by the

Holy Spirit might, if constantly reproduced as a part of Christian worship, become not merely an unedifying spectacle in itself, but a real hindrance to true Christian growth.

Now it is a striking fact that St. Paul breaks off in the very middle of his discussion of the glossolalia with the words: "Brethren, be not children in mind: howbeit in malice be ye babes, but in mind be men."* He means them to understand, it would appear, that in the over-emphasis they laid on the glossolalia they were returning to the position of childhood—they were carrying on into the maturity of Christian life a thing that was only appropriate to the childhood, the beginnings, of their faith—and had no proper place in the more fully developed Christian life. The spirit of his words has been caught and well expressed by a recent writer:—

"The operation of the Holy Spirit must not be looked for in any abnormal, violent, or mysterious psychical experiences. Such convulsions of the soul have indeed in some cases marked the awakening into a new life; like a volcanic upheaval, they have brought to the surface hidden strata of the subconscious life;

* 1 Cor. 14²⁰.

but generally it is by the small voice, not by the earthquake or the fire, that God speaks to us. And the wish to strip ourselves of our own personality, to empty ourselves that God may fill the void, is a mistake. It is when we are most ourselves that we are nearest to God." *

St. Paul would not dispute that these remarkable psychological phenomena^s had their own place in God's scheme of things—but he held that to elevate them into one of the normal processes of the religious life was fatal to the Church's welfare.

But the passage under consideration (1 Cor. 14²⁰⁻²⁵) has a further point of interest. Immediately after the words to which we have referred he introduces the quotation from Isaiah 28^{11, 12}, in which God is said to be about to speak to His rebellious people *ἐν ἑτερογλώσσοις καὶ ἐν χείλεσιν ἐτέρων*. He then goes on to shew that tongues are a sign not to believers but to unbelievers, and that unsympathetic spectators coming into the Christian assembly when speech with tongues is in progress will say that the speakers are mad.

The *ἐτερογλώσσοις* of verse 21 is the nearest verbal parallel we have to the *ἐτέραις γλώσσαις*

* Inge, *Faith and Knowledge*, pp. 167, 168.

of Acts 2⁴. Is it, then, too fanciful to suppose that throughout this passage the Apostle has the episode of the Day of Pentecost in his mind? On that supposition we might paraphrase his words in some such fashion as this: "In the emphasis you lay on the gift of tongues you are returning to childhood's conditions, whereas you should now be fully grown men. It is true that on the Day of Pentecost, the day when the Church began its career of conquest, God bestowed His Holy Spirit in this startling and impressive way. Such a display was calculated to impress the representatives of the unbelieving world, which the Church was starting out to win for Christ. God had said of old that when His people was unfaithful He would speak to them *ἐν ἑτερογλώσσοις*, and it was by such mode of speech as this that His proclamation was heralded on the Day of Pentecost. But those days are now past. Christians must not spend their time in reproducing among themselves the phenomena that accompanied their first submission to the Spirit's power; they must edify one another and convince the world of sin by the higher gift of prophecy, which is appropriate to the maturity of their Christian life. There were mockers even on the Day of Pentecost,—and to

be constantly recalling the manifestations of that day, at a time when the exercise of a different and higher gift is more appropriate, will only give occasion for mockery of a similar kind. The glossolalia was right for the assembled Church at Pentecost, it was right for you at the moment of your spiritual birth—to cultivate it now is to go back from manhood to childhood.”

This seems to be a not unfair paraphrase of St. Paul's words in this context. The only serious obstacle to this view is his assertion in v.¹⁸: “I thank God I speak with tongues more than you all,” which, on the surface, would seem to imply that he exercised the glossolalia more than any of his converts. But the context as a whole must receive due weight. He proceeds immediately to say: “In the Church I had rather speak five words with my understanding, that I might instruct others also, than ten thousand words in a tongue.” It is hard to believe that he took the lead in a practice which he most obviously tolerated rather than encouraged. In view of this seeming conflict with the general context it is not unreasonable to question the soundness of the reading. There

is a suspicious fluctuation in the position of the *μᾶλλον*. The Latin of the Codex Claromontanus — which represents an ante-Hieronymian text — has “quod omnium vestrum linguam aliis loquor,” while the Vulgate has “quod omnium vestrum linguam loquor.” These variations, as well as the fluctuation between *λαλῶ* and *λαλῶν*, afford the presumption that some corruption may lurk in the text.

Even, however, if we regard the text as sound, we may not unreasonably suppose that St. Paul's exercise of the glossolalia was carried on in private.* He bids the Corinthian speak in tongues—if there be no interpreter—to “keep silence in the Church—to speak to himself and to God.”† It may have been in this way that the Apostle exercised the gift which he claimed to possess. In any case, we cannot suppose that he took the lead in making a public display of a gift which he regarded as lacking in edification and which he did his utmost to restrict.

This view, that the over-development of the glossolalia at Corinth may be connected with the presence of the “Christ party” from Jerusalem, is suggested as an attempt to account for St.

* *I.e.* to himself

† 1 Cor. 14²⁸.

Paul's peculiar treatment of the question. It is not bound up with any decided opinion as to the presence or absence of foreign languages in the glossolalia at Corinth, for speech in foreign languages may only have constituted one specific variety of the phenomenon. If the view we have taken of 1 Corinthians 14²⁰⁻²⁵ be correct, that it is a veiled allusion to the episode of Pentecost, then the use of *ἑτερογλώσσοις* there (which in its original setting can only have indicated "men of foreign speech") would seem to indicate that, on the Day of Pentecost at any rate, St. Paul believed the glossolalia to have included speech in foreign languages. It points even to the possibility that this particular form of the gift may have been manifested at Corinth too.

II.

THE LEGAL TERMINOLOGY IN THE EPISTLE TO THE GALA- TIAN.

Ἀδελφοί, κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω.

GALATIANS 3¹⁵.

II.

THE LEGAL TERMINOLOGY IN THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS.

THERE are, in the Epistle to the Galatians, certain passages in which St. Paul makes use of terms which have a distinctly legal connotation. The terms, it is true, are capable of being used in a more vague and general way; but they do happen in certain instances to be words that have a specific technical significance in legal procedure.

This proposition, set forth in such a carefully guarded form, is incontrovertibly true, and would doubtless meet with universal acceptance. Stated in any more precise and definite fashion it becomes the theme of acute controversy. No agreement, for example, has yet been reached as to the passages of the Epistle which ought to be included in the above-mentioned category. Some critics hold that Galatians 3¹⁵⁻²⁰ should be regarded as a reference to contemporary legal

procedure; others hold that the reference is entirely to the religious ideas and terminology of the Old Testament. In the passages, too, where the legal reference is fully admitted, it is debated whether the Apostle is alluding to the usage of Greek or of Roman Law, or whether, indeed, he has no particular system in view, but is merely using the terms in a popular and non-technical way.

To find an answer to these questions would be in itself a matter of some interest, for it would lead to a more exact understanding of St. Paul's modes of thought. It would be interesting to know whether he turned more readily for his illustrations to the Old Testament and Rabbinical tradition, or to the contemporary legal usage of the Gentile world. We should be better able to estimate the relation of St. Paul the Pharisee to St. Paul the Roman citizen. Any investigation which thus enabled us to grasp more fully his precise point of view would be of service towards a better understanding of his life and work as a whole.

In the present case, however, the interest does not end here. The question of the legal terminology in the Epistle to the Galatians has, of late years, been made to play a part in another

and, in some respects, a larger controversy—that of the locality of the Galatian Churches. The conflict between the North and South Galatian theories is still in progress: neither side can claim to have won a clear and undisputed victory. The opposing arguments now cover a wide field and deal with a great variety of subject-matter. Questions of Greek grammar, of geography, of archæology, of history are pressed into the service on either side; and now, at last, the legal references in the Epistle to the Galatians have been placed under examination from this point of view. It has been argued that these references, if rightly interpreted, go to shew that St. Paul is referring to legal procedure which is much more likely to have been in vogue in South Galatia than in North Galatia, and that therefore the legal allusions in the Epistle are to be counted as supporting the South Galatian theory. Still more recently this argument has been subjected to the most searching and, as it would appear, the most damaging criticism.

In addition, then, to the general interest of the investigation, we have this particular aspect of the problem claiming our attention: “Can the legal references be thus used in the interests

of the South Galatian theory?" To say that they cannot would, of course, by no means amount in itself to a rejection of the South Galatian hypothesis, for this argument is but one among many others. On the other hand, such a result to the inquiry might really be to the ultimate advantage of the South Galatian theory; for it is a wiser policy in critical as well as in any other form of strategy to evacuate a weaker position and concentrate one's forces in more impregnable strongholds.

The solution of this problem of the locality of the Galatian Churches, it may be remarked, is a matter of strictly historical and literary importance. No great doctrinal issue depends upon it. In the language of present-day politics, the question is not a "party" one; it is not one that divides orthodox from heterodox, or conservatives from "advanced" critics. This is obvious from a mere consideration of the names of the men who, on this topic, find themselves ranged in opposite camps; for here it may be very truly said that "a man's foes are they of his own household." In Germany, for example, two conservatives like Zahn and Zöckler find themselves divided—Zahn supporting the South Galatian and Zöckler the

North Galatian theory. Two "critical" writers like Hausrath and Lipsius are similarly divided—Hausrath upholding the South while Lipsius defends the North Galatian hypothesis. In England, too, there are similar divisions. Lightfoot held the North Galatian theory. It should be remembered, indeed, that his view was formed more than a generation ago, when the geography of Asia Minor and its condition under the early empire was not so well known as it is now. Yet, in face of all this increasing knowledge, Lightfoot is still followed by the Bishop of Ely and Professor Findlay, to whom are opposed, on the South Galatian side, Dr. Sanday, Mr. Rendall, and the great protagonist, Professor Ramsay. In the face of a question which causes such divisions as these one may well have long hesitation before reaching a final decision.

It is not the purpose of this essay to attempt a discussion of the problem in all its bearings, but simply to investigate the legal terminology that appears in the Epistle, and see to what extent, if at all, it bears upon the larger issue; to see how far it may legitimately be regarded as a weapon in the conflict, or whether, on the other hand, it has no claim to a place in the armoury of either party.

The recent literature bearing on this topic is so copious, and the varying points of view so perplexing, that it is a matter of some difficulty to decide how to arrange the materials in the most lucid and intelligible way. On the whole, the historical order appears to be the best. Certain points of view have become associated with the names of certain writers. The simplest method will be to examine their books and tractates in the order of their publication, and then try to form an estimate of the opposing points of view.

To carry out this plan we may proceed in some such fashion as the following. In the first place, the passages must be indicated in which legal phraseology is held to occur, and the views of commentators (more especially of Meyer and Lightfoot) on these passages discussed. We shall then be in a position to examine Dr. Halmel's tractate *Über römisches Recht im Galaterbrief* (Essen, 1895), in which is advanced, with the greatest ingenuity and plausibility, the view that St. Paul is using the technical terminology of Roman law with consistency and scientific exactness throughout. Professor Ramsay's *Historical Commentary on the Galatians* (1899) will next claim our con-

sideration. This work is very much influenced as Professor Ramsay admits, by the *Reichsrecht und Volksrecht* of Professor Mitteis (1891). On the general principles set out in this latter book Professor Ramsay formulates his theory that the legal references in the Epistle are not to Roman law at all, but to Greek law modified by local usage. Professor Ramsay's views on this point are subjected to a most searching scrutiny by Professor Schmiedel in the second volume of the *Encyclopædia Biblica* (1901), and full weight must be given to his criticisms. It may be mentioned that Ramsay and Schmiedel appeal constantly to the *Syro-Roman Law Book* of the fifth century, edited in 1880 by Bruns and Sachau at Berlin.

I.

The passages in the Epistle held to contain legal phraseology* are fortunately not very extensive. It will be convenient to transcribe them in the Greek for purposes of reference.

3¹⁵⁻²⁰: Ἀδελφοί, κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω ὅμως ἀνθρώπου κεκυρωμένην διαθήκην οὐδεὶς ἀθετεῖ ἢ ἐπιδιατάσ-

* Ramsay includes also 3⁷: οἱ ἐκ πίστεως, οὗτοι εἰσιν υἱοὶ Ἀβραάμ.

σεται. τῷ δὲ Ἀβραὰμ ἐρρήθησαν αἱ ἐπαγγελίαι, καὶ τῷ σπέρματι αὐτοῦ· οὐ λέγει Καὶ τοῖς σπέρμασιν ὡς ἐπὶ πολλῶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐφ' ἑνὸς Καὶ τῷ σπέρματί σου, ὃς ἐστὶ Χριστὸς. τοῦτο δὲ λέγω, διαθήκην προκεκυρωμένην ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὁ μετὰ τετρακόσια καὶ τριάκοντα ἔτη γεγονὼς νόμος οὐκ ἀκυροῦ, εἰς τὸ καταργῆσαι τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν. εἰ γὰρ ἐκ νόμου ἡ κληρονομία, οὐκέτι ἐξ ἐπαγγελίας· τῷ δὲ Ἀβραὰμ δι' ἐπαγγελίας κεχάρισται ὁ Θεός. τί οὖν ὁ νόμος; τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν προσετέθη, ἄχρις οὗ ἔλθῃ τὸ σπέρμα ᾧ ἐπήγγελται, διαταγείς δι' ἀγγέλων ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου. ὁ δὲ μεσίτης ἑνὸς οὐκ ἔστιν, ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἷς ἐστίν.

3²⁹ : εἰ δὲ ὑμεῖς Χριστοῦ, ἄρα τοῦ Ἀβραὰμ σπέρμα ἐστέ, κατ' ἐπαγγελίαν κληρονόμοι.

4^{1.2} : Λέγω δὲ, ἐφ' ὅσον χρόνον ὁ κληρονόμος νηπιός ἐστιν, οὐδέν διαφέρει δούλου, κύριος πάντων ὢν, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἐπιτρόπους ἐστὶ καὶ οἰκονόμους ἄχρι τῆς προθεσμίας τοῦ πατρὸς.

4⁵ : ἵνα τοὺς ὑπὸ νόμον ἐξαγοράσῃ, ἵνα τὴν υἰοθεσίαν ἀπολάβωμεν.

4⁷ : εἰ δὲ υἱός, καὶ κληρονόμος διὰ Θεοῦ.

In the first of these passages the word διαθήκη in v.¹⁵ gives the earliest occasion for critical disputation. The question is whether the word is used in a strictly Biblical or in a secular sense, —whether, as in the LXX, it represents the Hebrew בְּרִית, and should be translated “cove-

nant," or whether it means "will" in the sense of a testamentary disposition, and should be so translated here.

Nothing very decisive on this point can be gained from patristic commentators. The translation in the Vulgate is "testamentum." Jerome, however, in his comment on the passage, says: "Si quis diligenter Hebræa volumina et cæteras editiones cum Septuaginta Interpretum translatione contulerit inveniet ubi testamentum scriptum est, non 'testamentum' sonare sed 'pactum' quod Hebræa sermone dicitur Berith." * He, however, explicitly states, a few lines before, that the other interpretation of the passage had its supporters: "Putant aliqui quod de testamento hominis et de testatoris morte, et cæteris humanæ similitudinis disputaturus exemplis, dixerit: Fratres secundum hominem dico." †

Chrysostom's comment seems to shew that he may be counted among those who regard *διαθήκη* as meaning here "a will." He says: 'Εὰν ἄνθρωπος, φησὶ, διάθηται, μὴ πολλὰ τις ἀνατρέψαι μετὰ ταῦτα ἐλθὼν ἢ προσθεῖναι τι; τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν "ἢ ἐπιδιατάσσεται." ‡

* *Comment. in Epist. ad Galatas*, lib. ii. cap. iii. 439 C. (ed. Vallarsi).

† *Loc. cit.* 439 B.

‡ *Comment. in Epist. ad Galat.* 701 C.

There is no doubt whatever that Ambrosiaster took this view of the passage. His comment on the whole verse may be quoted.

“‘Fratres, secundum hominem dico.’ Hoc dicit, quia exemplo humanæ causæ commendare vult rationem divinæ promissionis. ‘Hominis testamentum, confirmatum tamen, nemo irritum facit, aut superordinat.’ Verum est quia testamentum defuncti jure factum non potest scindi.” *

Modern critics continue to be divided on this point. Lightfoot and Meyer, followed quite recently by Rendall,† hold that *διαθήκη* here means “covenant.” The grounds for this belief are the general usage of *διαθήκη* in the LXX and the demands of the context in this particular passage. St. Paul proceeds in the next breath to refer to God’s covenant with Abraham, and then goes on to refer to the giving of the Law to Israel. On the other hand, Meyer-Sieffert,‡ Ramsay and Schmiedel all agree in translating *διαθήκη* by “will.” In supporting this view, Ramsay, for example, does not deny that the general Biblical meaning of *διαθήκη* is “covenant.” But he holds

* *Comment. in Epist. ad Galatas*, 355 BC. (Migne, *Pat. Lat.* vol. 17).

† *Expositor’s Greek Testament*, vol. iii. p. 170.

‡ 7th ed. 1886.

that in this passage there are unmistakable indications that "will" is meant.

He thinks, in the first place, that the phrase *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω* points decisively to this interpretation. St. Paul is using the word as it was used in the everyday life of an Eastern city, and not according to the special usage of the LXX. Secondly, the subsequent reference to an "inheritance" in v.¹⁸ seems to indicate that "will" is the appropriate rendering of *διαθήκη*.

With reference to this latter point, it may be questioned whether the reasoning is quite conclusive. The conception of "inheritance" to express some, at least, of the blessings assigned to the children of Abraham—in consequence of the Divine Covenant with Abraham—was a quite familiar one to the Jewish mind. That the juxtaposition not only of the two ideas, but even of the two words, was not impossible is seen by a sentence of Justin Martyr: *Νυνὶ δὲ ἀνέγνω γάρ, ὃ Τρύφων, ὅτι ἔσοιτο καὶ τελευταῖος νόμος καὶ διαθήκη κυριωτάτη πασῶν, ἣν νῦν δέον φυλάσσειν πάντας ἀνθρώπους, ὅσοι τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ κληρονομίας ἀντιποιούνται.** Throughout this passage and its context *διαθήκη* undoubtedly means "covenant," yet it is used in connection with the Divine *κληρονομία*.

* *Dial. cum Tryphone*, 228 B.

The words *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω* are important. This particular phrase only occurs in the three Epistles 1 Corinthians, Galatians, and Romans. The passages are: Romans 3⁵, 1 Corinthians 9⁸ (*λαλῶ*), and Galatians 3¹⁵. In all the three passages the expression means to express one's thought—even about the ways of God—in a form taken from human affairs, to illustrate it by a reference to mundane practices or ways of thought. To this extent the phrase does not help us to a solution of the present difficulty, for a "covenant" and a "will" are equally human institutions. To the present writer, however, it seems that something more decisive may be gathered from the passage in 1 Corinthians 9⁸. St. Paul has just been maintaining his own claim as an Apostle to receive support from the Church. He has illustrated his claim by a series of comparisons with other recipients of support in return for work—the soldier, the vine dresser, the shepherd. He then goes on: *μὴ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον ταῦτα λαλῶ; ἢ καὶ ὁ νόμος ταῦτα οὐ λέγει; ἐν γὰρ τῷ Μωσέως νόμῳ γέγραπται, Οὐ φιμώσεις βοῦν ἀλοῶντα*. Now, the point of these words seems to be that the phrase *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λαλῶ* does not merely indicate a human mode of expressing a Divine truth, but rather, an illustration taken

from human life around, *as opposed to one taken from Scripture*. The *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον* is opposed to the *ἐν τῷ νόμῳ . . . γέγραπται*.

If this view of the expression in 1 Corinthians 8⁹ be well founded it may serve to throw light on our present passage. It may indicate that by the phrase *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω* St. Paul wishes it to be understood that he is taking his illustration not from Scripture but from the affairs of daily life amid which the Galatian converts lived ;* that he is therefore not using *διαθήκη* in its Jewish but in its Gentile sense ; that he does not mean a "covenant" but "a will."

Assuming this, provisionally, to be the case, we have next to ask the question whether the *οὐδεὶς* is the same subject as the *ἄνθρώπου*, *i.e.* whether the statement is that a man cannot nullify or add further clauses to his own will, or that when a man has made a will no other person can invalidate it or make alterations in it. The latter view is strongly supported by both Meyer and Meyer-Sieffert, and apparently by Lightfoot, though he makes no definite remark on the point. It seems, on the whole, the

* Chrysostom *in loc.* says that the Apostle is speaking ἐξ ἀνθρωπίνων παραδειγμάτων, and contrasts this with an illustration taken ἀπὸ γραφῶν. He also quotes 1 Corinthians 9⁷ as a parallel.

most probable one,—but we shall have occasion later to discuss the point at greater length.

With reference to v.¹⁶, the generally held view is, that St. Paul is laying stress on the fact that a singular noun (σπέρμα) is used to indicate the offspring of Abraham—where a plural like τὰ τέκνα or οἱ ἀπόγονοι might conceivably have been employed; and, that this fact points to the one individual Christ as being the true seed of Abraham. The Rabbis applied the promises made to Abraham to the Messiah, and St. Paul would seem here to be following Rabbinical principles of interpretation.

The next point to which it is necessary at this stage to call attention is the statement about the Law in v.¹⁹, διαταγείς δι' ἀγγέλων ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου, with more particular reference to the last three words.

The question is, Who was the Mediator? In answering this we have an opportunity of observing the powerful influence of Origen as a commentator. He was misled by the statement in 1 Timothy 2⁵, εἰς καὶ μεσίτης θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἄνθρωπος Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς, into referring the term, in our passage also, to Christ. His words are found in a fragment of his commentary on the Epistle to the Colossians, incorporated in the

Apology of the Martyr Pamphilus. The passage runs: "Data est autem lex Moysi per angelos in manu et virtute mediatoris Christi, qui cum esset in principio Verbum Dei, et apud Deum esset, et Deus esset Verbum, Patri in omnibus ministravit. Omnia enim per ipsum facta sunt, id est, non solum creaturæ, sed et lex et Prophetæ; et ipse est Mediator Dei et hominum." * Jerome follows this interpretation, and seems to paraphrase Origen's words: "In manu Mediatoris Christi Jesu, quia omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil: non solum cælum, terra, mare et universa quæ cerminus, sed etiam illa quæ per Moysen duro populo quasi jugum Legis imposita sunt. Scribitur et ad Timotheum: Unus enim Deus, unus et Mediator." †

Chrysostom's brief comment is to the same effect: *Μεσίτην δὲ ἐνταῦθα τὸν Χριστόν φησι, δεικνὺς ὅτι προῆν, καὶ τὸν νόμον αὐτὸς ἔδωκεν.* ‡ Ambrosiaster follows Origen and Jerome in directly connecting the words with those of 1 Timothy 2⁵: "Lex . . . disposita est a Deo in manu, id est potestate Salvatoris; ipse est enim mediator et reconciliator Dei et hominum." §

That the reference of *μεσίτης* to Christ was

* Vol. iv., ed. Delarue, p. 692.

‡ *Loc. cit.* 702 C.

† *Loc. cit.* p. 441 A. B.

§ *Loc. cit.* § 221, p. 356 D.

quite unsuitable to this context was seen as early as the fourth century by Basil. He perceived the proper application of the word to Moses, and supported his view by a reference to Exodus 20¹⁹: ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου (δηλαδὴ τοῦ Μωϋσέως), κατὰ τὴν πρόκλησιν τοῦ λαοῦ λέγοντος. Δάλησον σὺ, φησὶ, πρὸς ἡμᾶς, καὶ μὴ λαλείτω πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁ Θεός.*

Theodoret also unhesitatingly refers the words to Moses: Ἐτέθη δὲ ἀγγέλων ὑπουργούντων, καὶ τῇ τούτου θέσει Μωυσέως διακονούντος. Αὐτὸν γὰρ μεσίτην ἐκάλεσε.†

Gennadius (quoted in Ecumenius), commenting on ὁ δὲ μεσίτης ἐνὸς οὐκ ἐστίν, takes the same view: λέγει τοίνυν, ὅτι Μωσῆς μὲν ἐμεσίτευσε πρὸς τὴν δόσιν τοῦ νόμου.‡

The reference of the word to Moses has the practically unanimous support of modern scholars.

On 4^{1.2}—a passage full of technical words—Lightfoot's view is that St. Paul does not appear to use the legal terminology of any system with technical exactness, but "seems to put forward rather the general conception of the office of a guardian, than any definite statute regulating

* *De Spiritu Sancto*, 27 C. (vol. iii. p. 37, ed. Garnier).

† *Interpretatio Epist. ad Galat.* 481 B. (Migne, *Patr. Græc.* vol. lxxxii.).

‡ *Ibid.* 1730 D. 1731 D. (Migne, *Patr. Græc.* vol. lxxxv.).

it." He thinks that *νήπιος* probably represents the Latin "infans," although it does not seem to have been a technical term in Attic Law (the distinction there being between *παῖς* and *ἄνῆρ*). So also he regards *ἐπιτρόπους καὶ οἰκονόμους* as having the general sense of "controllers of person and of property." This conception of the meaning of the words seems certainly to underlie the various translations of the Latin Fathers. For instance, the translator of Origen, the Vulgate, Ambrosiaster, Jerome, all render *οἰκονόμους* by "actores." The translator of Theodore of Mopsuestia renders it by "dispensatores." The chief function of both the "actor" and the "dispensator" was the control and management of property. *Ἐπιτρόπους* is variously rendered by "curatores," "tutores," and "procuratores." This variety is sufficient to shew that *ἐπιτρόπους* did not carry any exact technical significance patent to the minds of all readers.

On the words *τῆς προθεσμίας* (*sc. ἡμέρας*) the difficulty arises, that whereas St. Paul seems to speak of the appointed day for the cessation of guardianship as being fixed by the father, it was according to Roman Law fixed by statute. There seem to be indications, however, that under certain particular circumstances the time might be

fixed by the father. To this we shall have to return more particularly later. It may suffice at present to say either that St. Paul must be supposed to use the term in a vague and general way, or that he is speaking from an exact knowledge which includes even exceptional cases.

In 4⁵ we have the allusion to the practice of adoption—*υιοθεσία*. As this was a Greek and Roman, but not a Jewish custom, St. Paul is obviously drawing his illustration from a purely Gentile institution. The fact that he does so is interesting, as indicative of his mode of teaching; but for the question with which this paper is occupied, as to the respective claims of Greek and Roman Law, it has no decisive significance.

This brief sketch may serve to indicate the problems that arise in those sections of the Epistle with which we are concerned. In it we have glanced at the interpretations of ancient and modern commentators. We have now to examine, on their merits, two opposing theories. That, in the first place, of Halmel, which holds that the whole legal argument in the Epistle is deliberately and consistently framed on the lines of Roman procedure. Secondly, Ramsay's, which sees in it Greek Law, influenced in varying ways by local usage.

II.

It will be most convenient to state Halmel's theory as a connected whole, without the addition of any criticisms or comments. These may be reserved for a final review of the whole question. This method of treatment will make it more easy to appreciate the inter-relationship of the various parts of the theory, and so more easy to do full justice to its claims. We may begin by giving a conspectus of the words which St. Paul is said to use with a technical reference, along with the corresponding Roman terms.

| | | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------|---|-------------------------------|
| 3 ¹⁵ | ἀθετεῖν | } | rumpere, irritum facere |
| 3 ¹⁷ | ἀκυροῦν | | |
| 3 ¹⁵ . 17 | διαθήκη | | testamentum |
| 3 ¹⁵ | ἐπιδιατάσσεσθαι | | insuper mandare |
| 3 ¹⁶ | λέγειν (ἐρρήθησαν) | | dicere (promittere) |
| 3 ¹⁸ | κληρονομία | | hereditas |
| 3 ²⁹ 4 ¹ | κληρονόμος | | heres |
| 3 ¹⁹ . 20 | μεσίτης | | mediator, persona interposita |
| 4 ¹ | νήπιος | | pupillus, infans |
| 4 ² | ἐπίτροποι | | tutores |
| 4 ² | οἰκονόμοι | | curatores |
| 4 ² | προθεσμία | | tempus præstitutum |

In 3¹⁵ not only is the word *ἀνθρώπου* to be emphasised, but also *κεκυρωμένη*. St. Paul is going to compare the promise made by God to

Abraham with a testamentary disposition—a will.* In v.¹⁶ he will shew how this will is a *valid* one. In v.¹⁵ he merely, by the emphatic word *κεκυρωμένη*, states the fact.

The question at once arises whether the testator is, in this passage, supposed to be alive or dead. On the latter supposition the word *οὐδεὶς* is to be taken without any limitation. When a man has made a will, and is dead, no other person whatever can, legally, either annul, alter, or make additions to the provisions of that will. If, however, the reference is held to be to what can happen while the testator is still living, then the word *οὐδεὶς* must be limited by the exception of the testator himself. In this case the sentence must mean: "In the case even of a human will no one (except the testator himself) annuls or makes additions to it."

The Apostle does not explicitly make this exception, because he regarded it as a perfectly self-evident one. He knew that it was quite possible, in accordance with Roman Law, for a man to make a valid will and then afterwards to invalidate it (*ἀθετεῖν*, *ἀκυροῦν*,—*rumpere*, or *irritum facere*; cf. also *καταργῆσαι* in v.¹⁷) by a

* Halmel seems to hold that the reference to an "inheritance" in v.¹⁸ is decisive for making *διαθήκη* here mean "will."

later will, or to add additional clauses to the original will (ἐπιδιατάσσεσθαι v.¹⁵, προστιθέναι v.¹⁹). The words of Justinian declare this clearly: "Posteriore quoque testamento, quod jure perfectum est, superius rumpitur." * To this may be added the dictum: "Suprema voluntas potior habetur. Nemo enim eam sibi potest legem dicere, ut a priore (sc. voluntate) ei recedere non liceat." †

This view of the case—that the testator, while alive, can annul or make additions to his will—is borne out by the fact that a little further on God is said to make an addition to His original διαθήκη (the giving of the Promise) by the giving of the Law (οὐκ ἄκυροί v.¹⁹, προσετέθη v.¹⁹), i.e. He is said to act as a man might quite conceivably do while still alive. A testator may add a codicil to his will.

We proceed, then, on the assumption that St. Paul compares God's action in bestowing the Promise on Abraham and afterwards following it by the gift of the Law, with the action of a man who, while still alive, adds an additional clause to his already valid will.

On this basis we may go on to assert that

* *Institutes*, lib. ii. tit. xvii. § 2.

† *Digest*. lib. xxxii. § 22.

God's act in giving the Law amounts either to the annulment (*ἀθετεῖν*) or to the making of additions to (*ἐπιδιατάσσεσθαι*) the already bestowed Promise.

The Law would be an annulment of the Promise, if the Promise were not the final expression of God's will, set forth in legally valid form. But this is exactly what the Promise is. That it is the final expression of God's will, will be shewn in v.^{18b}; that the form of its expression is legally valid, according to the conceptions of Roman Law, will be shewn in v.¹⁶. Under these circumstances the effect of the Law on the Promise cannot be that of annulment; it can only be related to it as an *ἐπιδιατεταγμένον*.

St. Paul, then, is going to shew that the relation of the Law to the Promise is that of an additional clause to an already valid will. That is why in v.¹⁵ he contemplates the possibility of such a thing in the verb *ἐπιδιατάσσεται*, and in v.¹⁹ uses the expressions *διαταγείς* and *προσετέθη* of the Law. To put the matter in a slightly different form, the Law is an *ἐπιδιαταγή* to the Promise, because God, who is the Author of both, does not abolish the latter by the former.

Now, St. Paul knew that a will, to be valid,

must fulfil certain requirements, and it is his aim to shew that these conditions had been fulfilled in the bestowal of the Promise on Abraham, viewed in the character of a testamentary disposition. Such requirements would be in his mind as those stated by Gaius: "Si quæramus an valeat testamentum, imprimis animadvertere debemus, an is, qui fecerit testamentum, habuerit testamenti factionem; deinde si habuerit, requiremus, an secundum regulas juris civilis testatus sit."* St. Paul's proof that God's disposition had this validity is contained in the words τῷ σπέρματι . . . ὃς ἐστὶ Χριστὸς. That he regarded the words καὶ τῷ σπέρματι as highly important is evident by the careful explanation which he gives them.

The whole weight of the proof, according to St. Paul's presentation of it, rests on the fact that the singular σπέρματι is used instead of the plural σπέρμασι. But the explanation of this is not to be found in the influence of Rabbinical exegesis, but in the principles of Roman Civil Law. He was well aware, from his knowledge of this Civil Law, that a testamentary disposition framed in the words τῷ Ἀβραὰμ καὶ τῷ σπέρματι αὐτοῦ was valid (*Secundum regulas juris civilis*),

* *Digest*. lib. xxviii. § 1, sec. 5 (Gaius, *Inst.* ii. 144).

whereas framed in the words τῷ Ἀβραὰμ καὶ τοῖς σπέρμασιν αὐτοῦ it would have been invalid. The reason for this was that by the singular σπέρμα was indicated a single concrete personality, marked by individual traits—the one person, Christ—in legal terminology a “persona certa.” If the plural σπέρματα had been used, or even if σπέρμα had been used in a collective sense,* the case would have been quite different. No concrete person would then have been indicated—the recipients of the Promise would have been, in legal terminology, “personæ incertæ.” The legal definition of a “persona incerta” is given by Gaius:† “Incerta videtur persona quam per incertam opinionem animo suo testator subicit.” It is probably this dictum of Gaius that is quoted by Justinian in the *Institutes*, with only a slight verbal difference: “Incerta persona videbatur, quam incerta opinione animo suo testator subiciebat.”‡

The fact of chief importance, however, for our present purpose is this. No such “personæ incertæ” could benefit by a testamentary disposition. The words of Gaius are quite clear:

* Halmel does not deny its constant usage in a collective sense, but he thinks St. Paul intentionally excludes that sense here.

† Gaius, ii. 238.

‡ *Institutes*, lib. ii. tit. xx. § 25.

“*Incerta persona heres institui non potest*,” on the ground that “*certum consilium debet esse testantis*.”* St. Paul, then, uses the fact, that wills disposing property to “*personæ incertæ*” are invalid, to shew that the promise made to Abraham was valid, inasmuch as it was made with reference to a “*persona certa*.”

If the question were to be raised: What then becomes of the *σπέρματα*, Abraham’s descendants after the flesh, the answer would be that they only become recipients of the Promise through union with the real heir—the “*persona certa*”—Christ.

St. Paul’s argument might conveniently be thrown into a syllogistic form in something like the following terms:—

Major Premiss.—When a man has made a will, no one (except the testator himself) either annuls or makes additions to it (v.¹⁵).

Minor Premiss.—The bestowing of the Promise on Abraham by God is expressed in the form of a legally valid will (v.¹⁶).

Conclusion.—No one annuls or makes additions to the Promise (except God, the original donor).

* Gaius, ii. 242.

As a matter of fact, He does not annul it by the giving of the Law (*οὐκ ἀκυροῖ*), but He makes a further addition to it (*προσέτεθη*) (vv. 17. 19).

It is of the highest importance for the understanding of this argument to observe precisely what St. Paul says in v. 17. The words are : *διαθήκην προκεκυρωμένην . . . νόμος οὐκ ἀκυροῖ*. "The law *does not* annul." He is speaking of a fact, not of a possibility. It is quite possible for any man to cancel a previous will by a later one ("posteriore quoque testamento, quod jure perfectum est, superius rumpitur"). The point that the Apostle is making is that the Law does not, as a matter of fact, annul the Promise : from which fact the conclusion is, that the Law does not stand to the Promise in the relation of a later will to an earlier one. To speak of an inherent impossibility, and to translate *οὐκ ἀκυροῖ* "*cannot annul*" is to miss the whole point of St. Paul's argument. What he is labouring to shew is, if the Law were a *διαθήκη κεκυρωμένη* it *would* annul the Promise. But it does not, as a matter of fact, do so (*οὐκ ἀκυροῖ*). Hence the Law is shewn to be not a will at all, but only an additional clause added to the original

Will (the Promise), which still remains perfectly valid.

This may be more clearly seen by putting St. Paul's words in their logical sequence: *διαθήκην προκεκυρωμένην ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὁ νόμος οὐκ ἀκυροῖ [ἀλλὰ] (τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν) προσετέθη, ἄχρισ οὐ ἔλθῃ, κ.τ.λ.* The juxtaposition of *διαθήκην προκεκυρωμένην* with *ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ* is probably intentional on the Apostle's part. He wishes to indicate the irrevocability and the unalterableness of the Promise. The bestowing of the Promise was a valid *διαθήκη*; and if God were to invalidate it by a later *διαθήκη* there would seem to be a dualism in His determinations such as would be quite incompatible with the Divine character.

The Law is not a *διαθήκη* because it has bound up with it no *κληρονομία* (hereditas). God gave the inheritance to Abraham and his seed as a free gift "by promise." Had the inheritance been *ἐκ νόμου*, this would have meant that it was to be obtained *ἐξ ἔργων νόμου*. But what a man gains by works is to be reckoned as reward, or wages; he does not receive it as a free gift from the voluntary disposition of some testator. The Law points exclusively in the direction of wages, reward for human action.

This fundamental conception is quite different from that of the reception of gifts by testamentary disposition. Pay is not inheritance. The principle on which this argument rests—that the Law cannot be a *διαθήκη* in the sense that the Promise was, because it is not concerned, as the Promise was, with inheritance (*κληρονομία*)—is set forth by Gaius: “Testamenta vim ex institutione heredis accipiunt, et ob id velut caput et fundamentum intelligitur totius testamenti heredis institutio.”* From this point of view it is obvious that the Law lacks the fundamental characteristic of a will.

This conception of the Law is widely different from that of St. Paul’s Judaising opponents. They held, that to attain to righteousness, men must not only receive the Promise but fulfil the Law. They looked on the two as having equal worth, and construed them both in a positive sense. In opposition to this view St. Paul regarded the Law as being an addition to the Promise, of a purely formal and negative kind, possessing no retrospective effect on the object of the Promise, that is, the inheritance.

We may pause at this point to sum up the results which we have hitherto reached.

* Gaius, ii. 229.

The inheritance (*κληρονομία*) is connected with the Promise, that first *διαθήκη προκεκυρωμένη* of God, and not with the Law. The Law has no relation to an inheritance; it is therefore not a *διαθήκη*, and it does not therefore annul the first *διαθήκη* of God, but is only a later clause added to it. Inasmuch as it does not alter the disposition of the *κληρονομία* made in that first *διαθήκη* it is only an addition of a formal, and not of a material, kind.

Such an addition is a codicil. And this conception leads to the same result as that reached by the former line of argument, for it is clearly laid down in Roman Law that a codicil cannot affect inheritance. We find in Gaius: "*codicillis heres non instituitur*,"* and Justinian says: "*codicillis hereditas neque dari neque adimi potest*."† Thus the legal inferiority of a codicil as compared with a will illustrates the inferiority and transitoriness of the Law as compared with the Promise.

The reason for the addition of this codicil—the Law, is given in the words *τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν προσετέθη*. This phrase is the only fragment of a theological kind in an argument that

* Gaius, ii. 273.

† Justinian, *Institutes*, lib. ii. tit. xxv. § 2.

is otherwise constructed on the lines of Roman Law. The idea suggested by it is more fully worked out in the Epistle to the Romans. What is there expressed at much greater length is here indicated in the briefest manner. The words *ὑπὸ Θεοῦ* should be supplied with *προσέτεθη*, just as they were to be understood with *ἐρρήθησαν* in v.¹⁶. In the latter passage, the Apostle was simply laying stress on the fact that the disposition made was a legally valid one; in the former, on the fact that the Law was added in the manner of a codicil. In neither was it necessary for his purpose to make explicit reference to the testator—God.

The Law, then, in its character as a codicil, had but a subordinate significance. It had reference to a transient condition of things, *ἄχρις οὗ ἔλθῃ τὸ σπέρμα ᾧ ἐπηγγέλται*. Until the seed should come, the inheritance was but a "hereditas jacens." When the heir comes and the inheritance is taken up, then the validity of the Law ceases. Thus the words serve to bring out the transitory validity of the Law as opposed to the permanent and unalterable validity of the Promise.

This aspect of the Law is still further emphasised by the words *διαταγὰς δι' ἀγγέλων ἐν χειρὶ*

μεσίτου. Διαταγὴς points back to ἐπιδιατασσεται in v.¹⁵. It may possibly be that the intervening προσ- in προσετέθη has made the addition of ἐπὶ- to the διαταγὴς unnecessary. The contrast, of course, is between that which is direct and that which is mediated. The Promise was bestowed directly on Abraham; the Law was given through angels.

The μεσίτης referred to is Moses. But the question is, In what sense does St. Paul apply this term to Moses, and how does the application bear on his conception of the Law?

The generally accepted view is that Moses was the mediator between God and the people. The mediator is conceived as a person standing between two contracting parties. This view, however, rests on a fundamental error. It rests on the idea that we are dealing with the relationship of two contracting parties. But throughout the whole of this section of the Epistle there is no hint either of a contract or of any legal transaction comparable to a contract. The leading idea of the whole passage is that of a testamentary disposition, a will, and the inheritance bestowed by that will. In other words, it is an entirely "one-sided" transaction that is referred to, containing no idea of a Contract.

There is no reference, in the passage, to the Jews as contracting parties in their reception of the Law. For the giving of the Law, just like the bestowing of the Promise, was a "one-sided" transaction, for the Law was only an additional clause to the unalterable *διαθήκη*, holding good till the heir of the *διαθήκη* should come.

St. Paul regarded the Law as inferior to the Promise. The reason for the inferiority was not that the Law was mediated, and the Promise was not, but that the Promise was permanent and unalterable, whereas the Law was only intended to apply to an "interim."

If Moses, then, was not the mediator *between* God and the people, in what sense was he a mediator? The answer may be most clearly expressed thus. God had promised the inheritance to Abraham and his seed. Four hundred and thirty years after, that seed was still unborn; hence, the inheritance was still a "*hereditas jacens*." With a view to prolonging this state of things, God gave the Law, holding good only for an interim, as a supplementary disposition, until the coming of the heir. But God needed some one in whose hands He might place this transitory, supplementary disposition. For this purpose He chose His servant Moses.

Moses therefore was the mediator, in that he came in between the bestowing of the Promise on Abraham and the fulfilling of it in Christ. In other words, "mediator" is to be interpreted in a *temporal* sense. Moses was the mediator, not between two contracting parties, but between two time-limits—between the bestowal of the Promise and its fulfilment. From this the transition in thought is easy to Moses as the representative of the Law, as Abraham was the representative of Promise and Christ the representative of fulfilment.

This view is, of course, opposed to the strictly historical view, which rightly regards Moses as the mediator between God and the people. It is an abstract theological view, and it conceives Moses as the representative of Law coming in the midst between Promise and fulfilment. In support of this view it may be urged that St. Paul is here treating Abraham in a precisely similar way. In v.¹⁶ he is not conceived in his strictly historical character as the father of the Jewish people, but in his "theological" character as the father of those who obtain righteousness,—are accounted righteous—by faith.

V.²⁰ is a further development of the thought, that the Law has only been added to the Pro-

mise in a transitory way until the coming of the heir. Moses, as we have seen, intervenes between the Promise and the fulfilment. In a sense, then, he is a mediator between two. But the God who bestowed the Promise is the God who accomplishes its fulfilment. He is One in promising and in fulfilling. There is no real break, no alteration in His disposition of the inheritance. Hence the place and function of Moses indicates no opposition or contradiction in the Divine plans. It was, it is true, an addition devised for an intermediate period, but in no way affecting the essential character of the original Divine *διαθήκη*. In fact, the Law, so far from being opposed to the Promise, was intended in its own subordinate transitory fashion to lead to the fulfilment of the Promise.

The words of v.²⁹ refer back to v.¹⁶, and supply a link in the chain which was omitted there. The verse states the truth, that it is only through union with Christ, the true *σπέρμα*, the "persona certa" indicated in God's *διαθήκη*, that we become ourselves heirs, participators in the blessing bestowed.

In 4¹⁻² we have a further proof that Law, as compared with Promise, has but a transient and secondary significance. The thought here still

moves in the region of Roman Civil Law, but the details are slightly different. In the former passage (3¹⁵⁻²⁰) Law with its transient validity was simply opposed to the Promise with its permanent validity. Here it is the condition under the Law that is contrasted with the condition under the Promise. In the former passage the heir was regarded as not yet existing. In the present one the heir exists, but is still a minor. In both cases we have indicated a period of transitory duration. In the former instance the interval was that between promise and fulfilment; in the present instance it is the interval between the death of the testator and the heir's arrival at his majority.

The idea which St. Paul expressed by the conception of the *μεσίτης* in v.¹⁹ he here expresses by the conception of *ἐπίτροποι* and *οἰκονόμοι*. These functionaries are in a sense *μεσίται*, as Moses was; for it is their part to fill a place in an intermediate and transitory state.

The supposition of the passage is that the testator is dead. Hence the *ἐπίτροποι* and *οἰκονόμοι* here will correspond respectively to the "tutores" and "curatores" of Roman Law. This correspondence has often failed to win

recognition, because of the contradiction held to exist in the words ἄχρι τῆς προθεσμίας τοῦ πατρός. For it is generally supposed that in Roman Law the duration of guardianship and the coming of age which terminated it were not determined by the wish of individual testators, but by statute. Justinian, it is true, lays it down in the *Institutes* that the completion of the fourteenth year marked the entry on puberty and the corresponding freedom from supervision. "Pubertatem in masculis post quartum decimum annum ilico initium accipere disposuimus.* That, however, there was a difference of opinion on the point would seem to be a legitimate inference from the strife that existed between the Cassiani and the Proculiani. The former seem to have held that the time of arrival at puberty might differ in different cases; the latter, that the completion of the fourteenth year should be the absolute and universal rule. That is the account given by Ulpian: "Puberem autem Cassiani eum dicunt, qui habitu corporis pubes apparet, Proculiani autem eum, qui quatuordecim annos explevit."† This inference is considerably strengthened by a passage in the *Institutes* of Justinian. The words are: "Ad

* *Institutes*, lib. i. tit. xxii.

† Ulpian, xi. 28.

certum tempus, vel ex certo tempore, vel sub condicione, vel ante heredis institutionem possidere tutorem non dubitatur."*

If these passages may be taken to justify us in supposing that under certain conditions there were exceptions to the general rule, and that the testator might in his will designate the termination of the period of guardianship, then St. Paul, in speaking of "the term appointed of the Father," is referring to a usage sanctioned by the Roman Civil Law.

The results of this discussion may now be summed up in a few sentences. The Apostle's thought is moving in the sphere of Roman Civil Law. The dominating conception is that of a Will, the conditions of its validity, the relation to it of a subsequently added codicil. In the second passage the conception is that of an heir, still a minor, under guardians, the term of whose office is determined by the father's will. St. Paul holds that the Promise bestowed on Abraham has the unalterable validity of a rightly executed will. It is referred to in correctly expressed terms; it is devised to a "persona certa," Christ. The subsequently bestowed Law had merely the secondary character of a codicil.

* *Institutes*, lib. i. tit. xiv. § 3.

That it was not a second will was apparent from the fact that it had no concern with an inheritance ; it simply was a temporary additional arrangement, with the ultimate aim of carrying out the intention of the original will. Moses the mediator was so called as the representative of the Law in this intermediate period between promise and fulfilment. The condition of those who in this intermediate period were under the Law is comparable to that of a ward in his minority till the time of his majority arrives.

We have now sketched in outline Halmel's interpretation of the passages in question. Whatever estimate be formed of his theory as a whole, it will hardly be denied that it has the merit of consistency. The initial comparison of the Promise with a Will is carried into various details, in the working out of which the Apostle shews himself familiar not merely with the general principles, but also with the more recondite technical terminology of Roman Law. It will be convenient to reserve more detailed criticism for a later stage of our investigation. Before, however, leaving this portion of the inquiry, we may indicate in a few words the conclusion which Halmel, the author of the fore-

going theory, thinks that the theory inevitably necessitates. He thinks that in the first half of the first century A.D. the settlement of Roman citizens and the possession of full Roman citizenship in Asia, and even in Greece, was the exception rather than the rule. Hence when St. Paul, with no other introduction than the words *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω*, begins to use the terms of Roman Law, apparently on the assumption that the meaning of those terms will be self-evident to his readers, we can only suppose that he was writing in Rome, or at any rate in Italy, where he would be in the midst of these ideas. In supposing the Epistle to be written from Rome, Halmel is simply returning to the view generally held by patristic writers. Eusebius of Emesa, Jerome, Theodoret, and Euthalius all date the Epistle from Rome. On this hypothesis it would seem to be placed last in the series of the four great Epistles, and would have to be regarded as being composed during the early days of the first imprisonment. Whatever be the value of the theory as to St. Paul's use of Roman Law, this inference as to the place in which the Epistle was written is attended by the gravest difficulties.

III.

We come now to the consideration of a theory which is an absolute contradiction of the foregoing one both in its contents and in its consequences. Professor Ramsay's view of the matter is that the legal terminology used in the Epistle, if strictly interpreted, is found to belong not to Roman but to Greek Law. St. Paul is intentionally taking his illustrations from usages which he knew to be familiar to people living in the southern part of the province of Galatia, and which would have been comparatively meaningless in the ears of inhabitants of Northern Galatia. In order to appreciate the distinction which Professor Ramsay draws, we may indicate in brief outline the history of the province up to the time of St. Paul.

It is unnecessary for our present purpose to dwell at length on the condition of the country before the Celtic invasion in 278 B.C. It is sufficient to refer to the well-known fact that Seleucus I., the founder of the line of Seleucid kings, carried out with great energy the project, originally formed by Alexander himself, of Hellenising his Asiatic empire. The Seleucid

kings generally made it their aim to Hellenise their dominions, not exactly by planting in their newly founded cities the pure Hellenism of Athens and Greece proper, but by establishing Hellenic institutions in a form adapted to Oriental countries. The Hellenism which ultimately prevailed would modify itself, no doubt, and assimilate some Oriental elements.

In Southern Galatia we see the results of this process. Here geographical position as well as political circumstances played an important part. It was through this portion of the country that the highway ran between the two capitals Ephesus and Antioch, and this highway was the principal channel for the flow of Greek civilisation eastwards and for the passage of commerce between East and West. Along this line of route the Seleucid kings planted and fostered colonies of Greeks and Jews, which in time became flourishing cities. These cities became centres for the dissemination of ideas on law, literature, and education, by which the earlier Phrygian inhabitants would be to a certain extent influenced. And it must be remembered, these influences had been at work for more than three centuries at the time when St. Paul first introduced Christianity to Asia Minor.

In Northern Galatia, *i.e.* Galatia proper, from which the whole Roman province afterwards took its name, the course of history had been far different. This portion of the country had, before the third century B.C., belonged partly to Phrygia, partly to Cappadocia, and perhaps in part to Paphlagonia. After the Gallic invasion of 278 B.C., and after fifty years of struggle, during which the invaders were "the scourge and the allies of each Asiatic prince in succession," Attalus I. of Pergamos checked their power and confined them to the tract of country which afterwards bore their name. Their alliance with Antiochus, whose defeat they shared at the battle of Magnesia, made them the objects of Roman hostility, and they were defeated by the consul Manlius in 189 B.C. This defeat checked their propensity to general warfare and plunder, even more effectively than that of Attalus, and they henceforward were more inclined to remain in their own territory in the pursuit of peaceful occupations. In the Mithridatic wars several Galatian chieftains were prominent supporters of the Roman arms, and one in particular, Deiotaurus, was rewarded by large grants of territory outside Galatia proper, and by the favour of Pompey became the most powerful

monarch in Asia Minor. His kingdom, which had been increased by still further additions, was given by Antony to Amyntas in 36 B.C. (Deiotaurus had died in 40 B.C.), who on his death in 25 B.C. bequeathed it to the Romans. A Roman province was formed out of it, which retained the name Galatia, and included within its area the parts we have indicated as Northern and Southern Galatia.

The three chief cities of Northern Galatia were Pessinus, Tavium, and Ancyra. These would probably be chiefly occupied by the older Phrygian inhabitants, along with an admixture of Jews, Greeks, and resident Romans. The descendants of the Gaulish invaders were chiefly in the country regions, the chiefs in fortified villages, the general body living a pastoral, half nomadic life.

It may be noted that the formative influences in Northern Galatia were probably more Roman than Greek. One of the first steps in a process of Hellenisation was the adoption of the Greek language. Yet we have it on the testimony of Jerome * that so late as the fourth century A.D. the inhabitants of Northern Galatia were bilingual, and spoke, in addition to Greek, a

* *Inter. Epist. ad Galat.* lib. ii. Præf.

dialect like that used by the Treveri in Gaul. The probability is that so far from being merged in the tide of Hellenism, the inhabitants of Northern Galatia retained much of their distinctive Gallic character as late as 50 A.D. As for the cities, Ancyra was quite Romanised, and Pessinus was so in a less degree. These statements are chiefly made on the authority of Professor Ramsay, and it will be necessary to refer to them again when we examine the claims of his particular theory.

After this slight historical excursus we may return to the question of the legal terminology in the Epistle. The chief positions which Professor Ramsay tries to establish in this connection may be grouped under three heads. It will be most convenient to state these separately, and in each case to follow the statement by an examination of the arguments advanced. To mass all his arguments together, and then try to deal with them in one comprehensive criticism, would be to increase the complexity of an already difficult problem.

The first point raised is connected with the words of 3⁷: *γινώσκετε ἄρα ὅτι οἱ ἐκ πίστεως, οὗτοι εἰσιν υἱοὶ Ἀβραάμ*, which are paraphrased in this way: "All they who inherit that special pro-

perty of Abraham, namely, Faith, must be sons of Abraham.”* The underlying assumption here is, that only a son can inherit; hence, the terms “son” and “heir” are interchangeable. The right, then, of the Gentiles to be called “sons” of Abraham is based on the fact that they are “heirs” of Abraham, *i.e.* of his faith.

This equivalence of heirship and sonship was a feature in the ancient law of “Adoption” as held by both Greeks and Romans. In the case of Greek Law the principle still remained unaltered; in the case of Roman Law it had, by the time of St. Paul, undergone considerable changes. It had become quite possible for a man to make anyone his heir without adopting him as a son at all, and conversely a man might be adopted without any intention of making him an heir.

Now, in Greek Law, as we have said, this equivalence of heirship and sonship still held good. And St. Paul’s words in 3⁷ express this principle of Greek Law. Hence St. Paul must be writing for readers who were conversant with Greek rather than with Roman Law. As Greek Law would not be introduced after the Roman occupation of the country, the inference is that

* *Historical Commentary on the Galatians*, p. 338.

St. Paul must be writing to people whose ancestors had been familiarised with Greek Law before the Roman occupation of the country took place.

This, it is held, is precisely what would be the case in the country ruled by the Seleucid, or the Pergamenian, or the Bithynian kings. These various princes had undoubtedly established Greek principles of society and law in their dominions. The effect, of course, would be chiefly felt in the cities; the rural population would not be so susceptible of such influences. The inscriptions shew that "before the time of Christ the cities possessed an organised municipal government of the Greek type, cultivated Greek manners and education, and used the Greek language." *

In North Galatia, on the other hand, there seems to have been, as we have already implied, strong opposition to Greek manners and influence. Mitteis, speaking of the slow and imperfect adoption of Hellenic civilisation in the interior of Asia Minor, says "the Galatians especially constituted a distinct and exclusive stock of the population," † and points to the preservation of its language, and the continuation of Celtic customs

* *Hist. Com.* p. 372.

† *Reichsrecht und Volksrecht*, p. 23.

into the early Imperial period. Mommsen also refers to the fact that, in spite of the adoption of the Phrygian religion by the Galatians, "even in the Roman province of Galatia, the internal organisation was predominantly Celtic."* He illustrates this by the fact that even so late as the time of Antoninus Pius, the absolute power of the father over the children (even to life and death) still existed. This was a custom which the Celts both in Asia Minor and in Gaul seem to have had in common with the Romans, but one which was entirely repugnant to Greek ideas.

To these ascertained facts there may be added the probability that men like Deiotaurus, who was praised by the Roman Senate for his Roman spirit, and Amyntas, who was the tool and creature of Rome, would use every effort to establish Roman ideas and customs. Hence the probability is that "as North Galatia grew in civilisation it was not Greek, but Roman manners and organisation that were introduced." †

The reasonable inference from these combined facts is that in North Galatia, Roman, in South Galatia, Greek Law and custom, were the pre-

* Quoted by Ramsay, *Hist. Com.* p. 131.

† Ramsay, *Hist. Com.* p. 373.

dominant influences, and therefore that St. Paul's words, inasmuch as they are based on the principle of Greek Law rather than on Roman Law as it was in his day, are more likely to have been intended for readers in South than in North Galatia.

Such are the conclusions drawn by Professor Ramsay in connection with the question of heirship and sonship. We have now to ask whether the premisses from which the conclusion is drawn are valid.*

Let us take, in the first place, the statement that the equivalence of heirship and sonship persisted in Greek Law. This view is hardly borne out by the facts of the case. The evidence † seems to shew that in Athens, as early as the time of Isæus (*circa* 370 B.C.) a man was at liberty to make any one his heir *without adopting him*. Mitteis accepts this as holding good in the third century B.C., not in Athens only but in Greece generally. He says: "The Greek will,

* The materials for the criticism of Ramsay's position are largely taken from Schmiedel's article on "Galatia" in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, but I have carefully verified nearly all the passages, and have in some cases supplemented them.

† Schmiedel (*Encycl. Bibl.*, art. "Galatia") quotes in support of this, Schulin (*Das Griech. Test.* pp. 29-33), Beauchet (*Histoire du droit privé de la république Athénienne*, vol. iii. pp. 691-697), and Thalheim (in Herrmann, *Rechtsalterthümer*, p. 72, n. 3).

just like the oldest Roman will, was essentially based on the idea of adoption, and it is very probable that the most ancient form of appointing an "extraneus heres" was by a real "adoptio inter vivos." In later times it became customary simply to express the adoption (*εἰσπολίησις*) in the will, and in Attica, at least, during the age of the orators, this is the constant practice. It is true that it cannot be maintained that this form remained constant in Greece in later times; one would rather suppose that the later Greek will developed into a simple bestowal of the property." *

This latter supposition rests on the evidence supplied by the various wills preserved by Diogenes Laertius in his *Lives of the Philosophers*. It would seem from these that the circuitous method of adoption was no longer the absolute rule, and the internal probabilities of the case are that it would tend to be omitted. And the philosophers, whose wills are thus quoted, are not confined to Attica. There is no necessity here to examine all the evidence afforded by Diogenes Laertius. If we take simply Book V. as a specimen we have there, in addition to the will of Theophrastus (who may

* Mitteis, *Reichsrecht und Volksrecht*, p. 341.

count for this purpose as an Athenian, though he was born in Lesbos), those of Strato of Lamp-sacus and of Lyco who belonged to the Troad. In the wills of all three the property is bequeathed to a variety of different people without any mention of adoption.

Ramsay himself admits that a Greek will of the year 189 A.D. discovered in Egypt is expressed entirely in the Roman style and after Roman custom. He attributes this to a "rapid development" that took place in Egypt. "The soldiers who settled there were separated from their family, and were sole masters of their fortune, and therefore the family influence on the *Diatheke*, and family rights over the property of the individual, which were so powerful from long-standing feeling in the surroundings of their old home, had little force in Egypt. Everything concurred to give the individual owner absolute right to dispose of his property as he pleased." *

This looks dangerously like special pleading. It seems a much more probable supposition that this particular Greek will was so drawn up because Greek wills in general had developed into this particular form.

* *Hist. Com.* p. 366.

The evidence on this point that may be gathered from the *Syro-Roman Law Book* seems also to go contrary to Ramsay's view. It is clear from §§ 36, 63 of the London text that the testator can there name as heirs his wife and his children, whether they be legitimate or illegitimate.*

If, then, we take into consideration the later development of the Greek Law on this question of heirship, and its apparent approximation to the later Roman Law, it does not seem probable that either St. Paul or the inhabitants of South Galatian cities would think only of that ancient form of the Law according to which only a real or an adopted son could inherit. There is no reason whatever to suppose that Greek Law in the South Galatian cities had remained unaffected by the development of that Law which, as the evidence seems to shew, had been going on for three or four centuries.

In other words, there is little reason to suppose that the inhabitants of the South Galatian cities were familiar with the ancient form of Greek Law in which sonship and heirship were equivalent. Hence, even if the words *οἱ ἐκ πίστεως, οὗτοι εἰσιν υἱοὶ Ἀβραάμ* were a deliberate

* Bruns und Sachau, pp. 12 and 19.

enunciation of this principle on the part of St. Paul, they would prove nothing as to the destination of the Epistle; they would only be a piece of antiquarian lore. It seems, however, more reasonable to suppose that St. Paul is not here thinking of the matter from the point of view of either Greek or Roman Law. He is simply stating in plain words his fundamental belief that they who display the faith of Abraham have the status and the privileges of the sons of Abraham. Though they may not be physically his offspring, they are his spiritual descendants. In the decision therefore of the problem of the destination of the Epistle this passage has no decisive part to play.

The second division of the argument is occupied with the question of the *διαθήκη*. We may indicate, in a few words, the outline of Ramsay's position before setting it forth in greater detail. He holds that the *διαθήκη* in 3¹⁵ is referred to in such terms as to make it certain that the Apostle is laying emphasis on precisely those features in which a Greek will (as Ramsay holds) differed from a Roman.

As to the general conditions of a Roman "testamentum" in the time of St. Paul there is no disagreement. The simple form of will,

known as the "Prætorian testament," had come into general usage. The contents of it remained secret during the life of the testator, the will only took effect at the death of the testator, and until the moment of his death it could be at any time revoked or changed by the testator.

But, according to Ramsay's view, the Greek will was almost the exact opposite of this. And the Galatian will of 3¹⁵ agrees with the Greek rather than the Roman form. It "is irrevocable and unalterable; it comes into operation as soon as the conditions are performed by the heir; it is public and open." *

Ramsay points out that St. Paul in 3¹⁵ does not say that a supplementary will—an ἐπιδιαθήκη—cannot be made. He simply says, "that if it be made it cannot invalidate the first will." In essence the second will must confirm the original will, and cannot revoke or add essentially novel conditions." † It is difficult to see how he extracts this meaning from the Apostle's words, οὐδεὶς ἀθετεῖ ἢ ἐπιδιατάσσεται. He unhesitatingly makes οὐδεὶς the same subject as ἀνθρώπου. "We are confronted," he says, with a legal idea that the duly executed will cannot be revoked by a subsequent act of the testator." Admitting this

* *Hist. Com.* p. 351.

† *Ibid.* 352.

supposition for the moment, the Apostle's words do not say anything about the effect on the first will of an *ἐπιδιαθήκη* made by the testator. They say that the testator makes no *ἐπιδιαθήκη*—*οὐδεὶς ἄθετεῖ ἢ ἐπιδιατάσσεται*. We shall have to return to the further discussion of this point at a later stage.

According to Ramsay, the Galatian will of 3¹⁵ agreed with the Greek and differed from the Roman in the fact that it was irrevocable. But this was not all. It also differed from the Roman in the fact that it was public. It will be best to quote his own words.

“The expression in v.¹⁵, ‘when it hath been confirmed,’ must also be observed. Every will had to be passed through the Record Office of the city. It was not regarded in the Greek law as a purely private document, which might be kept anywhere and produced when the testator died. It must be deposited, either in the original or in a properly certified copy, in the Record Office; and the officials there were bound to satisfy themselves that it was a properly valid document before they accepted it. If there was an earlier will the latter must not be accepted, unless it was found not to interfere with the preceding one.”

“That is a Greek, not a Roman custom. There was no such provision needed in Roman law, for the developed Roman will might be revoked and changed as often as the testator chose; and the latest will cancelled all others.”*

The conclusion drawn from these considerations is identical with that drawn in connection with the question of heirship and sonship. “As the Galatian will is unlike the Roman and like the Greek, it is clear that Greek law must have been established among the people to whom Paul was writing.”† This, however, is not quite the full extent of the conclusion. As if to guard against objections raised on the ground that Egypt and other parts of the Hellenised world shewed a type of Greek will in which developments and alterations of the older form were visible, he claims that it was an *early* type of Greek will that survived in the South Galatian cities. “It is evident,” he says, “that Greek civilisation was established strongly in the South Galatian cities in the fourth century B.C., and that the form of government in the country was not Greek after B.C. 189. So far as it goes this establishes a probability that the civilisation of those cities had more of the older Seleucid type,

* *Hist. Com.* pp. 354, 355.

† *Op. cit.* p. 354.

and was not open to the same continuous and rapid development as among the Greek mercenaries in Egypt. An older type of Greek will is likely to have existed in Iconium and the neighbouring cities; and we see that Paul's references to the law 'after the manner of men' imply a law, on the whole, of rather early type." *

The two main points, then, made by Ramsay under this head are, that the Greek will was (*a*) public, and (*b*) irrevocable, as contrasted with the Roman will, which was secret and revocable. The will referred to in 3¹⁵ is held to conform to the Greek type. Its publicity is indicated by *κεκυρωμένην*, which is understood to refer to its acceptance and ratification at the public Record Office of the city. Its irrevocability is asserted in *οὐδεὶς ἀθετεῖ ἢ ἐπιδιατάσσεται*. Hence the conclusion that the recipients of the Epistle belonged to the cities of Southern Galatia, where the earlier Greek civilisation, established by the Seleucid kings, continued to survive.

Here, again, it remains to be seen whether the premisses from which this conclusion is drawn will bear the test of an impartial scrutiny.

Let us examine, in the first place, the question

* *Hist. Com.* p. 375.

of the publicity of the Greek will. So far as Attic Law goes the evidence is clear. Written wills were usually sealed up, and were only opened after the death of the testator. There was, apparently, no necessity to deposit them with a magistrate. They were allowed to be entrusted to private persons for safe keeping, or even, for greater security, to several private persons.

For proof of this we may again refer to what has been preserved by Diogenes Laertius. For example, copies of the will of Theophrastus were deposited with three separate friends. The copies were sealed with the testator's seal. The actual concluding words of the will are: αἱ διαθήκαι κείνται ἀντίγραφα τῷ Θεοφράστου δακτυλίῳ σφραγισμέναι, μία μὲν παρὰ Ἡγησίᾳ Ἰππάρχου. (Then follow the names of the witnesses.) τὴν δ' ἑτέραν ἔλαβεν Ὀλυμπιόδωρος· μάρτυρες δ' οἱ αὐτοί· τὴν δ' ἑτέραν ἔλαβεν Ἀδείμαντος.*

Of Arcesilaos, who was born at Pitana in Æolis, Diogenes tells us that τρεῖς δὲ διαθήκας ποιησάμενος ἔθετο τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἑρετρίᾳ πρὸς Ἀμφίκριτον, τὴν δ' Ἀθήνησι παρὰ τινος τῶν φίλων, τὴν δὲ τρίτην ἀπέστειλεν εἰς οἶκον πρὸς Θαυμασίαν ἕνα τινὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀξιώσας διατηρῆσαι.†

* *Diog. Laert. de Clar. Phil. Vit. lib. v. c. 2, § 57.*

† *Op. cit. lib. iv. c. 6, § 43.*

The idea of secrecy seems to be indicated in a passage of the *Wasps* of Aristophanes (583–590), which may be translated as follows :—

Phil. “ And if the father, at his death, should assign to anyone as a bride the daughter who is his heiress, we, bidding both the will and the case (*κόγχη*) which is very solemnly put upon the seals a long farewell, give the girl to anyone who by his prayers has won us to his own side. And we render no account of these actions which we do, while of the others not a single magistracy is so.”

Bdel. “ I certainly deem you happy with regard to this alone of these things which you have mentioned ; but you do injustice in opening and falsifying the will of the heiress.”

This passage is interesting as being the only allusion to the custom of keeping a seal in a capsule (*κόγχη*) lest it should be injured. The idea that the breaking of the seal and disclosure of the contents of the will is reprehensible is clearly expressed.

The custom of depositing wills with friends is more than once alluded to in the orations of Isæus. In the *De Philoctemonis Hereditate* we have the passage : *καὶ τὴν διαθήκην κατέθετο*

παρὰ τῷ κηδεστῇ Χαιρέα.* In the *De Apollodori Hereditate* there is the further allusion to the securing of the will's contents by a seal. εἴ τις τελευτήσῃ μὲλλον διέθετο, εἴ τι πάθοι, τὴν οὐσίαν ἑτέρῳ, καὶ ταύτην γράμμασι κατέθετο παρὰ τισὶ σημηνάμενος.†

It is clear, then, that according to Attic Law a will was deposited with private individuals, and that its contents remained a secret until the seal placed on the will by the testator was broken. We infer also, from a passage in Isæus,‡ that a will so deposited could be demanded back to be destroyed or declared no longer valid, in the presence of witnesses.

It would seem, then, that there is very little ground for the supposition that there was any such thing as an official scrutiny of the contents of a will. It is true that in the Faiyūm a public Record Office has recently been brought to light: but Professor Mahaffy in discussing its contents makes the remark that "the entry of these private documents on the records of some public office is not accompanied by any

* *De Phil. Hered.* § 2.

† *De Apoll. Hered.* § 1.

‡ *De Phil. Hered.* § 6: ἀκούσας δ' ὁ Εὐκτῆμων εὐθὺς ἀπῆγει τὸν Πυθόδωρον τὸ γραμματεῖον καὶ . . . ἔλεγεν ὅτι βούλοιντ' ἀνελεῖσθαι τὴν διαθήκην.

supervision, any official countersigning of each as inspected and approved by the state." *

As to the irrevocability of a Greek will, we can only remark that it appears to be quite unknown to those scholars who have made a special study of the subject. Schulin,[†] who includes in the scope of his investigations not only Attic wills, but all other Greek wills accessible to him, makes no mention of it. In fact, while it is admitted that an adoption made during the lifetime of the adoptive father was irrevocable, it is still affirmed that a will containing an adoption could at any time be recalled. This fundamental principle seems to have remained operative in Syria at anyrate till the fifth century A.D., for in the *Syro-Roman Law Book* the principle (which accords with the Roman one) is upheld, that an earlier will is cancelled by a later one. The words are: "If a man makes a will, and he who made it makes known in brief the determination that he has formed to make another will, then is the first that he made no longer valid." ‡

The only evidence which Ramsay produces on this point of irrevocability is taken from

* Quoted by Schmiedel, art. "Galatia," *Encycl. Bibl.* vol. ii. col. 1609.

† Quoted by Schmiedel.

‡ Bruns und Sachau, p. 15.

the Greek wills found in the Faiyūm, and this evidence is of the most slender and hypothetical character. "In the wills in Egypt," he says, "there is often contained the provision that the testator is free to alter or invalidate. Such a provision need not have been made, if wills were acknowledged to be revocable at the testator's pleasure; he has to guard by a special provision against the customary presumption that the *Diatheke* is irrevocable." * As Schmiedel here acutely points out, a "customary presumption" has no legally binding force. If it had, it would not be possible for wills to be revoked. Ramsay also makes a candid admission, which seems to militate against his own theory. He says: "I confess that several high English authorities on Greek wills in Egypt, when consulted privately, expressed the opinion that these wills were revocable at the testator's desire." He adds, however: "but they have not satisfied me that the evidence justifies that opinion earlier than the Roman time and Roman influence." †

What is needed here, to establish Ramsay's view, is a clear case in which Greek Law was different from Roman in this matter of re-

* *Hist. Com.* pp. 366, 367.

† *Op. cit.* p. 366.

vocability. As yet, no such case has come to light. No instance has been produced from any part of the area in which the influence of Greek Law was operative of the irrevocability which, as he says, "was a characteristic feature of Greek Law."

In this case, then, as in the former one, we conclude that Ramsay's contention is not backed by satisfactory proof. There is no convincing evidence that in this matter of secrecy and revocability the Greek will was very different from the Roman. Hence there is nothing in the words of 3¹⁵ to lead us to suppose that the Epistle was sent to the Hellenised cities of South Galatia rather than to the cities of North Galatia, where Roman Law is more likely to have been in vogue.

We come finally to the question of the *ἐπίτροποι* and *οἰκονόμοι* mentioned in 4². Ramsay's argument here is somewhat complicated, and needs careful statement. "Paul," he says, "clearly describes a state of society and law in which the father by his will appoints two distinct kinds of administrators for his child, so that the infant owner is said to grow up under the rule of guardians and stewards (*ἐπίτροποι* and *οἰκονόμοι*). The former is the

regular term in Greek Law for the guardian of an infant, appointed by the father, or by the law in default of the father's nomination. It was also the regular translation of the Latin "tutor." *

But here a difficulty arises. In the present passage Ramsay claims that "the father by his will appoints *two* distinct kinds of administrators for his child." But Greek Law knows of no such twofold guardianship. It only knows the one form of guardian, *ἐπίτροπος*. In Roman Law, on the other hand, the twofold form of guardianship is clearly established. A father had the right of nominating guardians by will (*testamento tutores dare*) for those of his male children who might be of tender years or born after his death. The authority of such a tutor ceased, as we have seen, when the boy had completed his fourteenth year. From then, till the twenty-fifth year of his age, the ward was under the care of a "curator." This official did not necessarily, like the "tutor," exercise a general superintendence, but was frequently nominated for one special purpose. The appointment of the "curator" was not fixed by the father's will, but lay with the *Prætor Urbanus*.

At the first glance, therefore, it seems as if

* *Hist. Com.* p. 392.

this passage is a direct contradiction of Ramsay's general view. Greek Law knows only one form of guardianship—that of the *ἐπίτροπος*. In the present passage we have the twofold form of the *ἐπίτροπος* and *οἰκονόμος*, which would appear to correspond to the twofold form of “tutor” and “curator” in Roman Law, as Halmel unhesitatingly maintained.

Ramsay, however, draws a distinction between pure Greek Law and later developments. “In pure Greek Law,” he says, “as for example at Athens, this distinction (*i.e.* between tutor and curator) seems to have been unknown; and Paul's words have less meaning when we think of pure Greek manners. But the law and manners of the Græco-Phrygian cities (and of the Seleucid cities generally) were not pure Greek. They were Hellenistic, having the form which Greek ideas assumed when they went forth to conquer the East, and were inevitably modified in the process.” *

Having, as it were, cleared the ground by this general supposition, he finds a clear analogy to the words of 4² in the *Syro-Roman Law Book* of the fifth century. It will be convenient to quote the whole of § 5.

* *Hist. Com.* pp. 392, 393.

“The Law is asked: Can minors make a will, and at what age can they make it?”

“A girl until the age of twelve is subject to the ἐπίτροπος (tutor), and can make no will. But so soon as she has passed her twelfth year she passes out of the control of the ἐπίτροπος, and comes under the control of the curator. From the moment that the girl stands under the hand of the curator she can make a will.

“A boy remains till his fourteenth year under the power of the ἐπίτροπος, and can make no will. But from his fourteenth year and thereafter he is under the power of the curator, and can make a will when he chooses.

“Minors remain under the power of the curator till their twenty-fifth year. From the twenty-fifth year the youth is a full-grown man, and the girl a full-grown woman.” *

The importance of this passage lies in the fact that, while the provisions of Roman Law are laid down, the word ἐπίτροπος is used instead of the Latin tutor, while the word curator remains untranslated. This verbal distinction, however, is not the only difference from ordinary Roman Law. A little further on in § 34 we have this passage: “If a man dies, and will make a will,

* Bruns und Sachau, p. 5.

if he has children who are under age, and he appoints *ἐπίτροπος* or curator over his children the Law allows him to do this." * These words shew clearly that the Syrian Law differed from the Roman in allowing the father to appoint both *ἐπίτροπος* and curator by will.

Hence we seem to have a twofold distinction between the enactments of the *Syro-Roman Law Book* and ordinary Roman Law. Firstly the word *ἐπίτροπος* is used instead of the word tutor. Secondly, the curator as well as the *ἐπίτροπος* is appointed by the father's will whereas in Roman Law he was appointed by the Prætor Urbanus.

"This," Ramsay says, "is exactly the state of things which Paul speaks of; and the probability is that the distinction of *ἐπίτροπος* and *οἰκονόμος* dates back to the old Seleucid Law and thus persisted both in Syria and in South Galatia. In Syria, however, as time went on, Roman Law affected native custom; and so the name curator was substituted for *οἰκονόμος*. Thus once more we find that we are placed amid Seleucid, and therefore South Galatian, not among North Galatian manners and law." †

The argument, put quite briefly, amounts to

* Bruns und Sachau, p. 12.

† *Hist. Com.* p. 393.

this. Pure Greek Law knows only one form of guardianship, that of the ἐπίτροπος. But Greek Law as established in the Seleucid cities enacted the double form of ἐπίτροπος and οἰκονόμος. In the cities of South Galatia this double form continued to exist, and we have a reference to it in this passage of St. Paul's Epistle. In Syria the essence survived, but under the influence of Roman Law the word "curator" came to be substituted for the word οἰκονόμος (ἐπίτροπος remaining unchanged). This is the state of things revealed by the *Syro-Roman Law Book*.

What is the value of this argument? Once again we are driven to the assertion that it has a far too slender basis of fact. Why is it, as Schmiedel asks, that if οἰκονόμος, not only in St. Paul's day, but even so far back as the time of the Seleucidæ, corresponded to the Latin "curator," the Latin is substituted (in the *Syro-Roman Law Book*) for οἰκονόμος only, and not for ἐπίτροπος also? Again, if the correspondence of οἰκονόμος to curator was known to lawyers, how is it that the Roman Jurist Modestinus in his Greek treatise *De Excusationibus* not only uses the word ἐπίτροπος, but also "curator," written in Greek letters κουράτωρ? The words are: Ἐπεὶ εἰδέναι δεῖ ὅτι κουράτωρ κατὰ διαθήκας οὐδὲ

ὑπὸ πατρὸς ὀρθῶς δίδοται, ἀλλὰ δοθεὶς εἴωθε βεβαιοῦσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡγουμένου.* On Ramsay's theory we might have expected him to use οἰκονόμος if this corresponded to "curator" as ἐπίτροπος did to "tutor."

In this connection a remark made by Mitteis is of great importance, and tells heavily against Ramsay's view. He quotes the opinion of Bruns—the co-editor of the *Syro-Roman Law Book*—to the effect that "the formal difference made by the Romans between 'tutela' and 'cura' was not rightly understood by the Orientals." †

This is supported by the fact, on which we have already laid stress, that in the *Syro-Roman Law Book* both ἐπίτροπος and "curator" are appointed by will, a thing not permissible in Roman Law. Mitteis further quotes a rescript of the time of Severus in which an allusion is made to the appointing of a curator by will: "Curatorem tibi quidem patris testamento datum dicis; quod non potest videri jure factum," etc. ‡ He also quotes a Peloponnesian inscription of the second century A.D. in which a Roman lady of the province is said to pass

* *Digest*. lib. xxvi. § 3, sec. 1.

† Quoted in *Reichsrecht und Volksrecht*, p. 217. ‡ *Ibid.* p. 218.

under the care of a *φροντιστὴς καὶ κύριος*.* These are two designations of one and the same person.

These passages are sufficient to bear out the dictum that the distinction between the "tutor" and "curator" was not familiar to the Oriental mind. Bruns further says: "The ancient Greeks had only one kind of guardianship, and therefore had only one word—*ἐπίτροπος*—to express it. This word the later Greeks restricted to the meaning of tutor, and they introduced alongside of it the word *κουράτωρ*."†

In all this, it is to be observed, there is not a word of any use of *οἰκονόμος*, or of any connection between it and "curator." Schmiedel, moreover, points out that if the Egyptian papyri may be called into evidence here, they seem to shew that when a further word beside *ἐπίτροπος* was required to indicate a male tutor, it was not *οἰκονόμος* that was used, but *φροντιστὴς*, the word which occurs in the above-mentioned Peloponnesian inscription.‡

All this evidence goes to shew that there is very little probability in Ramsay's supposition that the twofold kind of guardianship indicated

* *Loc. cit.* p. 217.

† Bruns und Sachau, pp. 184, 185.

‡ *Encycl. Bibl.*, vol. ii. col. 1610.

by the words *ἐπίτροπος* and *οἰκονόμος* is a survival into St. Paul's time of an earlier form of Greek Law in vogue centuries before in the cities of the Seleucidæ. So far as the enactments of the *Syro-Roman Law Book* are brought into the argument, it seems to the present writer that they point much more strongly to Roman than to Greek influences; that is to say, we have the Roman system of "tutor" and "curator" with this change, that under the influence of the prevailing Greek speech the word "tutor" is translated into *ἐπίτροπος*. There is, indeed, the difference that in the law book the "curator" can be appointed by the father's will. This may be an extension to the twofold Roman guardianship of the nomination of the *ἐπίτροπος* which was made in the Greek will. However this may be, Ramsay's theory, that the terminology employed in this verse points distinctively to Greek rather than Roman usage, and so to South rather than to North Galatia, is unsupported by anything like a sufficient foundation of fact.

IV.

In the preceding section we have examined the cogency of Professor Ramsay's arguments,

and found that they fail to carry conviction. It remains now to attempt a general survey of the whole position. The most convenient way of doing this will be to touch on the various points as they arise in the course of St. Paul's discussion, indicating in each case the conclusion we are led to adopt, as well as the reasons for discarding those hypotheses which appear untenable.

It must be premised that these conclusions are held and stated in the most cautious and guarded way. Seeing that St. Paul's words are open to such a variety of interpretation that two able scholars have found in them a setting forth in precise and exact terms of Greek Law on the one hand and Roman on the other, one may well hesitate before venturing on any dogmatic assertions. Our conclusions can only claim to be opinions which seem to be supported by general probabilities.

With the safeguard of this proviso the present writer is of opinion that the word *διαθήκη* in v.¹⁵ means "testament" or "will," and not "covenant." The determining reason for this has already been suggested, namely, that the antithesis in 1 Corinthians 8⁸ between *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λαλῶ* and *ὁ νόμος λέγει* seems to point to the

probability that St. Paul by the former phrase wishes to introduce an illustration drawn from contemporary mundane life, as opposed to one drawn from Scripture. This hypothesis, along with the admitted fact that in the same general context the Apostle speaks of the *παιδαγωγός*, the *ἐπίτροπος*, *υἰοθεσία*,—personages and institutions of Gentile life,—lead one to believe that he introduces by the words *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω* an illustration drawn from the conditions of the making of a will.

What, then, on this view of the matter, are we to say of the immediate transition to the case of Abraham in the next verse? For this allusion to Abraham is regarded as one of the strongest reasons for asserting that *διαθήκη* in v.¹⁵ must mean "covenant." Halmel, as we have seen, makes even this verse (v.¹⁶) a link in the Roman legal construction of the argument, making the singular *σπέρμα* indicate the "persona certa" who only, in Roman Law, could inherit. We venture to think, however, that he is wrong in this, and that St. Paul, in passing from v.¹⁵ to v.¹⁶, passes at a stroke from a reference to a secular "will" to a reference to the covenant made by God with Abraham.

Our reason for regarding this as possible is,

that there appears to be a similar rapid transition from the secular to the LXX sense of *διαθήκη* in the Epistle to the Hebrews 9¹⁶⁻¹⁸. The words there are : ὅπου γὰρ διαθήκη, θάνατον ἀνάγκη φέρεσθαι τοῦ διαθεμένου· διαθήκη γὰρ ἐπὶ νεκροῖς βεβαία, ἐπεὶ μὴ ποτε ἰσχύει ὅτε ζῇ ὁ διαθέμενος ; ὅθεν οὐδ' ἡ πρώτη χωρὶς αἵματος ἐγκεκαίνισται. To the present writer it seems exceedingly probable that we have here a play on the twofold meaning which *διαθήκη* must have had for Greek-speaking Christians who were familiar with the LXX. It must be frankly admitted that both Westcott* and Moulton† decline this view, and hold that *διαθήκη* throughout the whole passage means "covenant." Such a consensus of opinion cannot be lightly set aside. Yet Westcott admits that "the patristic interpretations rest on the sense of 'will,' the Greek commentators from Chrysostom downwards taking the familiar sense of *διαθήκη*, and Latin commentators apparently finding it given by the text which they used."* The view, too, for which we are pleading has the weighty support of Dr. A. B. Davidson, who, while admitting that "there is something awkward in the double use of the word," yet

* *The Epistle to the Hebrews*, p. 302.

† In *Ellicott's Commentary for English Readers*, vol. iii. p. 319.

thinks that "probably a Greek to whom the two senses of the word were familiar would perceive at once, from the connection, the author's divergence in vv.^{16, 17} to the special sense of testament, and the aptness of the allusion to illustrate the point of the necessity of the death of the Son.* Professor Ramsay unhesitatingly adopts this view, adding, with his usual vigour: "It is quite extraordinary to see how some theologians torture these words to escape their plain and inevitable meaning (even plainer in the Greek than in the English)." †

It is obviously impossible to use such a keenly disputed passage as decisive proof one way or the other. Our present contention is merely this: that a play on the two senses of the word *διαθήκη* was quite possible for a Greek-speaking Christian; that there is probably such a play on the word in the passage in Hebrews; that in our present passage it is quite conceivable that by a similar transition of thought we may have *διαθήκη* in v.¹⁵ meaning a "will" followed by an immediate transition to the "covenant" made by God with Abraham.

* *The Epistle to the Hebrews*, p. 183.

† *Hist. Com.* p. 369.

Assuming, then, that *διαθήκη* means a "will," the next debatable point to which we come is the meaning of *οὐδεὶς* in *οὐδεὶς ἀθετεῖ ἢ ἐπιδιατάσσεται*. Here neither Halmel nor Ramsay appears to be satisfactory. They agree in maintaining that the allusion is to the state of things in the testator's lifetime, *i.e.* the testator is supposed to be still alive. But from this point they widely diverge. Halmel, in order to extract his meaning from the words, has to suppose that the Apostle makes, in thought, an exception which he does not express in the words. Halmel's rendering of the passage is: "In the case of a human will, when it is made valid, no one annuls it or makes an addition to it (*except the testator*)." This exception, he maintains, would be so self-evident to St. Paul—and apparently to his readers—that there was no need to express it in words. We must do Halmel the justice here to remember that his theory is built up on St. Paul's language in the context as a whole, and not on this particular verse. Otherwise his argument would seem to be a vicious circle. He would be using the words of the passage to prove St. Paul's acquaintance with Roman Law, and would be at the same time introducing an exception into the words on the ground that,

the words being based on Roman Law, the exception must necessarily be made.

It seems to the present writer that the exception which Halmel makes is quite a gratuitous one. It only becomes necessary provided that all the following stages of his argument are sound; and we shall see reason to gravely doubt this. Hence it appears that his rendering of οὐδεὶς "no one (the testator himself excepted)" is exceedingly improbable.

Ramsay deals more fairly with the words, in that he takes them as they stand, without introducing any implied exceptions. He interprets them, as we have seen, as an assertion of the irrevocability of a Greek will. The man who has made a will can neither annul it nor make additions to it. We have already seen reason to believe that his theory is not supported by historical fact. We have also expressed the suspicion (p. 135 of this essay) that Ramsay too is inclined to read into St. Paul's words more than is actually there. He claims that St. Paul does not say that an ἐπιδιαθήκη cannot be made, but that, if made, it does not invalidate the original διαθήκη. To the present writer St. Paul's statement appears to be that when a will is made neither an ἀθέτησις nor an ἐπιδιαθήκη

was possible. Yet it is a well-known fact—as St. Paul must have known if he knew anything at all about either Greek or Roman Law—that under either system a supplementary will could be made. Greek Law had its *ἐπιδιαθήκη*, Roman Law its Codicil, added, it need hardly be observed, necessarily by the original testator. Our passage, interpreted in a straightforward way, amounts to a denial of this, and both Halmel and Ramsay can only make it square, each with his own theory, by to a certain extent torturing the words.

Hence we are strongly inclined to agree with those critics who, as we have shewn (p. 95), hold that *οὐδεὶς* does not refer to the original testator at all, but means “no other person.” On this supposition we have no allusion to any distinctive peculiarity of either Greek or Roman Law, but the statement of a most obvious fact true of either system; the fact, namely, that when a man has made a valid will it is impossible for any other person either to annul or make alterations in that will. The point which St. Paul wished to establish by this allusion was, that God’s promise to Abraham was His divine ordinance as to the conditions of the *κληρονομία*, and was unalterable by anything that might be enacted from any other source.

The objection at once suggests itself, that St. Paul was so much dominated by Jewish ways of thought that he would certainly regard the Law as well as the Promise as being of Divine origin. It does not, however, seem to the present writer at all certain that this is the case here.

It must be remembered that, while St. Paul's Judaising opponents would certainly take this point of view, he is here engaged in a life-and-death struggle with them. He is contending for what seemed to him to be the very essentials of his Gospel, and the present passage is most keenly controversial in character. The prevailing idea of the whole argument is, the inferiority of the Law as compared with the Promise.

One reason suggested by the Apostle for this inferiority is the late date at which it was introduced. His point is: "If it was intended to be an institution of eternal significance, why was it not given to the Patriarchs at the first? The Jews too had raised this question, and in their reverence for the Law had shewn a tendency to antedate its institution, or at least to imply that it was not unknown to the Patriarchs. Adam, they said, was to have been the recipient of the Law, but he broke the six commandments which were given to him (a sort of compendium of the

Decalogue, to which a seventh, it was said, was added in the time of Noah). Abraham knew and fulfilled the whole Law. St. Paul opposed this tendency to anachronism, and recalled his opponents to the historical fact that four hundred and thirty years intervened between the time of Abraham and the Lawgiving.” *

His second reason for the inferiority of the Law lay in its nature and manner of introduction. It was “ordained through angels by the hand of a mediator.” Here the emphasis is on the number of persons through whom it was transmitted to the Jews. It was not directly given from God, as the Promise was to Abraham, but intermediate agents were employed. The Law, in other words, was something adventitious. It was not to be placed on the same footing with the original Divine Promise.

In view of these considerations there is no improbability in the supposition that St. Paul here conceived the Law as almost human, or at any rate non-divine as compared with the Divine Promise. The emphasis he lays on intermediate agencies seems to point to this. It harmonises, too, with the whole aim of his argument, which

* Thackeray, *The Relation of St. Paul to Contemporary Jewish Thought*, pp. 68, 69.

is to demonstrate the absolute and unalterable supremacy of the Promise made by God to Abraham.*

We conclude, then, that the objections to making *οὐδεὶς* mean "no other person" are not insuperable, and that what St. Paul's statement amounts to is, that when A has made a valid will, B can neither annul nor make additions to that will. This view has the merit of taking the words simply as they stand, without the necessity for any of the "self-evident" exceptions or qualifications which either Halmel or Ramsay makes.

This is perhaps the most suitable point at which to express one's view of Halmel's theory as a whole. It is an exceedingly ingenious theory. In his hands it works out in a most consistent and harmonious fashion. All the various details are suitably related to the fundamental conception of the Roman will. The Promise is the will; Abraham is a "persona certa," and therefore qualified to be the heir; the Law is the codicil, having only a supplementary and secondary

* As Thackeray (*op. cit.* pp. 74, 75) points out: "It can hardly be unintentional that the name of God occurs several times in connection with the earlier covenant, . . . but never in connection with the law." St. Paul's "argument here seems to lead him to attribute to it only a relatively divine origin."

significance. To the present writer, however, the theory seems so over-elaborate and artificial as to be highly improbable. Even supposing that St. Paul himself had such a full and detailed knowledge of the Roman Law as to inheritance and guardianship, it seems very unlikely that he should have introduced it into such an Epistle as this, and into this portion of his argument. It is one thing to suppose that his readers in the Galatian Churches, whether Jews or Gentiles, would be aware of such an obvious fact as that one man cannot alter another man's will; it is quite another to suppose that they would appreciate an argument the understanding of which depended on a clear apprehension both of the relation of a codicil to an original will, and of the fact that a codicil could in no way affect the inheritance. Halmel admits that the knowledge of law displayed is full and precise; so much so, that he thinks the Epistle could only have been written in Rome, or at any rate in Italy. We can only reiterate our conviction that even if St. Paul had possessed such knowledge, it is extremely unlikely that he would have used it in such a context as this.

There are two points in particular at which

the theory seems to be quite untenable. The first is the view that the singular *σπέρμα* in v.¹⁶ is an allusion to the fact that a "persona certa" could inherit, while "personæ incertæ" (*σπέρματα*) could not. This interpretation is to the last degree artificial and far-fetched. It is far more probable that St. Paul is here resorting to the dialectical methods of his Judaising opponents. The word *σπέρμα*, it is true, and its Hebrew equivalent *זרע*, are ordinarily collective words, indicating a race of descendants. The use of *σπέρμα* to indicate a single descendant, as opposed to *σπέρματα*, meaning several descendants, though not absolutely devoid of parallels, is quite exceptional. Still, Rabbinical teachers were wont to base arguments on such a grammatical distinction as this. A case is recorded, for example, in which an inference was drawn from the use of the plural *זרעים* (*αἵματα*) instead of the singular *זרע*, and they were quite capable of drawing an instance from the use of the singular even in a case where the word had no plural.* This method of interpretation was not limited to the schools of Palestine. We have a passage in Philo in which he seems to argue in a way very similar to St. Paul's in our present passage.

* Cp. generally, Thackeray, *loc. cit.* p. 70.

He is speaking of the use of the singular τέκνον in Genesis 17¹⁶.

πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἄξιον θαυμάσαι τὸ μὴ πολλὰ τέκνα φάναι δώσειν, ἐν δὲ χαριεῖσθαι μόνον. διὰ τί δὲ; ὅτι τὸ κάλον οὐκ ἐν πλήθει μᾶλλον ἢ δυνάμει πέφυκεν ἐξετάζεσθαι.*

It seems, on the whole, to be a far more likely supposition that St. Paul, arguing against Jewish opponents, would use a dialectical method with which, as the above instances make probable, they were quite familiar, than that he was alluding to the analogy of the "persona certa" and his capacity to inherit. The analogy is at best a very remote one, and, even presuming that his readers were familiar with Roman Law in general, there was nothing in the context to suggest this particular point of it to the minds of his readers.

The second point at which Halmel's theory appears untenable is in the interpretation of the μεσίτης. Moses, it will be remembered, is regarded as being the mediator not between God and the people, but between the Promise and its fulfilment, *i.e.* between two points of time, and not between two contracting parties. Here, again, the hypothesis is ingenious, but very fanciful. It quite parts company with the

* *De mutatione nominum*, 26.

ordinary usage of the word, and Halmel's defence that it is used in an abstract theological sense of Moses here, in the same way that Abraham is theologically viewed in v.¹⁶ as the father of the faithful, is hardly adequate.

In this case also, St. Paul is speaking in the language most familiar to his opponents. "Mediator" was the title ordinarily given by the Jews to Moses. Although the name does not actually occur in the Old Testament, we find instances in Jewish writings contemporary with St. Paul.

It may suffice to quote from *The Assumption of Moses*, where the words occur: "Accordingly He designed and devised me, and He prepared me before the foundation of the world that I should be the mediator of His covenant." * *Philo* also refers to Moses *οἷα μεσίτης καὶ διαλλάκτης*,† and the title is applied to him in the Talmud.‡ The original application of the term to Moses may also be inferred from the passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews 8⁶ f., where Christ is spoken of as the mediator of a better covenant.

Here again, it seems far more probable that St. Paul here applies the term *μεσίτης* in the

* *Assumpt. Mos.* i. 13.

† *Vita Mos.* iii. 19.

‡ For this, and the two foregoing references, Thackeray, *loc. cit.* p. 74.

usual and familiar way to Moses, than that he indicates Moses as intervening in a temporal sense between two epochs of time. We say "the usual and familiar way," because it will hardly be questioned that Moses was generally regarded as intervening between God and the people. This is shewn by such a passage as Deuteronomy 5⁵, *καὶ γὰρ εἰστήκειν ἀνάμεσον Κυρίου καὶ ὑμῶν*. The probabilities in this case, as in the former one, are on the side of a usage familiar to Jewish interpreters rather than on the side of a more recondite and much less obvious analogy.

With regard to the *ἐπίτροποι* and *οἰκονόμοι* of 4², we have seen that Halmel springs straight to the conclusion that they represent "tutores" and "curatores" without any uneasiness as to the relation between *οἰκονόμοι* and "curatores." To the present writer it seems that this view is very likely to be true, with the emphatic proviso that St. Paul is not speaking with scientific technical precision, but in a more popular and general way. The use of the plural makes this probable. A minor did not, as a matter of strict exactness, have "tutors" and "curators" in the plural. St. Paul is merely referring in vague terms to the generally well-known practice, and while *ἐπίτροπος* happens to be the exact legal

rendering of "tutor," *οἰκονόμος* was the most suitable word ready to hand to express the function of the "curator," the person who when the tutor's functions were ended undertook a general supervision of the minor's property while he was between the ages of fourteen and twenty-five.

A similar view appears probable with reference to *τῆς προθεσμίας τοῦ πατρὸς* (4²). It is just possible that St. Paul knew that, whereas the term of guardianship was ordinarily terminated by statute, there were cases in which the term was fixed by the father in his will. Halmel's references certainly seem to shew that the point was a debated one by the Jurists, and that there may have been such variety of practice as to bring St. Paul's remark, even if he was speaking generally and untechnically, within the limits permitted by the Roman Law.

Our conclusion, then, with regard to Halmel's theory is that as an articulated and coherent whole it will not stand. The interpretations given of *σπέρμα*, of *μεσίτης*, and, we may add, of *διαταγὴς δι' ἀγγέλων*, are fanciful and improbable. It is unlikely that St. Paul, without a word of explanatory warning, should have used familiar words in a sense quite different from the generally

accepted one; it is still less likely that his readers would have understood him if he had done so.

We arrive, then, at this general view of the passage. *Διαθήκη* means a "will," and is spoken of in terms that will apply either to a Greek or to a Roman will. The argument about the *σπέρμα*, the reference to *διαταγὴς δι' ἀγγέλων* and to the *μεσίτης*, have no connection with Roman Law, but belong to the sphere of Jewish thought and exegesis. In the reference to *ἐπίτροποι* and *οἰκονόμοι* St. Paul has probably Roman Law in view, but he uses general Greek equivalents for the exact technical terms. In *τῆς προθεσμίας τοῦ πατρὸς* the reference is *probably*, in *υἰοθεσία* (4⁵) almost certainly to Roman Law.

This conclusion amounts to a rejection of Ramsay's theory of distinctly Greek Law, and to a partial acceptance of Halmel's views. It only remains, now, to say a few words on two points that almost inevitably arise from this discussion. They are these :—

(α) What are the probabilities about St. Paul's usage of legal metaphors generally?

(b) How do these probabilities bear on the case of the Epistle to the Galatians?

The first question is too large for a detailed

discussion here. Only one or two considerations can be suggested. We have to bear in mind that "Rome spread her passion for the study of law wherever she imposed her yoke. The inhabitants of distant provinces came to rival the Italians themselves as masters of their national science. At a period not long after the death of Paul, Gaius, who like him was a native of Asia Minor, became the greatest Jurist of the age." * I have quoted the above passage for this purpose. If the state of things which it implies is historical, then it seems unnecessary to draw, as Halmel does, a conclusion from the use of Roman Law as to the place where an Epistle was written. If we may suppose that St. Paul, the Roman citizen, had made so careful a study of the general principles of Roman Law that it coloured his thought and constantly formed the groundwork of his allusions, then the probability is that its influence would be generally visible in whatever place and to whatever recipients the Epistles were written. In other words, it seems more generally probable, on the basis of the above hypothesis, that in Epistles written, for the most part, to or from the great cities of the

* Ball, *St. Paul and the Roman Law*, pp. 2, 3 (from whom also the two following instances are taken).

Roman Empire, he would draw his illustrations from Roman Law, than from the particular local usages of separate localities, which in many cases would be archaic survivals of the far-off time before the Roman conquest.

We may quote in this connection two passages, one from the Epistle to the Romans and the other from the Epistle to the Ephesians. They are representatives of quite a large group. It would, of course, be premature to say that the allusions in them are certainly to Roman Law. But it may fairly be claimed that, regarded from this point of view, they become most luminously significant. The passage in Romans is that about "adoption" in 8^{15, 16}: "Ye received not the spirit of bondage again unto fear; but ye received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father. The Spirit himself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are children of God: and if children, then heirs."

The Holy Spirit is here represented in the character of a witness, and the reference is to the legal ceremony of adoption. The ordinary form of adoption was very dramatic. We cannot now describe its minutiae at length, but the main point for our purpose is that there were seven witnesses, whose function it was to testify that

the transaction which they had seen was really the adoption of a child. If after the death of the adoptive father the claim of the adopted son to the inheritance was contested and his status as a son denied, then the law demanded the corroborative testimony of these witnesses. One or more of them had to testify that a valid adoption had taken place. The bearing of all this on the passage above quoted is obvious. What is referred to is a coincidence of testimony; our own consciousness supported by the testimony of the Holy Spirit that we are God's adopted sons.*

In the passage from Ephesians (1^{13, 14}) the Holy Spirit is again referred to as a witness, but in a different connection. It is suggested that the passage should be translated: "In whom, having also believed, ye were sealed with the Holy Spirit of testimony, which is an earnest of our inheritance, until the ransoming accomplished by the act of taking possession (of the inheritance), to the praise of His glory." Here the Holy Spirit is regarded as the witness whose seal authenticates the will by which

* Ball, *op. cit.* pp. 7, 8. It is true that ἀπαβών in this passage introduces another conception, of contract or conveyance. But it was a conception quite familiar to Roman Law. (See Smith, *Dict. Greek and Roman Antiquities*, s.v. *arra*.)

our inheritance is obtained. "This spiritual inheritance, as in other passages, is referred to by St. Paul as succeeding upon a state of bondage. When a slave was appointed heir, although expressly emancipated by the will which gave him the inheritance, his freedom commenced not upon the making of the will, nor even immediately upon the death of the testator, but from the moment when he took certain legal steps, which were described as 'entering upon the inheritance.' This is 'the ransoming accomplished by the act of taking possession.' In the last words of the passage—'to the praise of His glory'—there is an allusion to a well-known Roman custom. The emancipated slaves who attended the funeral of their emancipator were to the praise of his glory." *

The Epistles to the Romans and Ephesians were written respectively from Corinth and Rome. The locality seems to make little difference to St. Paul's allusions to Roman Law, and the probability is that those allusions would be equally well understood in Rome, Ephesus, and Corinth. The passages mentioned above are, as we have said, typical of

* Ball, *loc. cit.* pp. 27, 28.

many others, and the conclusion to which we are strongly inclined is that St. Paul's legal allusions will be ultimately found to be generally grounded on the usages of Roman Civil Law.

If, then, we hold that the Epistle to the Galatians falls within the scope of this general probability, and that Halmel is right in his main contention that a reference to Roman Civil Law underlies St. Paul's argument, how does this bear on the precise destination of the Epistle? To the present writer it seems to have no effective bearing on the question at all. We recall, on the one hand, Ramsay's emphatic assertion that "as North Galatia grew in civilisation it was not Greek, but Roman manners and organisation that were introduced."* We recall, on the other hand, his admission in connection with South Galatia, that in regard to the two Roman colonies, Antioch and Lystra, it might be maintained that their new foundation implied a Romanisation of society. To a certain extent it did so; actual Italian settlers would not abandon their Occidental ideas of family and inheritance.† It seems very probable, therefore, that whether the Christian communities to which the Epistle

* *Hist. Com.* p. 373.

† *Ibid.* p. 374.

was sent were situated in North or in South Galatia, there would be a sufficiently strong Roman environment to make such general allusions as St. Paul makes to Roman Civil Law quite intelligible. We therefore conclude that the legal allusions in the Epistle are indecisive. There is nothing in them that bears so directly on the question of the locality of the Galatian Churches as to enable us to say decisively whether the Epistle was sent to North or to South Galatia.

III.

ST. PAUL'S VISITS TO JERUSALEM,
AS RECORDED IN THE ACTS
AND IN THE EPISTLE TO THE
GALATIANS.

Ἄ δὲ γράφω ὑμῖν, ἰδοὺ ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ ὅτι οὐ ψεύδομαι.

GALATIANS 1²⁰.

III.

ST. PAUL'S VISITS TO JERUSALEM, AS RECORDED IN THE ACTS AND IN THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS.

ONE of the most important problems that face the New Testament critic is that of the relationship between the Acts and the Pauline Epistles. The question has, in recent times, become at once more complicated and more interesting. Formerly there seemed to be a very simple way to a very obvious solution. In the case of this particular subject, St. Paul's visits to Jerusalem, the argument was developed on some such lines as these: "There are serious discrepancies between the account of the visits given in Acts and that given in the Epistle to the Galatians: the Epistle is admittedly and incontrovertibly Pauline, and therefore must be received as an absolutely trustworthy first-hand account; the very considerable discrepancies of Acts prove

the book to be both late and untrustworthy ; moreover, the Epistle gives us a clue as to the real nature of Acts. It leaves before us the picture of St. Paul rebuking St. Peter at Antioch ; there remains fixed in our minds an impression of St. Peter and St. Paul at variance ; this variance between the leaders was transmitted to their followers, and so there were Pauline and Petrine factions in the Church. The Book of Acts was a deliberate attempt, at a later date, to reconcile these jarring elements, by an artificial reconstruction of the history, in which St. Peter and St. Paul should be made to appear on a footing of friendly equality."

Unfortunately for this argument, St. Luke's character as a historian has been placed beyond reproach. There is an increasingly strong consensus amongst scholars that not only is the Acts a first-century document, but that the author, St. Luke, has displayed both wonderful industry in the accumulation of accurate information and consummate ability in the use he has made of it. We can no longer, therefore, find an easy solution for the problem by exalting the Epistle at the expense of the Acts. Still, the discrepancies remain. Hence we are con-

fronted by the task of reconciling the differences between two first-century documents, each of which has, admittedly, very powerful claims.

Before attempting to appreciate the efforts that have been made to solve this problem—the question of St. Paul's visits to Jerusalem—it will be as well to realise quite clearly what are the points of agreement and what the points of difference between the accounts given in the Acts and the Epistle to the Galatians.

Five visits of St. Paul to Jerusalem are recorded in Acts. They may be briefly described:—

1. 9²⁶⁻³⁰: St. Paul is introduced to the Apostles by Barnabas: he preaches boldly, but in consequence of plots made by the Hellenistic Jews he is sent away by the brethren to Cæsarea.

2. 11³⁰ 12²⁵: He comes with Barnabas from Antioch to the elders, with relief for the brethren during the famine. When this ministry is completed they both return to Antioch.

3. 15¹⁻³⁰: St. Paul and Barnabas are sent from Antioch to Jerusalem to discuss the terms on which Gentiles are to be admitted to the Church. The Apostolic Council is held, at which they both strongly advocate liberty for the Gentiles.

4. 18²²: St. Paul pays a visit at the end of the Second Missionary Journey.

5. 21¹⁷: St. Paul arrives at the end of the Third Missionary Journey with contributions for the poor.

In this discussion we are concerned only with the first three of these visits.

The Epistle to the Galatians speaks of two visits to Jerusalem. (1) 1¹⁸⁻²⁰: Three years after his conversion St. Paul goes to visit Cephas, and stays fifteen days. He meets St. James, but no other Apostle. (2) 2¹⁻¹⁰: After fourteen years he goes up again with Barnabas — by revelation, and is recognised as the Apostle of the Gentiles.

We have, then, three visits recorded in the Acts and two in the Epistle, and we are faced by the question: "With which of the three visits of Acts are the two in the Epistle to be identified?"

There can be very little doubt that the first of the visits in Acts is to be identified with the first visit in the Epistle, *i.e.* Acts 9²⁶⁻³⁰ with Galatians 1¹⁸⁻²⁰. There are considerable differences in detail, but in both cases the visit is the first one paid by St. Paul to Jerusalem after his conversion, and in both cases it follows

immediately on a sojourn at Damascus. Acts, it is true, contains no reference to the visit to Arabia of which the Epistle speaks; nor does Acts contain any indication that a space of three years elapsed between St. Paul's conversion and his visit to Jerusalem. The only marks of time St. Luke gives are "certain days" (*ἡμέρας τινάς*), Acts 9¹⁹, and "many days" (*ἡμέραι ἱκαναί*), Acts 9²³. Even though the instances quoted in Grimm prove that *ἱκανός* can be used to express very considerable size or number, still no one would have inferred from the narrative in Acts that so long a period, including such an important event as the visit to Arabia, had elapsed. It is difficult to resist the impression that St. Luke means us to understand that the return to Jerusalem followed very quickly on the sojourn at Damascus, and that the first intimation of St. Paul's conversion received by the Apostles was his own presence amongst them as a Christian convert. Yet this could hardly have been the case after a lapse of three years.

It is quite true, as Headlam says, that "the two narratives give a somewhat different impression," and it is equally true that at the first reading "the obvious impression created by the narrative (in Acts) is that the writer did not

know of the Arabian journey, nor of the length of time which had elapsed before the Jerusalem visit.* But this "obvious impression" may need to be corrected by a clearer view of St. Luke's purpose in writing Acts, and a more adequate conception of the use he made of his materials. If he selected what was strictly relevant to his purpose, and was here describing the growth of the Christian Church, and St. Paul only in his capacity as convert to the Church, he may have left out everything, of set purpose, that did not strictly bear on the matter in hand. The chronological notices generally in Acts 1-12 are vague and slight, so there is nothing peculiar in the omission of a definite reference to the period of three years.

Lightfoot's account of the matter may still be accepted as fairly accounting for the facts. "This divergence," he says, "is due to two causes. The different *position* of the two writers, the one deriving his information at second-hand, the other an eye-witness and an actor in the scenes which he describes. . . . The different *objects* of the two writers. The one sets himself to give a continuous historical account; the other introduces incidents by way of allusion rather than

* Headlam, art. "Acts" in Hastings' *Bibl. Dict.*

of narrative.”* In a word, “the accounts are different and to all appearance independent: they represent different points of view, they supplement one another, they are not inconsistent.”†

The issue that confronts us now is a comparatively simple one. We have left one visit in Galatians and two in Acts. With which of the two visit in Acts is the one in Galatians (2¹⁻¹⁰) to be identified?

For us in England, at any rate, the answering of this question is closely associated with the names of certain leading scholars. The view that is generally accepted—the identification of Galatians 2¹⁻¹⁰ with Acts 15—was clearly and fully expressed by Lightfoot. More recently Ramsay, in his book *St. Paul, the Traveller and the Roman Citizen*, has pleaded with great force and ingenuity for the identification of Galatians 2¹⁻¹⁰ with the second visit mentioned by St. Luke in 11³⁰. Since the publication of this book Sanday has reasserted the claims of Acts 15, and has debated the point with Ramsay in the pages of the *Expositor*. Still more recently a contribution of great value has been made to the discussion by Turner in the article on “Chronology” in the new *Dictionary of the Bible*.

* Lightfoot, *Galatians*, p. 91.

† Headlam, *loc. cit.*

As the identification of Galatians 2¹⁻¹⁰ with Acts 15 is generally accepted, we may take this as a starting-point, and consider briefly the arguments for and against it. Acts 15 gives the following picture. St. Paul and Barnabas have returned from the First Missionary Journey, and are at Antioch. Certain men come down from Judæa to Antioch, and teach that circumcision according to the law of Moses is essential to Christianity. As this doctrine meets with great opposition, St. Paul and Barnabas are deputed to go to Jerusalem for the purpose of having the point decided. They go, they are "received of the Church and the Apostles and the elders." The Apostolic Council is held, at which St. Peter strongly supports the claim for Gentile liberty urged by St. Paul and Barnabas. The claim is admitted by St. James, who pleads, however, for certain concessions to Jewish feeling—which concessions are formulated in the decree of the Council.

The picture described in Galatians 2¹⁻¹⁰ is somewhat different. St. Paul and Barnabas went up to Jerusalem, taking with them Titus. St. Paul, at any rate, went up "by revelation," and laid before the chief Apostles privately the Gospel that he was accustomed to preach.

Although Titus, a Greek, was uncircumcised, the question of circumcision does not seem to have been raised at first: when it was raised, it was by people whom St. Paul describes as "false brethren privily brought in." To their suggestions St. Paul offered the strongest opposition. He maintained that the Gospel was for uncircumcised as well as for circumcised; that the preaching of the Gospel to the uncircumcised was his own divinely appointed sphere of work. This was frankly recognised by the leading Apostles, Peter, James, and John, who merely request that St. Paul and his fellow-workers "should remember the poor."

These two descriptions are generally regarded as applying to the same event.* This view is held on various grounds. The *geography* is the same in both cases; in both narratives Antioch and Jerusalem are the two places chiefly concerned. The *time* is approximately the same. In Galatians St. Paul places the event fifteen or sixteen years after his conversion. St. Luke's narrative in Acts implies that the Council took place about 51 A.D.† The *persons* are the same: Paul and Barnabas on one side, Cephas and

* Cf. Lightfoot, "Galatians," 123 ff.

† Ramsay gives 50 A.D. as the date for the Apostolic Council of Acts xv.

James on the other (Galatians mentions John also). The *subject* of debate is the same—the circumcision of Gentile converts. The general *character* of the debate seems to be the same in one respect at any rate—that it was a contest long and strenuously waged. The *result* is in two important respects the same—that the Gentiles were declared to be exempt from the peculiar ordinances of the Jewish Law; and further, that the special call of Paul and Barnabas to preach to the Gentiles was freely recognised.

These numerous coincidences seem to establish a claim for identification; but before admitting the claim we must consider sundry difficulties.

St. Paul, in Galatians, says he went up to Jerusalem “by revelation.” In Acts he is represented as being simply one of the delegates from the Church at Antioch. In Galatians St. Paul speaks of private communications with the leaders of the Church at Jerusalem. Acts describes a full public congress of all the members of the Church. Again, Acts seems to imply complete harmony between the leaders on both sides; Galatians seems to hint at differences of opinion between the Apostles themselves (2⁶).

Still more serious difficulties are raised by St.

Paul's omissions in Galatians. On the view taken above, he makes no reference whatever to the visit he paid to Jerusalem at the time of the famine (Acts 11³⁰). He is quite silent also about the apostolic decree. He makes no reference to it in Galatians; and even in 1 Corinthians, when he is dealing with the particular question of meats offered to idols, he never even hints at its existence.

In view of these and other difficulties an attempt has been made to identify the visit of Galatians 2¹⁻¹⁰ with that of Acts 11³⁰—the second of the visits recorded in Acts. The defence of this view is associated with the name of Fritzsche;* but at the present time we are more accustomed to think of it in connection with Professor Ramsay, who has restated it with his wonted skill and vigour. His arguments are very ingenious, and often very subtle. It will be well to summarise them as adequately as possible before proceeding to an estimation of their worth.

In the first place, he forms a different conception of the famine ministry of Paul and Barnabas. It was no mere conveying of money to Jerusalem, followed by a speedy return to

* *Opusc.* p. 223 sq.

Antioch. The prophecy of Agabus was probably made in the winter of 43-44 A.D. This was followed by a bad harvest in 45 A.D., and a total failure of the crops in 46 A.D. During these bad harvests the delegates had ample time to be making preparations for their ministration. They would purchase corn, convey it to Jerusalem, and then personally supervise the distribution of it there.

In this connection he lays a great deal of stress on the word *διακονία*. He holds that it means much more than the mere handing over of a sum of money. It refers to the exercise of a continuous function—to the discharge of a duty, the performance of which involved a long period of regular work, as, for example, a daily, weekly, and monthly ministration to the poor of Jerusalem.

In pursuance of this ministry they must have been in Jerusalem a considerable time, and have had ample opportunities for such meetings with the Apostles as are referred to in Galatians 2¹⁻¹⁰.

In this connection the difficulty arises, that in Acts 11³⁰ St. Paul and Barnabas are said to convey the relief from the Church of Antioch to the *elders* at Jerusalem. Ramsay explains this by a reference to Acts 6². The reason why the

relief was brought to the elders was that such a practical work fell more properly within their province. The Apostles had already declined to concern themselves with the serving of tables.

A further point of connection lies in the fact that while the visit of Acts 11³⁰ is primarily concerned with the relief of the poor, St. Paul in Galatians 2¹⁰ says that relief of the poor was his special care: *ὁ καὶ ἐσπούδασα αὐτὸ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι.*

One or two more coincidences may be briefly mentioned. Ramsay very ingeniously finds an explanation of the "revelation" referred to by St. Paul in Galatians 2¹ in the prophecy of Agabus about the famine in Acts 11²⁸. The reason why Titus is not mentioned in 11³⁰ is that he "was a privately selected associate and not an official." Yet the presence of an uncircumcised Gentile with St. Paul would give rise to an expression of feeling so strong as to necessitate these private conferences between St. Paul and the older Apostles on the matter. The reason why no mention of these conferences is made at Acts 11³⁰ is precisely this, that they remained private: the matter did not come to open controversy. Ramsay holds that the case of St. Peter and Cornelius shews that even so

early as this there were members of the Church who would be prepared to raise the question of the relation of Gentile Christians and Jewish in the form in which it was raised in Galatians 2¹⁻¹⁰.

One point that occurs in this connection seems at first sight to be a very attractive one. St. Peter's reputation is saved from a stain which otherwise seemed to rest on it. If we accept the view that Galatians 2¹⁻¹⁰ is to be identified with Acts 15, then it seems (Gal. 2¹¹) that shortly after the Council was over St. Peter at Antioch so far departed from the principles he had advocated at the Council as to merit a severe rebuke from St. Paul.

On the view advocated by Ramsay, St. Peter's vacillation took place *after* the private conferences supposed to have been held at the time of Acts 11³⁰, but *before* the Council of Acts 15. Hence we may infer even that the firmness with which St. Peter advocated Gentile freedom at the Council may not have been wholly disconnected with the rebuke previously administered to him by St. Paul.

From the point of view of this position the question might also fairly be asked : "How could St. Paul use the words 'they who were of repute imparted nothing to me' (Gal. 2⁶) to describe

the issue of the Council in Acts 15?" It might certainly be suggested that the terms of the apostolic decree were something imparted by the Apostles at Jerusalem to St. Paul.

Finally, on this view St. Paul stands acquitted of the strange omission of which he seems to be guilty on the other view. The second recorded visit in Galatians is identified with the one recorded second in the Acts.

This may be taken as a sufficient review of the positive arguments advanced on either side. It remains now to submit them all to a careful scrutiny in order that we may be in a position to form an opinion as to the weight of the opposing claims.

First, with regard to the difficulties that are urged against the identification of Galatians 2¹⁻¹⁰ with Acts 15. There is no real difficulty in the matter of the "revelation" spoken of by St. Paul. It is perfectly possible that St. Paul here speaks of the matter from the subjective point of view as it presented itself to his own mind. St. Luke, on the other hand, writing history, presents the matter on its objective side; he speaks of the outward visible events which led to St. Paul's journey to Jerusalem. It is quite possible that the needs of the crisis may have

appealed to the consciousness of St. Paul as a "revelation." Ramsay's reference of the "revelation" to the prophecy of Agabus is highly ingenious, but carries no very decisive weight as an argument.

In the alleged discrepancy between the public congress described in Acts 15 and the private interviews of Galatians 2¹⁻¹⁰ the difference is again largely to be accounted for by the differing point of view. St. Luke writes as the historian, telling the events as they interested the Church at large; St. Paul views the matter from the inside—from the standpoint of an actor in the events, who knew intimately all the most secret transactions. It would be absurd to maintain that the two accounts are mutually exclusive. Whenever a great controversial question is to be debated in public there are numerous private meetings and conferences between those who will have to take a prominent part. Not the least straining of probability is involved in the supposition that St. Paul refers more particularly to the private meetings where the question at issue was debated freely with the heads of the Church, while St. Luke naturally describes the chief features of the public congress when the points were submitted to and ratified by the whole Church.

The description of events before the Council in Acts 15^{4, 5, 6} may well leave room for such discussions as those of Galatians 2¹⁻¹⁰.

The third difficulty suggested was that whereas Acts seems to indicate complete harmony between St. Peter and St. James on the one hand and St. Paul and Barnabas on the other, Galatians points to disputes and differences of opinion between them. In reply to this, it may be pointed out that even in Galatians harmony is ultimately arrived at between St. Paul on the one hand and St. Peter, St. James, and St. John on the other. It is natural that St. Luke, in a somewhat brief history like Acts, should concern himself with results rather than the processes that have led to them.

We come now to the question of the omissions. It is urged that, according to Lightfoot's theory, St. Paul, who is giving an account of his visits to Jerusalem, deliberately omits any reference to the visit of Acts 11³⁰. The answer to this is that in Galatians St. Paul's purpose was *not* primarily to enumerate his visits to Jerusalem, but to shew to what extent he had held communication with those who were Apostles before him. He is not enumerating his visits to Jerusalem, but his interviews with the other Apostles.

Admitting that this is St. Paul's purpose in Galatians, we cannot fail to mark one significant thing in Acts 11^{29, 30}. There is no mention of the Apostles. The Christians at Antioch provided relief for the poor of Jerusalem, "sending it to the *elders* by the hand of Barnabas and Saul." Why are the Apostles not mentioned? Lightfoot very properly suggests that owing to the persecution of Herod they had fled for safety and were not in Jerusalem at the time. Ramsay, both in *St. Paul the Traveller* (p. 53) and again in his articles in the *Expositor*, scouts this idea as a most unworthy one. "Such an act of cowardice should not be attributed to the Apostles without distinct evidence. . . . One can only wonder that Lightfoot ever stooped to the idea that they sneaked into the city and sneaked out hastily again, leaving the poor without a single 'Christian of rank' to minister to them."

These are strong words, but they rather overshoot the mark. It is questionable whether it is at all necessary to attribute "cowardice" to men who, after all, were only obeying our Lord's command, "When they persecute you in this city, flee into the next" (Matt. 10²³). It was no more cowardly for the Apostles to leave Jerusalem at the time of Herod's persecution than it was for

St. Paul to leave Damascus (Acts 9²⁵), and again, under similar circumstances, to escape from Jerusalem (9³⁰).

But Ramsay argues the point in greater detail. He points to Acts 8¹ and 12¹⁷ as clear proof that the Apostles *did* stay in Jerusalem during a time of persecution. 8¹ relates how after the death of Stephen "they were all scattered abroad throughout the regions of Judæa and Samaria, *except the Apostles*." In 12¹⁷ we are told that St. Peter said to those in the house of Mary, whither he had gone after his escape from prison, "Tell these things unto James and to the brethren."

But these passages do not really prove Ramsay's point. 12¹⁷ is not conclusive: in fact, it rather indicates, if anything, that the Apostles *were* out of Jerusalem, and that St. Peter sent this message because he had no means of access to them himself. With regard to 8¹ it is significant* that the persecution there mentioned—the one after the death of Stephen—was directed against the Church in general; the Apostles were not particularly aimed at, and were in no *special* danger. Whereas the persecution of

* This point is indicated by Askwith, *The Ep. to the Galatians* p. 152.

Herod in Acts 12 seems to have been directed against the Apostles in particular. Herod had evidently decided that the most effective way to stamp out the new sect was to kill the leaders. Under the stress of such a persecution as this it was quite natural that the Apostles should flee from the city.

If we are justified, in view of these considerations, in thinking that the Apostles were not in Jerusalem at the time of Acts 11³⁰–12²⁵; if we are right, also, in supposing that St. Paul's purpose in Galatians is to enumerate the occasions when he had personal intercourse with the older Apostles,—then the omission of any reference to this visit becomes perfectly explicable. He does not refer to it because it was not an occasion when he met the Apostles.

An interesting suggestion* on this point was made some little time since, which is at any rate well worth consideration. In 11²⁹ we read that the Church at Antioch “determined to send relief to the brethren who dwelt in Judæa.” St. Paul and Barnabas were the chief agents in the distribution of this relief. The distress would probably be great among scattered and feeble communities in the country districts. It

* Falconer in *Expository Times*, vol. xi. p. 487.

is true that 12²⁵ says that Paul and Barnabas returned "from Jerusalem" when they had fulfilled their ministry. But is it not possible that Barnabas may have superintended the distribution in the city, while St. Paul undertook the work in the country districts? St. Paul was well known in Jerusalem before his conversion; Acts 9²⁹ shews that when he returned after his conversion he was a marked man, hated as a traitor to his religion. It would have been highly perilous for one so well known and so well hated as he was by the Jews to risk an entry into the city of Jerusalem during the stress of Herod's persecution. This view fits well with the facts of the case; it has, too, this further advantage, that it explains fully why St. Paul makes no mention of this visit of Acts 11³⁰. He does not mention the visit because there was no visit to mention. The statement in 12²⁵ is general in terms: he and Barnabas "returned from Jerusalem" when they had finished their work in Judæa, of which Jerusalem was the capital, and where Barnabas may have gone.

This view conflicts to a certain extent with the one mentioned previously, that the Apostles had left Jerusalem because Herod's persecution was aimed specially at them; for in that case

we can hardly see why Barnabas should dare to enter the city. It has been mentioned, however, in order to make it quite clear that there are more ways than one of accounting for St. Paul's omission to refer to the visit of Acts 11³⁰. It *may* have been, as Lightfoot suggests, because he went to Jerusalem but did *not* see the Apostles; this other theory suggests that he neither saw the Apostles nor visited Jerusalem at all, but confined his work of ministration to the country parts of Judæa.

This point has been argued at some length, because there seems to be a lingering feeling of dissatisfaction over the episode. It is still open to a determined opponent to say that when all is said and done, St. Paul *seems* to suppress the visit. Why did he not name it, and state explicitly that the Apostles were away? Others, notably Wendt, M'Giffert, and Drummond, solve the difficulty by practically rejecting the second visit in Acts. This is a drastic method, but it is not open to those who have agreed to estimate St. Luke as a first-class historian.

The question of the apostolic decree is not of much importance. It is true that St. Paul does not mention it in Galatians, and it is true

he makes no reference to it in his discussion of meats offered to idols in 1 Corinthians. But the advice which he there gives—as well as in Romans 14—shews that his injunctions to the “strong” to consider the feelings of the “weaker” brethren are practically a carrying out of the terms of the decree.

Lightfoot has suggested that the decree was only for temporary and local application. It was addressed to the brethren in “Antioch, Syria, and Cilicia.” Acts 16⁴, however, seems to shew that St. Paul and Barnabas communicated it to the Churches in the neighbourhood of Lystra and Iconium. On the South Galatian theory these would be among the Churches to which Galatians was addressed, and it therefore becomes additionally remarkable that St. Paul makes no reference to the decree which he had himself promulgated among them. The fact is, however, that the decree did not touch the real point at issue between St. Paul and the Galatians. The enactments of the decree were concessions to be made by Gentiles to Jewish feeling and custom; they were not doctrinal, concerned with the essential conditions of salvation. Hence there was no need for particular reference to them in the Epistle.

Assuming, then, that a sufficient account has been given of the objections urged against the identification of Acts 15 with Galatians 2¹⁻¹⁰, we may now proceed to consider those points in Ramsay's theory which have not already been incidentally dealt with.

The account he gives of the ministration to the poor of Jerusalem *may* be true. It may have been an organised distribution lasting over a considerable time. It may be questioned, however, whether all this meaning is to be extracted from the one word *διακονία*. *διακονία* means "service." It is used of Christian service generally, and is applicable to a slight and temporary service just as much as to a prolonged one. All that this point proves, however, even if we accept Ramsay's view to its full extent, is that there was ample opportunity for St. Paul and Barnabas to see the Apostles if they were there to be seen.

The view that the Apostles *must* have been in Jerusalem—otherwise they would be liable to a charge of cowardice—has been sufficiently discussed already.

With regard to the request made by the older Apostles that St. Paul would remember the poor, which thing he "was also zealous to

do," with its supposed reference to Acts 11³⁰, it may be remarked that the request comes curiously at this point. Ramsay * sees in it an instance of the delicacy of the older Apostles. He paraphrases the words as follows: "The only advice and instruction which we have to give is, that you continue to do what you have been zealously doing," *i.e.* relieving the wants of the poorer brethren at Jerusalem. The purport of the words is to pay a "graceful and delicate compliment to Paul."

The words, however, are capable of quite a different construction.† The Apostles at Jerusalem would recognise clearly, after the Council was over, that there were two distinctly marked bodies in the Church—the circumcised Jews and the uncircumcised Gentiles. Even within the unity of the Church there would be a deep gulf between these two in matters of ceremonial and social custom. Feeling this division to be inevitable, they earnestly desired to preserve every possible bond of unity. Such a bond presented itself in the contribution of the whole Church to the support of its poorer members—a contribution that should be irrespective of Jewish or

* *St. Paul the Traveller*, p. 57.

† I have discussed this a little more fully in *Expository Times*, vol. xi. p. 190.

Gentile origin. This view gives a deep, emphatic significance to the word *μόνον* in the phrase *μόνον τῶν πτωχῶν ἵνα μνημονεύωμεν*. "If this be the *only* possible union, let us cling to it and use it." This interpretation of the passage *demand*s the identification of Galatians 2¹⁻¹⁰ with Acts 15.

A further suggestion * that is not without weight has been made in reference to this passage. St. Paul in Galatians 2¹⁰ uses the singular *ἐσπούδασα*; it is highly probable that, had he been referring to the ministration of relief of Acts 11³⁰, in which he and Barnabas were colleagues, he would have used the plural in order to associate Barnabas with himself in the work on which they had been jointly engaged.

The reference to Titus is not very decisive either way. He is never mentioned throughout Acts. But the probabilities of the case favour the ordinary view. The presence of an uncircumcised Greek with St. Paul at Jerusalem fits in exactly with the state of things indicated in Acts 15—the raising of the question whether it was possible for those who were uncircumcised to win full salvation.† Ramsay lays stress on the word *συμπαλαβών* used in Galatians 2¹, maintaining that it is properly used of one who was

* Knowling, *in loc.*

† *St. Paul the Traveller*, p. 170.

a private unofficial helper. This view is quite consistent with the omission of any reference to Titus in Acts 15.

The discussion has hitherto been largely concerned with details. We have tried to estimate the positive arguments for the ordinary view; we have seen that the difficulties urged against it do not seem to be insuperable, and we have considered some of the obstacles to the identification of Galatians 2¹⁻¹⁰ with Acts 11³⁰. It remains now to state an argument that seems to be absolutely conclusive,—an argument which seems to gain added weight the more one reflects on the circumstances as a whole.

The contention is briefly this : that the circumcision controversy was not sufficiently developed at the time of the famine in Judæa, and that Galatians 2 implies a more extended missionary work than had taken place by the year 44 A.D. To put the position in Sanday's words,* "the language of St. Paul in Galatians is satisfied by nothing short of the events of the First Missionary Journey." The conference of the Apostles was retrospective—not prospective.

Till St. Paul's First Missionary Journey little if anything seems to have been done in the way

* *Expositor*, vol. iv. p. 45.

of preaching to Gentiles who were in no sense proselytes to Judaism. Cornelius was a proselyte in the wider sense of the term ; he belonged to the class of *φοβούμενοι* or *σεβόμενοι τὸν θεόν*, "who were bound to observe certain ceremonial regulations of purity in order to be permitted to come into any relations with the Jews." It is true that the admission of Cornelius was a step onward, but it was only a slight one in comparison with the advance that was afterwards made. Even the Church of Antioch at this period probably consisted largely of converts such as Cornelius from the class of *φοβούμενοι* or semi-proselytes, whose status in the Church was not yet defined. This is on the assumption that we read *Ἕλληνας* in Acts 11²⁰ ; if we read *Ἑλληνιστάς* with Wetscott and Hort (and the MS. evidence is strong), the case is still clearer that the Church of Antioch was as yet practically confined to the limits of Judaism.

But on the First Missionary Journey these limits were deliberately overstepped. When standing before Sergius Paulus at Paphos (Acts 13⁷) St. Paul offered the Gospel to the Græco-Roman world ; at Antioch in Pisidia, after the rejection of his message by the Jews in the synagogue, he pronounced the significant words

(13⁴⁶): "Lo, we turn to the Gentiles." On their return to Antioch he and Barnabas declared—as the great outstanding feature of their journey—that God "had opened a door of faith unto the Gentiles."

There are obviously two stages, then, in the opening of the door of Christianity to the world. The first consisted in the admission of *φοβούμενοι* such as Cornelius; the second consisted in the admission of absolute Gentiles who had had no previous connection with Judaism. Galatians 2¹⁻¹⁰ certainly presupposes the second of these stages, and not merely the first.

One would have thought that there could be little reasonable doubt on this head, that St. Paul's words in Acts 13⁴⁶ mark his assumption of the apostleship of the Gentiles; that from this point onwards he felt himself divinely commissioned to preach a "Gospel of the 'uncircumcision.'" Ramsay, however, with great skill attempts to evade this conclusion. He thinks it probable that St. Peter and St. James were men of such discrimination, of such statesmanlike sagacity and foresight, that even so early as the date of Acts 11³⁰ they recognised the destiny of St. Paul. In the private discussions which they held they admitted St. Paul's qualifications for

the apostleship of the Gentiles. In fact, when St. Paul started on his First Missionary Journey he not only had the firm conviction that his vocation was to preach to the Gentiles, but had also the assurance that the older Apostles were on his side and would be prepared to give him loyal support. Their confidence in him was prophetic rather than retrospective.

This is ingenious, but hardly does justice to the tone of the whole passage, Galatians 2¹⁻¹⁰. St. Paul is certainly appealing to *facts*—to facts the knowledge of which was common property. He speaks of τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ὃ κηρύσσω ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσι ; he says that the Apostles perceived ὅτι πεπίστευμαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς ἀκροβυστίας καθὼς Πέτρος τῆς περιτομῆς. It is true, as Ramsay points out, that ἐνήργησε in Galatians 2⁸ is subjective rather than objective ; that is, “the Greek lays stress on the powers implanted, the gifts and energies bestowed upon the two Apostles, rather than upon the results which they obtained.” But still the passage as a whole appeals to objective results ; it looks back to accomplished facts.

This argument is rightly regarded by Sanday as the central stronghold of the position. We cannot but feel that it has most powerful claims. It is almost determinative in itself, and the aim

of the earlier parts of this paper has been to shew that all the other circumstances which claim consideration are not inconsistent with it.

We come finally to the episode at Antioch; the rebuke administered to St. Peter by St. Paul. There has doubtless often been an uneasy consciousness that Lightfoot's account of this was hardly conclusive; that we cannot be satisfied to find the key to the incident in the character of St. Peter, and say simply that the man who once denied his Lord might possibly recant even after such a momentous decision as that of the Council at Jerusalem. Besides, the character of Barnabas was in question as well as that of St. Peter; he was just as deeply committed to the decree of the Apostolic Council.

Not the least of the advantages of Ramsay's theory seemed to be that St. Peter's character was saved by the acceptance of it. On that theory the rebuke at Antioch took place before the Council at Jerusalem.

We have seen reason, however, to reject the theory, so we are left with this difficulty on our hands. How great a difficulty it always has been is manifest from the desperate shifts to which patristic commentators * have been put to

* Cf. Lightfoot, *Galatians*, 128 ff.

explain it. The necessity for some explanation was all the greater because of the use made of the incident by heretics and unbelievers. The author of the Clementine homilies made it a ground for a personal attack* on St. Paul. The Gnostic Marcion† used it to prove the antagonism between Judaism and Christianity, as represented by the strife between the Apostle of the Jews and the Apostle of the Gentiles. Adversaries such as Porphyry‡ made it the ground for an indiscriminate attack on Christianity, administering blame to St. Peter and St. Paul alike.

In view of all this we can hardly wonder that every effort should have been made to explain away the obvious meaning of the passage. Clement of Alexandria§ held that the Cephas here mentioned was not the Apostle Peter, but one of the Seventy who bore the same name. Origen's|| theory as quoted by Jerome is still more extravagant. The whole dispute was a pretence. The Apostles, "being of one mind in the matter, got up this scene that St. Paul

* Hom. xvii. 19, ii. 22, xix. 22, etc.

† See Tertull. *adv. Marc.* I. 20, v. 3.

[‡ See Hieron. *Ep. ad Gal.* Præf.]

§ Quoted Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* i. 12.

[|| Quoted Hieron. *Epist.* cxii.]

might the more effectively condemn the Judaisers through the chief of the Apostles, who, acknowledging the justice of the rebuke, set them an example of submission." The only criticism that need be passed on this view is that it saves St. Peter from a charge of cowardice by convicting both St. Peter and St. Paul of deliberate dishonesty.

This is no easy problem for the upholders of the generally accepted theory, and it is curious that the hint which leads to solution should be supplied by Ramsay. Turner* takes up Ramsay's suggestion† that the emissaries from St. James, whose presence at Antioch caused St. Peter to recant (Gal. 2¹²), are to be identified with the "certain men" who "came down from Judæa" of Acts 15¹. Should this identification be made,‡ then St. Peter's desertion of the Gentile Christians at Antioch would be made *before* the Council, while St. Peter and Barnabas would be both acquitted of the charge of denying the principles they had publicly professed.

One condition is obviously inseparable from this view. Galatians 2¹¹⁻¹⁴ must be allowed to

* Art. "Chronology," Hastings' *Dict. Bibl.*

† *St. Paul the Traveller*, p. 158.

‡ The suggestion is more fully worked out by Falconer, *Expos. Times*, *loc. cit.*

precede in order of time Galatians 2¹⁻¹⁰, and further examination shews that this condition is not inadmissible. The main sequence of the Epistle is argumentative, not chronological. It is true that in 1¹⁸⁻²¹ 2¹ the order is chronological, and each stage is marked by a recurring *ἔπειτα*. But 2¹¹, the opening verse of the episode at Antioch, has no *ἔπειτα*: it begins with *ὅτε δε*. St. Paul's argument is an expansion of and justification of his description of himself in 1¹ as *ἀπόστολος οὐκ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ δι' ἀνθρώπου*: also of the words in 1¹², *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγὼ παρὰ ἀνθρώπου παρέλαβον αὐτό, οὔτε ἐδιδάχθην*. Turner's paraphrase brings out the force: "I have not received any gospel from the elder Apostles. I went up to their headquarters at Jerusalem, but first at an interval of three years and then at one of fourteen; the first a private visit, the second an official one, when I was treated with them and recognised by them on equal terms. So far from simply submitting to them, I once publicly rebuked their chief when he was on my ground at Antioch, and backed out of his own liberal principles under pressure from representatives of James." That is to say, the paragraph 2¹¹⁻¹⁴ contains an additional episode inserted by St. Paul to support his main contention, but

not necessarily following in strict chronological sequence in what has gone before.

This view has great intrinsic probability, and it absolutely clears away one of the greatest obstacles to the identification of Galatians 2¹⁻¹⁰ with Acts 15, the difficulty of accounting for St. Peter's somewhat ignominious recantation so soon after his unequivocal plea for freedom, as recorded by St. Luke in Acts 15⁷⁻¹¹.

We may now summarise in one or two brief propositions * the results at which we have arrived. There are three main arguments for identifying the visit to Jerusalem recorded in Acts 15 with the one referred to in Galatians 2¹⁻¹⁰.

Firstly, St. Paul's account in the Epistle clearly implies that his missionary work amongst the Gentiles had already begun. This was the case at the time of Acts 15, but not at the time of Acts 11³⁰.

Secondly, the principle of non-circumcision was plainly contended for and won at the visit of Galatians 2¹⁻¹⁰. This was both the purpose and the result of the visit in Acts 15.

Thirdly, St. Paul's account in Galatians 2¹⁻¹⁰ shews clearly that, at the visit there recorded,

* I have ventured to express these almost *verbatim* in Askwith's words (*The Epistle to the Galatians, Destination and Date*, pp. 150, 151), as they put so clearly the conclusion I support.

the Apostles became convinced of his mission to the Gentiles, obviously in view of the facts of the First Missionary Journey. In connection with this Acts 15¹² is significant; St. Paul and Barnabas rehearsed 'What signs and wonders God had wrought among the Gentiles by them.' No doubt it was this recital that largely helped to produce the conviction spoken of by St. Paul in Galatians 2¹⁻¹⁰.

With regard, then, to the whole question, renewed examination seems to establish the conclusion that the first visit of Galatians is to be identified with the first of Acts; that Galatians omits any reference to the second visit of Acts; that the second visit of Galatians is to be identified with the third of Acts.

This conclusion bears on the general relation of Acts to the Pauline Epistles. It tends to establish the conviction of St. Luke's independence—the conviction that he probably wrote Acts before the Pauline Epistles had emerged into such prominence as to be consulted as authoritative documents in the writing of Church history.

IV.

THE DATE OF ST. LUKE AND ACTS.

Quare cum hæc tota theologorum argumentatio et per se sit fallax neque rebus conveniat, missam eam faciemus statuemusque nihil per nos obstare, quominus et evangelium et Acta Lucæ ante a. 70 scripta putentur.

BLASS, *Acta Apostolorum*, p. 5.

IV.

THE DATE OF ST. LUKE AND ACTS.

PRESENT-DAY criticism of the New Testament concerns itself especially with the investigation of origins. There is a distinct tendency, for instance, to lay stress on Christianity as conceived by Christ rather than as interpreted by St. Paul. In this attempt to return to and to realise the historical figure of Jesus Christ, the interpretation of the documents which record the facts of His earthly life becomes a matter of supreme interest. What is the evidential worth of these documents? Are they found to be so trustworthy in points in which their reliability can be tested that we may also rely on them when they testify to the miraculous acts of Jesus and His Resurrection from the dead?

The answer to these questions becomes highly important in view of such a position as that taken in Harnack's *What is Christianity?* (p. 28). "That a storm was quieted by a word

we do not believe, and we shall never again believe; but that the lame walked, the blind saw, and the deaf heard, will not be so summarily dismissed as an illusion." Now, St. Luke not only gives repeated instances of the healing of sick folk by our Lord, but also tells the story of the quieting of the storm. How far are we justified in saying that his evidence for the one event is as good as his evidence for the others? Harnack would draw distinctions between different kinds of miracles, between miracles of healing and miracles concerned with the forces of the natural world. If the possibility of such power in a unique personality be accepted in the former case, and St. Luke's testimony is so far admitted to be trustworthy, why should we not admit the possibility of even greater power in such a personality, and admit St. Luke's testimony as entirely trustworthy? The subject that is proposed for this essay has a close connection with the question of St. Luke's worth as a historian. Hardly a year passes now without the discovery of some new point in which the careful accuracy of his work in the Acts is further established. Professor Ramsay has demonstrated that St. Luke is to be placed "among the historians of the first

rank." * It is surely, then, fair to say that every added testimony to his credibility as the author of Acts is an added testimony to his credibility as the author of the Gospel, the narrator of the words and deeds of Jesus. In this connection the question *when* his two works were written becomes one of high importance. The nearer the historian stands—in point of time—to the events he narrates, the better his opportunity of giving a truthful record. It may be that the historian who is removed by years or centuries is in a better position to appreciate more fully the *significance* of the events: the *recording* of them is best done by the eye-witness or the writer who has access to first-hand information, whether it be in the form of written document or of oral tradition. To sum up this contention briefly. In view of St. Luke's proved accuracy in certain portions of Acts as a recorder of what he saw and what he heard, then, the earlier the date that can legitimately be assigned to the Acts and the Gospel, the higher the value of their account of our Lord's words and deeds.

The above statement contains the positions which, for the purpose of this discussion, will

* *St. Paul, the Traveller and the Roman Citizen*, p. 2.

be taken as axiomatic. We assume, as matters generally accepted by reasonable criticism, that the Third Gospel and the Acts are the work of the same hand, that the Gospel is prior in point of time, and that the author of the two works is St. Luke. If, then, a date can be fixed for the Gospel, Acts will be somewhat later; if, on the other hand, Acts can be dated, the Gospel must be assigned to a time before that date.

Sober criticism now concerns itself with three possible dates for the Acts—a late one, about 100 A.D., or the earlier years of the second century; an intermediate one, somewhere about 80 A.D.; and an early one, about 62 A.D. It is the object of this essay to estimate the respective claims of the second and third of these views. The first does not call for an elaborate discussion.

The reason for this apparently summary treatment of the latest suggested date lies in the fact that the argument on which it mainly rested has now been generally discarded. It was assumed that Acts shewed traces of dependence on the *Antiquities* of Josephus, which were written about 93 or 94 A.D., and that therefore time must be allowed for the author of Acts to have read this work. It has been urged that traces

of this dependence are visible in the choice and usage of particular words, and in the treatment of particular incidents. With regard to the *words*, it has been conclusively demonstrated that no valid argument can be based upon them. There is nothing convincingly distinctive about them; they are mostly ordinary words such as two historians, writing about the same time, in the same language, and with occasional reference to the same events, must of necessity have used. It is quite unwarrantable, for example, to argue the literary dependence of two historians on the ground of their common usage of such technical terms as ἀνθύπατος, κολωνία, νεωκόρος, ναύκληρος, σικάριος, στρατοπεδάρχης, τετραρχέω, or such very ordinary terms as ἐκέϊσε, πλοῦς, παροίχομαι, ἀποστέλλω, αὐξάνω. These are the common property of all classical writers. With regard to the record of particular incidents, two of the more important cases may be mentioned. One is the death of Herod Agrippa I., narrated in Acts 12 and by Josephus (*Ant.* xix. 8. 2). Zeller* refers to this, and emphasises the discrepancy between St. Luke and Josephus. Schürer,† on the other hand, points out how, in spite of many

* *Acts of the Apostles*, i. p. 233 (E.T.).

† Schürer, *The Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*, i. ii. p. 164 (E.T.).

variations, the two writers are "in thorough and detailed agreement on the principal points." This partial agreement and partial disagreement has been utilised by critics of different schools for their own purposes. The disagreement has been used as a proof of St. Luke's want of accuracy; the agreement has been used to prove his dependence on Josephus. It is obvious, however, that the argument cannot be valid in both directions at once.

The other crucial passage is the reference to the revolt of Theudas in the speech of Gamaliel in Acts 5³⁶. He speaks of it as coming *before* the revolt of Judas the Galilean; Josephus, however, reverses the order of the events, making the revolt of Theudas at least ten years after the revolt of Judas. It is now suggested that this is not a mere discrepancy, but that it rises from a misapprehension of Josephus by St. Luke. Josephus speaks of the revolt of Theudas; then, within twenty lines he makes a reference to "the sons of Judas of Galilee." It is assumed that St. Luke read the whole passage consecutively—jumped to the conclusion that the one event came after the other in chronological sequence; hence the mistake. With reference to this particular passage, it is suffi-

cient to remark that so slender is the connection that even Clemen, who still maintains the dependence of St. Luke on Josephus, is forced to admit that in this instance he had read Josephus but forgotten him. Schürer's conclusion* on the whole question is that either St. Luke "has taken no notice of Josephus at all, or at once forgot everything that he had read of him." St. Luke's independence of Josephus may be said to be demonstrated, and it is not the purpose of this essay to contend for positions that can now be regarded as secured, but to consider certain points that are still debated by a reasonable and cautious criticism.

The conviction of St. Luke's independence of Josephus leaves us free to consider the respective claims of the other two suggested dates—80 A.D. for Acts, with 75–80 A.D. for the Gospel, on the one hand; 62 A.D. for Acts, with *circa* 59–60 A.D. for the Gospel, on the other. Both these views have very powerful support, though it must be frankly admitted that the general tendency of recent English criticism is to support the former.

One point is worth notice in passing. Those who support the later of the two dates make the

* Quoted in Sanday, *Bampton Lecture*, p. 278.

Gospel the determining factor, and then, having settled its place, they assign Acts to a somewhat later period. The advocates of the earlier view first settle the place of Acts on grounds of (largely) internal evidence; the Gospel is then relegated to a period somewhat earlier. In order to clearly estimate the respective claims of the two points of view we will first state the main arguments for the later date; then consider the claims of the earlier one; and finally, reconsider the claims for the later date, to see whether the arguments advanced are really incontrovertible.

The advocates for the later date, then, begin by fixing the position of the Gospel. The two most important arguments are stated by Sanday;* one of subsidiary importance, but of considerable interest, is brought forward by Ramsay. Sanday's view is "(i) that the process described in the preface to the Gospel implies a longer period than would fall within the year A.D. 63; it is probable that the common basis of our three Synoptic Gospels was not committed to writing so early; and (ii) there is a rather strong presumption that the Gospel was written after, and not before, the fall of Jerusalem in

* *Bampton Lecture*, p. 278.

A.D. 70." Ramsay's argument* is based on the chronological passage in St. Luke 3¹. The year there referred to is called "the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius Cæsar." He holds that this description implies that the reign of Tiberius began in 12 A.D., when Tiberius was associated by Augustus in the Empire. But, he maintains, "such a method of reckoning the reign of Tiberius was unknown," and St. Luke could only have used it under the reign of some emperor whose years were reckoned from his association as colleague. This was the case with Titus. His reign began from his association with his father on July 1, 71 A.D. Ramsay thinks the chronological details would probably be inserted when the composition of the book was finished; hence we may infer that the Gospel was pretty well completed by the year 79-81 A.D., when Titus was sole emperor. His view of the Gospel is confirmed by his view of Acts. "Acts could not have been written so late as Trajan, when long persecution had altered the tone and feeling of the Church towards the State. It is the work of a man whose mind has been moulded in a more peaceful time, and who has not passed through a

* *St. Paul the Traveller*, p. 386.

time like the reign of Domitian. On the other hand, its tone is not that of assured conviction about the relation to the State such as we observe in St. Paul's Epistles. It is the tone of one who seeks to prove a position that is doubtful or assailed, but still of one who believes that it may be proved. As we have seen, there runs through the entire work a purpose which could hardly have been conceived before the State had begun to persecute on political grounds." Ramsay, then, would place the Gospel between 70 and 80 A.D., and the Acts about 80 A.D., thus agreeing in his general conclusions with Sanday.

We come now to the view that Acts was composed somewhere about 62 or 63 A.D. The arguments are of varying value, but the sum of them presents a very convincing case.

The first point is that in Acts we have no reference implicit or explicit to the martyrdom of St. Paul. This certainly took place before 70 A.D., and if Acts was not written till 80 A.D. it is remarkable that St. Luke makes not the slightest reference to it. [It should perhaps be mentioned here that Overbeck sees a distinct reference to St. Paul's death in Acts 20²⁵: "And now, behold, I know that ye all . . .

shall see my face no more." This view, however, is quite unlikely. The remark of Blass is much more likely to be correct, that St. Paul, indeed, used these words (Luke being present), but that after events did not justify them (*i.e.* the Ephesians *did* see his face again), but St. Luke at the time of writing was not aware of this. It has been urged * that the omission of any reference to St. Paul's martyrdom is remarkable even from the standpoint of the *structure* of Acts. There is supposed to be a parallelism of plan not only between the Acts and the Gospel, but also between the earlier and the later portions of Acts itself. In each we have an Introduction, a Ministry, a Passion, a Resurrection, a Deliverance. This suggested parallelism may be most briefly and clearly set out in a tabular form.

| | | Acts. | | |
|------------------|--|-----------------------------------|---|-------|
| | | Gospel. | Peter. | Paul. |
| Preparation | . . . 2 ²¹ -3 ²¹ | 1 | 12 | |
| Giving of Spirit | . . . 3 ²¹ . 2 ² | 2 ¹⁻¹³ | 13 ¹⁻⁴ | |
| Ministry | . . . 3 ²³ -2 ² | 2 ¹⁴ -11 ²⁶ | 13 ⁴ -19 ²⁰ | |
| Passion | . . . 22, 23 | 12 (impris.) | 19 ²¹ (bondage at Jerusalem) | |
| Deliverance | . . . 24 | 12 (escape) | 28 (delivered to Gentiles) | |

Now the whole of this scheme holds good *if*

* Rackham, *Journal of Theological Studies*, vol. i. p. 77.

Acts was written before the death of St. Paul. If it was written after St. Paul's death, it is urged that St. Luke has absolutely missed the finest—the most essential—point of the whole comparison, the death of Paul, which would match with the death of his Master as recorded in the Gospels.

This argument, from structure, cannot be pressed very far. It is easy to over emphasise such a thing as parallelism. It is quite probable that St. Luke may have perceived certain general resemblances in the careers of our Lord, of St. Peter, and of St. Paul; but to construct a scheme of St. Luke's history, and then to say that St. Paul's death, had it been known to the writer, *must* have fallen into its place in this scheme, seems somewhat arbitrary.

Again, this omission of any reference to the martyrdom of St. Paul is remarkable from the *personal* point of view. It is quite evident that in the latter part of Acts St. Paul is pre-eminently the hero. St. Luke is evidently his faithful companion—during a great part of his career—and his devoted admirer. Is it credible that St. Luke, in a history said to be written fourteen or fifteen years after St. Paul's death, should make no reference to it—should

not even give a hint that it was impending? This becomes all the more incredible when we reflect what an artist St. Luke was; what dramatic power he possessed; what an increasing weight of gloom seems to hang over our Lord, in the Gospel narrative, as He slowly draws near to the time of His Passion. It is not merely that Acts contains no definite statement about St. Paul's death; it is free from the remotest, most incidental allusion to it.

It has also been urged* that Acts must have been composed during St. Paul's first imprisonment; that is, before the trial and acquittal. Otherwise St. Luke has again lost a chance of his finest possible climax—St. Paul before Cæsar. This *may* be so, but must not be pressed too far. The arrival of the foremost defender and exponent of Christianity in Rome seems to be regarded as the fitting conclusion of the events the course of which he has been tracing.

It has been suggested that St. Luke intended to write a third book, and Ramsay is prepared to argue this from the use of *πρῶτον* in the first verse of Acts. He holds that if St. Luke had only contemplated two books he would have

* Rackham, *loc. cit.* p. 80.

used *πρότερον*,—that *πρῶτον* *must* mean “first in a series including more than two.” The inference from the grammatical point is very doubtful; but even assuming on this and other grounds that St. Luke *did* intend a third volume, it is still very incredible that the second book should contain no slightest hint of the momentous events that were to follow. For example, in recording the journey to Jerusalem, the travellers are full of forebodings as to the fate—the bonds and imprisonment that awaited St. Paul—his friends part from him with tears and regrets. But there is no hint of any such forebodings in the account of the journey to Rome. Could an artist like St. Luke have omitted, have failed to depict at least, some slight shadow of the coming doom?

Further, the whole tone of Acts—its whole point of view—is very difficult to reconcile with the later date. Throughout it the Roman Empire, as represented by its most prominent officials, is either friendly or at any rate not hostile to Christianity. Sergius Paulus, Gallio, the Asiarchs, the town-clerk of Ephesus, Felix, Festus, all take Paul’s side against his foes. Cornelius accepts Christianity, the Philippian

jailer and Julius the Centurion are kind to him. It is no exaggeration to say that throughout the history in Acts, Christianity is protected against its foes by the intervention of the Roman Empire. Nor does there seem to be a clear hint of any other attitude, in spite of Ramsay's statement that "its tone is not one of assured conviction about the relation to the State." If, then, we remember the events that took place between 62 A.D. and 80 A.D.—the persecution under Nero, especially the horrors that followed on the burning of Rome in 64 A.D., the deaths of St. Peter and St. Paul—is it possible that these events should not have left a deep and lasting impression on the mind of St. Luke, and that this impression should not have left its mark in some form or other on the Acts? The more carefully one reads Acts and tries to realise as a whole the impression that it leaves, the more one becomes convinced that St. Luke simply was not aware of this changed attitude of the Empire. The book is free from any suspicion of it.

A further point to be noted in this connection is the reference to the Jews. In the Acts they are the chief persecutors of the Christians—they and the city rabbles instigated by them. But

after the fall of Jerusalem in 70 A.D. all this was changed. The Jews themselves were crushed—and scattered; their city and temple were destroyed. But of this change also St. Luke gives no hint. Nowhere in the record of St. Paul's seizure in the temple, of the consequent riots and plots, is there the slightest hint of any doom overhanging the devoted city. And yet if Acts was not composed till ten years after the city's fall, St. Luke could hardly have failed to convey some hint of the impression that event had left upon him. Yet, here again, he seems to be absolutely unaware of the event.

In spite of Ramsay's view to the contrary, one cannot help feeling that, in so far as the Acts is an apologia for Christianity, it might claim to fulfil that part before 64 A.D.—that is, before Nero's outbreak and the subsequent proclamation of Christianity as a *religio illicita*—much better than it ever could after. St. Paul had appealed to Cæsar; and the two years during which the trial was pending would be quite the most appropriate time for the production of an apologia—especially when one bears in mind the hostile influence the Jews might exert at Court through the support of Poppæa.

The extreme view of the Tübingen school,

that Acts is an eirenicon between Pauline and Petrine factions is no longer tenable. But a careful reading of Acts can hardly fail to leave the impression that St. Luke is very jealous for the honour of St. Paul, and very anxious to completely vindicate his place as an apostle on an equality with the Twelve. It has been suggested * that if he wrote his history so late as 80 A.D. he might well have vindicated this claim in the most convincing manner by shewing how St. Peter and St. Paul after lives of Christian service had together won the crown of martyrdom.

Two other points may be briefly mentioned. The first is the question of the relation of Acts to the Pauline Epistles. The discrepancies between them on certain points are so great as to make it practically certain that they are independent. This independence is so marked, for example, in the case of the visits to Jerusalem, as to make the task of reconciliation a very difficult one. Now, if St. Luke wrote Acts so late as 80 A.D., he must have had time to have access to copies of these Epistles and to harmonise his statements with theirs. If, on the other hand, he wrote before the death of St. Paul,

* Rackham, *loc. cit.* p. 84.

the Pauline Epistles would not at that early date have risen to such a position of pre-eminence as they afterwards occupied,—they would still have rather the character of occasional documents—the property of the Churches to which they were sent; they would hardly have come to be regarded as materials for the writing of Church history.

The second question is that concerned with the text of Acts. Whether we accept or reject Blass's theory of two texts—an earlier draft and a revised edition—as embodied in the “Western” variants of the Codex Bezae and the Neutral text—we are still left face to face with the fact that the text of Acts as we have it is in certain places marked by roughness and obscurity.* Ramsay, who fully recognises these marks of incompleteness, suggests that the reason lay “perhaps in the author's martyrdom under Domitian.” Is it not at any rate equally probable, if the foregoing arguments are valid, that the reason lay in the author's martyrdom under Nero?

These, then, are the main arguments—from the side of Acts—for an earlier date. The apparent ignorance of the death of St. Peter and

* *E.g.* 5¹²⁻¹⁵ 12²⁵ 13^{42, 43} 15³³ 16^{19, 20} 18¹⁸ 20³⁻⁵.

St. Paul; the apparent ignorance of the fall of Jerusalem; the strongly prevalent view of the Roman Empire as a friend, and of the Jews as persecutors; the opportunity for literary composition during St. Paul's two years' imprisonment—the especial fitness of such an apologia at such a crisis; the independence of the Pauline Epistles—all combine to suggest a date about 62 A.D.*

It now remains for us to face the consequences of this conclusion. If Acts be assigned to 62 A.D., the Gospel must be earlier: it must be *before* the fall of Jerusalem; it must—even in view of the statements in the preface to the Gospel—be put not later than 58–60 A.D. Here we come face to face with the chief arguments—from the side of the Gospel—for demanding the later date. Do these arguments amount to insuperable difficulties? Are they so powerful as to compel us perforce to surrender all the conclusions we have arrived at from our study of Acts?

Let us examine them in detail. The argument about our Lord's words with reference to the fall of Jerusalem is based on a comparison

* The passage in Iren. *Hæres.* III. i. 1 is too vague to be conclusive. And it is open to question whether *ἐξόδος* in the passage means "decease."

of St. Luke 21²⁰⁻²⁵ with St. Mark 13¹⁴⁻²⁴ and St. Matthew 24¹⁵⁻²⁹. In this connection St. Luke 19^{43, 44} is also very important.

This passage about the siege of Jerusalem forms part of the common tradition. It is recorded by St. Matthew, St. Mark, and St. Luke. But there are differences in detail. St. Matthew and St. Mark both speak of "the abomination of desolation." St. Luke speaks of "Jerusalem compassed with armies." St. Matthew and St. Mark both have the words, "let him that readeth understand." St. Luke omits them. St. Matthew (24²⁹) has the word "immediately," which St. Mark and St. Luke omit. As, however, there is some doubt about the reading this last point need not be pressed. The argument from this comparison is, that St. Luke's version of the common tradition has been affected by the witnessed realisation of the prophecy; in other words, that he gives this more specific, less obscure version of our Lord's words—because he knew of the fall of Jerusalem as an accomplished fact. The question is: Does this consequence inevitably follow from the above comparison?

It may be remarked in passing that this is no question of the possibility or impossibility of predictive prophecy with reference to our Lord.

The view that St. Luke's words shew that the fall of Jerusalem was an established fact is held by scholars who would be the last to deny such a power to our Lord. It is purely a question of criticism, and must be argued as such.

Let us approach it from the side of the Synoptic problem. It is generally admitted now that St. Mark's version of the common tradition has the strongest claim to being primitive, that St. Matthew and St. Luke used St. Mark's Gospel, or one closely resembling it, in the construction of their own narratives. It is also generally admitted that St. Matthew wrote his Gospel for Jewish readers, and that St. Luke wrote his for Gentiles. Taking these conclusions for granted, we may make the following hypothesis about the passage before us.

St. Mark's version gives the nearest approximation to the words as they fell from the lips of our Lord. He simply speaks of "the abomination of desolation standing where he [A.V. "it"] ought not."* These words were not only ill-omened, but very mysterious: it was felt that they needed explanation, and it was in no way contrary to the literary habit of the time to incorporate some such explanatory addition with

* St. Mark 13¹⁴.

the words themselves. Further, when the words for some time were preserved in the form of an oral tradition the explanatory gloss might very easily become incorporated in the tradition. It would seem that the writer of the First Gospel, writing for Jews, felt the need of an explanatory addition that would appeal directly to them. Hence for St. Mark's vague "where he ought not" he substitutes "in the holy place," a change which would give to the prophecy, in the ears of a Jew, a meaning terrible and unmistakable.

But St. Luke, writing for Gentile readers, also felt that the mysterious prophecy needed explanation. How was he to interpret it to them? "Abomination of desolation" was an unintelligible term; the presence of such a thing "in the holy place" had no such ring of infinite horrible desecration as it would have in the ears of a Jew. Hence the prophecy must be interpreted in terms intelligible to Gentiles. Where was such an explanation to be found? Obviously in the circumstances with reference to which, in the Book of Daniel, the words were written about the "Abomination of desolation"—the capture of Jerusalem by Antiochus Epiphanes, when the city was taken, many thousands of the people massacred, and the

temple robbed of its treasure. Here was sufficient explanatory material for the significance of our Lord's mysterious words. St. Luke's Gentile readers might not know what was meant by an "abomination of desolation": they certainly knew what was meant by the sack of a city by an invading army. In other words, if it be true that St. Luke is "looking backward" when he pens his version of our Lord's words, it is not to the capture of Jerusalem by Titus that his gaze is directed, but to its overthrow and desecration by Antiochus Epiphanes. He interprets our Lord's words in the light of the passage in Daniel to which our Lord Himself refers.

It may, however, legitimately be questioned whether St. Luke is "looking backward" at all. With the words of our Lord's prophecy before him, and events in Palestine going on as they were doing around him, it did not need superhuman sagacity to predict the particular mode in which our Lord's words would find their fulfilment. If (as seems probable) St. Luke collected the materials for his Gospel during St. Paul's imprisonment at Cæsarea, which covered the last two years of Felix's term of office, he could hardly fail to notice the way in which affairs were hastening to a catastrophe. The

misgovernment of Felix, the growing irritation of the Jews, the constant uprisings under various insurgent leaders, could have been but one consequence. An effort was made on the part of the imperial authorities to heal the wounds, by sending Festus, who came specially charged to appease the Jews ; but the matter had gone too far. The only resort left open to Rome was the absolute subjugation of the Jews. But St. Luke, writing during the procuratorship of Felix, could not fail to see the end, and so declared what he saw in words intelligible to his Gentile hearers.

One or two more points remain to be dealt with in connection with this important passage. St. Matthew and St. Mark both give the words : "let him that readeth understand" ; St. Luke omits them. It has been suggested that this warning is omitted by St. Luke because the prophecy had found its fulfilment in the fall of Jerusalem, and therefore the warning was no longer necessary. But may it not be the case that St. Luke, having, by his own explanatory paraphrase of our Lord's words, to a certain extent cleared the passage of its mystery, felt that this warning injunction to readers "to understand" was no longer necessary ? That is, the substitution on St. Luke's part of "Jerusalem

compassed by armies" for "the abomination of desolation standing where he ought not" is a sufficient reason for the omission of the injunction "let him that readeth understand."

A further point may be mentioned in support of the view that St. Luke had the passage in Daniel (9²⁷) in mind when he gave his "explanatory" version of our Lord's words. The full sentence in St. Luke is: "But when ye see Jerusalem compassed with armies, then know that her *desolation* is at hand." The occurrence of this word in his "explanatory" version would seem to shew that he had pondered over the phrase "abomination of *desolation*," both in its context in the common tradition and in its context in Daniel, and had then conveyed into his version not only a view as to the *mode* in which the desolation would be wrought, but the actual word itself.

One word must be said about St. Luke 19^{43, 44}; "For the days shall come, when thine enemies shall cast up a bank about thee, and compass thee round, and keep thee in on every side, and shall dash thee to the ground, and thy children within thee; and they shall not leave in thee one stone upon another; because thou knewest not the time of thy visitation." It has

been urged that these words shew that the siege of Jerusalem was an accomplished fact. But this, again, is hardly necessary. It is not improbable that in this passage our Lord is freely adapting the words of Isaiah 29^{f.}: "And I will camp against thee round about, and will lay siege against thee with a fort, and I will raise siege works against thee. And thou shalt be brought down, and shalt speak out of the ground. . . ." It is obvious that this passage is quite as clear in its details as are any of the passages in St. Luke.

This point leads to a further remark, applicable to both the passages in St. Luke. They are, after all, quite *general* in their phraseology, and can be paralleled in nearly every detail by Old Testament passages. In addition, for instance, to the above passage from Isaiah, we may also quote Isaiah 5⁵: "I will tell you what I will do to my vineyard: I will take away the hedge thereof, and it shall be eaten up; I will break down the fence thereof, and it shall be trodden down: and I will lay it waste." Psalm 137⁹: "Happy shall he be, that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the rock"; Zechariah 12³: "And it shall come to pass in that day, that I will make Jerusalem a burdensome stone for all

the peoples, . . . and all the nations of the earth shall be gathered together against it." It is needless to multiply passages: the above are at any rate sufficient to prove the point that our Lord's prophecy as recorded by St. Luke finds many parallels couched in equally specific phraseology in Old Testament prophecy.

Another side of this contention has been well worked out by Blass. If St. Luke really wrote his version of this passage after the fall of Jerusalem in the light of the accomplished fact, why has he not given more precise detail—as he might well have done—to shew that the prophecy had here found its fulfilment? Why did he not speak definitely of the Romans and Titus? If he wished—writing after the event—to illustrate the meaning of "abomination of desolation," why did he not give some detailed reference to the horrors of the siege, and especially of the burning of the temple? But there is not a single word in either of these prophetic passages which cannot be well accounted for by a reference to the original passage in Daniel, and to other passages of Old Testament prophecy. The suggestion, therefore, that the words were penned after the destruc-

tion of Jerusalem is not required by the words themselves.

The other difficulty that presents itself for discussion is the preface to St. Luke's Gospel. It is held that the words "Forasmuch as many have taken in hand to draw up a narrative concerning those matters . . ." demand the lapse of a longer space of time than that between 30 A.D., the date of the crucifixion, and 59 A.D., the approximate time of St. Paul's imprisonment at Cæsarea (according to Lightfoot's chronology). But is this necessarily the case? According to the view we stated above, the writer of the First Gospel and St. Luke have probably used St. Mark's Gospel, which must therefore be placed before 59 A.D. Can it be placed so early? We know that St. Mark was taken by St. Paul and St. Barnabas on the First Missionary Journey, but left them at an early stage. This would be somewhere about 48 A.D. About 51 A.D. he went with St. Barnabas to Cyprus. We do not know how long this visit lasted. The main point is that there is an interval of about ten years between St. Mark's separation from St. Paul and the date we are inclined to suggest for St. Luke's Gospel. It is surely not improbable that during a good part of that period St. Mark

may have been exercising his function as “interpreter” * to St. Peter, and may have drawn up during that period, from St. Peter’s lips, his narrative of our Lord’s life. It was to the house of St. Mark’s mother † that St. Peter made his way on his release from prison in Jerusalem; St. Mark, “my son,” is the last person referred to by St. Peter in the closing verses of his Epistle. ‡ Hence we are justified in inferring that the connection between them had been intimate throughout. It is also very probable that at a very early date a desire would arise for a *written* record of the main facts of our Lord’s life,—in fact, for some Christian Scriptures. “Critics who postpone the publication of the Synoptic Gospels to the latter part of the first century, or later, hardly realise the urgency of this demand.” § It certainly seems arbitrary to say that in the years that elapsed between 30 A.D. and 59 A.D. there was not time for the process indicated in St. Luke 1¹—“many have taken in hand . . .”—to have both been started and considerably advanced.

We conclude, then, that neither the words of our Lord’s prophecy with reference to Jerusalem,

* Eusebius, *Hist.* iii. 39.

† 1 Peter 5¹⁴.

‡ Acts 12¹².

§ Rendall, *Acts*, p. 12.

nor the words of St. Luke's preface, constitute an insuperable difficulty in the way of accepting the earlier date. The argument seems to resolve itself into this form : The contents of Acts imperatively demand an early date—about 62 A.D. This involves placing the Gospel at a somewhat earlier date : there is no conclusive argument from the side of the Gospel to oppose this earlier date ; hence it has very strong claims to consideration.

One word more may be said as to the general probabilities of the case. From the time of St. Luke's meeting with St. Paul at Troas he seems to have been his lifelong friend and devoted companion. There were intervals when he was absent from him. He was certainly *with* him on part of the Second Missionary Journey—on the journey to Jerusalem ; and, in fact, from this time onward continuously till the end of the record in Acts. Now, he would be in fullest sympathy with St. Paul's evangelistic work ; in fullest sympathy with his fellow-Gentiles who were accepting the Word of Life. The Christians of the Macedonian and Asiatic Churches, amongst whom he himself had worked as an evangelist, had no written Gospel worthy of the name. "The demand for Christian Scriptures

was already urgent amidst the multitude of Greek believers who had been trained in the synagogue upon the Jewish Scriptures, and were now flocking thence into the Pauline Churches.”* St. Luke, acting under the guidance and with the aid of St. Paul, felt called to the task of providing these Gentile Churches with a permanent record of our Lord’s life and words. Now, in St. Luke’s life as we know it there was no other opportunity so well suited for this work as the period of St. Paul’s imprisonment at Cæsarea. It was a time of cessation from active work ; St. Paul was allowed free intercourse with his friends ; St. Luke was in near proximity to the localities of the sacred history ; he was in personal contact with those who “from the beginning were eye-witnesses and ministers of the Word.” Two years under these conditions were an ideal period for the performance of such a task. Similarly at Rome : there was again a period of inactivity ; St. Paul in *libera custodia*, St. Luke with leisure for literary composition—for drawing up for Theophilus a record of the Church’s progress so far as it had hitherto advanced, a record which should emphasise the picture of Paul the Roman citizen,

* Rendall, *Acts*, p. 12.

protected by Roman proconsuls, wantonly persecuted by Jewish crowds. The circumstances are most suitable to the production of the works; the works, as we have them, seem to be exactly such as might have been produced under the circumstances. We therefore conclude that, in the present state of our knowledge, there are reasonable grounds for maintaining that the Gospel of St. Luke was probably composed during St. Paul's imprisonment at Cæsarea between the years 58 and 60 A.D., and that the Acts of the Apostles was composed by St. Luke at Rome not later than the year 63 A.D.

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CHAPTER II

THE GOSPEL AND THE LAW

IN his teaching Jesus took his stand, as we have seen, upon the Old Testament. He did not aim to introduce a wholly new religion. He clearly foresaw that some of his disciples would suppose that it was his purpose to break with the Old Testament system, and he warned them against this serious mistake by telling them that any of them who should feel themselves free to break the least commandment of the Old Testament law, and should teach others accordingly, should be called the least in the Kingdom of God (Mt. v. 19). His constant manner of speaking in regard to the Jewish religion and Scriptures shows the reverence in which he held them.¹

There is in one of his parables a significant expression in regard to the gradual progress of his truth in the world: "First the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear" (Mk. iv. 28). This statement might be fitly applied to the whole process of revelation of which the Old Testament represents the earlier stages. It would as truly describe Jesus' idea of this process as it does the growth to which he immediately applied it. The Old Testament represents the first steps in a great course of revelation and redemption which reaches its consummation in Christ himself.

While, therefore, Jesus builds upon the Jewish religious system, he also builds far above and beyond it. While

¹ On this subject I would refer the reader to the following discussions: R. Mackintosh, *Christ and the Jewish Law*, 1886; E. Schürer, *Die Predigt Jesu Christi in ihrem Verhältniss zum alten Testament und zum Judenthum*, 1882; W. Bousset, *Jesu Predigt in ihrem Gegensatz zum Judenthum*, 1892; L. Jacob, *Jesu Stellung zum mosaischen Gesetz*, 1893.

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